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ABSTRACT 
Approaching Cognitive-Behavioral and Existential Therapy 
Through Neo-Confucianism (December 1984). 
Joffre Denis Meyer, B. A. , Texas ARM University 
Chairman of Graduate Committee: Dr. William R. Nash 
The thesis is an effort to bring Neo-Confucian 
insights to modern cognitive-behavioral and existential 
therapy. The adaptability of Neo-Confucianism is illus- 
trated through the growth-system inherent in its concepts. 
Frequently, Neo-Confucian sages and modern psychologists 
used virtually identical statements. Moreover, humanity 
faces the same basic issues while the particularizations 
vary. The importance of reason, manners, appropriate 
behavior and self-actualization remains constant. 
However, the methods of their attainment change with 
time. The history of the Confucian/Neo-Confucian tra- 
dition is filled with such conceptual modifications. 
Neo-Confucianism is a syncretic philosophy that 
utilized elements of Zen, Taoism, and Legalism within 
Confucian teachings. This adaptation in'creased the 
sages' ability to communicate with a wider range of 
people. In effect, the Neo-Confucian movement was 
perhaps the earliest practice of eclectic counseling. 
Neo-Confucianism itself has undergone development from 
its eleventh-century origins to the present-day scholarly 
journals. 
The researcher does not believe the key issue in inter- 
disciplinary studies is whether psychology is being applied 
to philosophy or vice-versa. Neo-Confucianism pragmatically 
asserts that the true test of a philosophy rests in its 
ability to help the individual. Mere intellectual exercise 
contradicts the unity of knowledge and action. 
The thesis has five chapters. The existential therapy 
chapter uses a predominantly Western psychology format while 
the cognitive-behavioral therapy chapter uses Wang Yang- 
ming's Four Axiom Teaching as an outline. 
The thesis also includes Neo-Confucian cognitive-moral 
development observations reminescent of Lawrence Kohlberg's 
stage theories. Neo-Confucianism could be described as an 
education in evolving from preconventional to principled 
reasoning. Occasional parallels are drawn between process 
philosophy and Neo-Confucianism as well. 
There is also a chapter in which Confucian commentaries 
are provided to actual case studies faced by Albert Ellis 
and Maxie Maultsby. A Chinese glossary is provided at the 
end of the introduction. There are five figures in the 
text, two of which are summarizing models in the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
In the realm of ideas, the world has always been a 
small place. Ancience Greek and Roman merchants returned 
home to tell stories about "The Silk People", inhabitants 
of a mysterious but respectable land in the East. Several 
centuries later, Christian missionaries developed mixed 
emotions toward these same Chinese. Some clergymen saw 
Confucian texts as inspired by God, a type of universalism 
through a shared Law-Giver. This moverment was called 
Figuratism, and included among its ranks, the Catholic, 
Joseph de Premare, S. J. (Mungello, 1976). Other clerics 
cursed the books as purveyors of subtle agnosticism and 
abstruse metaphysics (Ching, 1977). Philosophers of the 
European Enlightenment hailed the Orient for developing an 
ethical system, with minimal religious overtones. 
Hoever, Europeans of the Nineteenth-Century snubbed 
the Oriental mind for not starting the industrial revolu- 
tion. Cheng (1984) sees the Western philosophies as the 
leading edge of a desire to "impress and conquer the 
Orient" in a quest for politico-economic power. A trickle 
of Eastern thought began seeping into America in the 
This thesis follows the style of the Journal of Counselin Ps cholo 
1960s, but only Zen and Taoism. This condition seems to 
reflect the weakness and tension of modern Western social 
structures. Few professional philosophers or psychologists 
heed its presence (Cheng, 1984). 
Yet, a turning point may be nearing. Japan gives credit 
to its Confucian background for modern success (Halberstam, 
1983). How can the West continue to study Japanese manage- 
ment, electronics, and auto-making while ignoring its, 
philosophy? The thought of a society is logically prior 
to its material products. This thesis is an effort to in- 
tegrate Neo-Confucianism with Cognitive-Behavioral and 
Existential Therapy, yet the researcher sees that his 
research can only be an introduction to such a vast under- 
taking. It is realized that Oriental thought faces a blend 
of complacency and criticism from Western scientists and 
philosophers, who claim that it is merely a cultural phen- 
omenon. Such a premature closure degrades the potential 
of communicating an integrated human experience (Chang, 
1984). 
A prime tenet of the journal, Philoso h East and 
West, is that true philosophy is comparative. Cheng (1984) 
believes understanding is dependent upon comparison. 
In this manner, the strengths and weaknesses of each 
tradition can be assessed from an objective third 
stance. The issue concerning whether human nature is 
good or bad did not occur in ancient Greece. Also, will 
as a faculty was not discussed by Plato (Chang, 1963) . 
The Chinese saw a very close connection between willing 
and knowing, a common outlook in cognitive psychology, 
In fact, the word ~i means both intention and thought 
(Ching, 1973) . 
Whereas some gaps in language remain unavoidable, 
an interpenetration of philosophical vocabulary can serve 
to enrich human awareness (Cheng, 1974a). A critical look 
needs to be taken at Neo-Confucianism as well (Cheng, 
1984) . The discriminatory practices of males toward fe- 
males were commonplace in ancient times, both East and 
West. Such biases were reflective of folk traditions 
and not the Confucian philosophical system itself . Ob- 
viously, some aspects of Chinese philosophy need to be 
ignored as relics of a bygone era (Ching, 1977) . It is 
doubtful that any Chinese philosopher would subscribe to 
such an outlook today. 
Definin Neo-Confucianism 
The task of defining Neo-Confucianism will take the 
form of a description. Neo-Confucianism can be conceived 
as a "metaphysical humanism, " a "philosophical anthro- 
pology, " an "existential phenomenology, " or a "cognitive- 
behaviorism. " 
Its concern with man in the world in relation to 
others makes it a humanism or a philosophical anthropology 
(Jung, 1966) . The Buddhist ideal of the monastic life is 
abhorrent to the Confucian/Neo-Confucian tradition. The 
interest in finding the principle of Heaven (t' ien-li), 
and sincerity (c~h'en ) as a means for participating in 
the transcendent creative (~shen ) force of the cosmos, 
reflects its metaphysical bent (Liu, 1972a). 
The observation that intentionality (Zi) is a reac- 
tion to objects in consciousness (hsin) is phenomenologi- 
cal (Jung, 1965) . Neo-Confucianism and existential ther- 
apy share a concern for the dilemma of freedom and will, 
together with its possible resolution through self- 
ct li* tints (c~h'1st-h 'n ) (Ni i on, 1973). fts foc 
pon 'nnat c Nnitions (Nf- " ), pptop at css (i) a 
n nina and applic hilicy, and onsci cs (1~is -chin) 
are some of its cognitive psychological aspects. The 
emphasis upon manners (li ) the unity of knowledge and 
action (chih hain ho-i), and setting goals (li-chih) 
reveal a strong behaviorist trend. 
Historical Develo ent of Neo-Confucianism 
Neo-Confucianism differs from Confucianism in its 
addition of metaphysical and epistemological theories to 
antiquated Confucian doctrines. These changes reflect 
influence from Taoism, Buddhism (particularly Zen and 
Hua-yen) and to a lesser extent, Legalism. A whole new 
range of potential was opened to the Neo-Confucian 
philosophy, while keeping the same terminology (Chan, 
1967b). 
(principle) was developed late in Neo- 
Confucianism. It had appeared in anti-Confucian texts 
originally. Ch'eng I (1033-1107) was chiefly responsible 
for the new outlook on li (principle) . This view con- 
siders principle to be an ordering pattern, an ultimate 
transcendent source, a type of form or reason (Chan, 
1967b). Li is the potential for new things to appear, 
through logical priority (Tong, 1982) . 
The name "Neo-Confucianism" itself is something of 
a misconception perpetrated by well-meaning Europeans. 
De Bary (1981) writes that the Chinese preferred not to 
reflect a debt to any single philosopher. Neo- 
Confucianism was generally called, "The School of Human 
Confucius is considered to be the greatest teacher/ 
philosopher in Chinese history (Chen, 1976), The most 
influential sages lived 1500 to 1900 years after Con- 
fucius. (6th cent. BC) . Yet they endeavored to express 
the spirit of Confucius and Mencius (3rd cent. BC) 
through frequent quotations within a syncretic structure. 
These philosophers included Chang Tsai (1020-1077), 
Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085), Ch'eng I (1033-1107), Chu Hsi 
(1130-1200), Lu Hsiang-hsan (1139-1193) and Wang Yang-ming 
(1472-1529) . The two ma]or Neo-Confucian schools were 
the Ch'eng-Chu and the Lu-Wang. The investigator regrets 
not having the chance to discuss many of the later sages . 
However, there is a discussion of the merchant class ethic 
in Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868). 
The reader may ask, "Why should anyone try to apply 
philosophy? Is not philosophy a task for medieval monks 
or gentile game for vain pedantic obscurantists'(" The 
answer emphatically, "No!" 
Neo-Confucianism was not a game but the state philos- 
ophy six and one-half centuries (de Bary, 1981). Host 
sages served in government. Wang Yang-ming was an out- 
standing general (Chan, 1972). The commentaries to the 
Classics was the basis for civil service examinations. 
No other religious or philosophical tradition in the 
history of the world stressed scholarship as much as 
Neo-Confucianism (de Bary, 1983). 
~KC c t 
Neo-Confucianism is a philosophy that staunchly op- 
poses "philosophizing, " The starting point is conscience 
(~la — h h) d ts t c (ch'h ). Ch g (1974) 
d s 1h t!l th e f cet *f ~14 — h'h: "(1) th *h'1- 
ity to know what are the first moral principles, (2) the 
ability to identify relevant information for moral evalua- 
tion, and (3) the ability to correctly relate moral 
principles to particular facts for correct moral judge- 
ments" (p. 82). 
L~h h mbi es so d i nlf. t' 't 
decision-making. Carsun Chang (1963) defines intuition as 
kind of knowing by direct apprehension and not by in- 
ference or experimentation" (p. 102) . Chang also stated 
that intuition includes every cognitive process except 
reason, a wider range than the European understanding of 
intuition. It can be developed through control of de- 
sires, singleness of purpose and going beyond habitual 
world outlooks. 
The inborn nature of man is assumed to be the 
grounds for certain positive behaviors. The classic 
example given by Mencius (4th Cent. BC) persuades us to 
imagine what they will feel immediately, when a child 
is seen suddenly about to fall in a well (Chang, 1974a) . 
This feeling is sympathy or commiseration, an instinctive 
readiness to help. Mencius called sympathy the beginning 
(tuan) of benevolence (jen), the first virtue to develop 
(Chan, 1967a) . 
Part of the beauty of Confucianism/Neo-Confucianism 
as a philosophy, is its disdain for the overly abstract 
tools of Western logic (Chang, 1984). The simple wisdom 
of Mencius is at once intuitive and empirical. Western 
logic can be so removed from everyday experience that it 
seems to be intended for the intellectual amusement of 
the select few. 
Self- tn 1 eet' (~ch' n-tl ' l. geh d, 
possible for all people who try to correct their errors 
and fulfill potentialities (Ching, 1973) . In fact the 
Ch' ee word, e~h''en-h n, 1 te'relly n e "f llilll g 
form, ". or "actualization the human design" (Tu, 1978) . 
The views of Wang Yang-ming and Carl Rogers (1961) are 
nearly identical in this regard. 
Goal of the Thesis 
The objective of this project is not as complicated 
as it may appear at first glance. The goal of the thesis 
is to show the similarities between Neo-Confucianism and 
current psychological thought; both cognitive-behavioral 
and existential. Once initial correlations are es- 
tablished, a wealth of information can be contributed to 
contemporary psychology in the East and West. Neo- 
Confucianism can be applied through proving its theoreti- 
cal compatibility with previously empirically validated 
concepts and methods in psychology. The next stage for 
incorporating Neo-Confucianism into psychology is testing 
the former discipline's unique contributions that go be- 
yond the initial correspondence with psychology. 
The "initial correlagion" stage is finding essential- 
ly identical passages in both Confucian and psychology 
texts. The researcher is happy to admit that the task 
is like "fishing in a bucket" that is well-stocked. The 
following example pertains to cognitive therapy. Aaron T. 
Beck (1976) wrote, "Whenever you experience an unpleasant 
feeling or sensation, try to recall what thought you had 
been having prior to this feeling. " (p. 33) Chang Tsai 
wrote, "Whenever in our effort at thinking we come to 
some thing that cannot be expressed in words, we must 
think it over carefully and sift it again and again" 
(de Bary, 1983, p . 61) . 
The "unique contribution" stage is a study of Neo- 
Confucian concepts that are related to one's initial 
perception. Examining the Neo-Confucian creed of pair- 
ing thought/will (~i) with discernment (club ) through 
content and semantic analysis yields fruitful results 
(Chang, 1979a). A thought with minimal awareness or faulty 
discernment is expressed as an "automatic thought" in 
Beck's (1976) cognitive therapy. 
Furthermore, the thesis invites the reader to ex- 
perience the teachings for oneself. Bugental (1965) 
viewed his own book as raw material for another therapist 
to ingest, assuming that some aspects would be rejected 
and other positions assimilated. He holds a mistrust 
for the counselor who is a complete disciple of any 
other one. 
The colloquial-sounding term "getting it oneself" 
(tzu-te ) isa key factor in understanding Neo-Confucianism b 
(de Bary, 1983) . Understanding of a philosophy or 
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counseling method comes with the internalization and 
practice of theories, not by the memorization or recita- 
tion of sentences. Tzu-te is both an educational and a 
philosophical concept; a frequent occurrence in Neo- 
Confucianism (de Bary, 1983) . Tzu-te has also been de- 
scribed as self-realizing through appropriate (i) con- 
duct; a bestowing or deriving of meaning from a situation 
(Hall & Ames, 1984) . 
Cheng (1984) proclaims that Chinese philosophy is 
not to be copied from the past, but should be the product 
of a "creative and self-reflective spirit" and a "critical 
and innovative mind" (p. 3) . Study without discovery 
renders a text as a "dry, expository skeleton" where the 
symbol replaces reality (Weisman, 1965) . Neither this 
thesis nor any psychology or philosophy book should be 
viewed as a static entity . If the nature of reality and 
the self is change, then so is written learning. 
The Twelfth-Century Neo-Confucian anthology, 
Reflections on Thin s at Hand, is more about the example 
and personal experiences of contemporary Sung masters, 
than the ancients upon whom they were writing commentaries 
(de Bary, 1983) . It should be noted that we are far less 
separated in time with the Sung (960-1279) and Ming 
(1368-1644) sages than they were from Confucius (5th 
cent. BC) and Mencius (3rd cent. BC) . The Sung and Ming 
philosophers illustrated the relevance of sagehood through 
characteristics of the times. People could identify with 
present-day philosophers and still keep their individu- 
ality. The reality of principle is in each person, a 
foundation of self-actualization and a drive for its 
attainment (de Bary, 1983). 
A book marks a step along the way of an infinite 
learning process, engaged by the academic. Bugental 
(1965) mentions that "any statement made must be the 
statement of what was thought rather than current 
thinking" (p. 6). The researcher's outlook on Neo- 
Conficianism has evolved through his studies. Gradually, 
the investigator has noticed the behavioristic tenden- 
cies in Neo-Confucianism and existentialism. Originally, 
the researcher. was more inclined to see the cognitive 
and metaphysical aspects. A strong interest developed 
in the relationship between chih (learning) 
epistemological concept, and chih (wisdom) 
the ethics. 
an 
one of 
A roach of Thesis 
Finally, the investigator arrives at the list of 
chapters in his thesis, following this introductory chap- 
ter. The second chapter covers existentialism — both 
the philosophy and the therapy, and Neo-Confucianism. 
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The third chapter attempts to apply Neo-Confucianism to 
the cognitive/rational-emotive therapies of the emotional 
disorders . The fourth chapter is two case studies and 
includes Neo-Confucian commentaries by the researcher 
on sample case studies faced by two cognitive-behavioral 
counselors: Albert Ellis (1971) and Maxie Naultsby 
, in Goodman and Kaultsby. (197S). 
Validation of Neo-Confucianism will be partly, evi- 
denced by its utilization in counseling at present. In 
other words, proven techniques under different titles 
should show clear similarities to Neo-Confucianism. The 
discussion of the "initial correlation" stage in research 
alluded to this theory . 
The author believes the greatest challenge of his 
project will be using English that does not read like a 
stilted translation of Chinese. The author will use dif- 
ferent English synonyms for a given Chinese concept in 
order to better reflect its meaning in a specific con- 
text. The reader will need to pay attention to the 
Chinese word in parenthensis. When a Chinese concept 
has been used repeatedly in a specific section, the 
English translation will no longer be given. Hopefully 
this procedure will be conducive to an interpenetration 
of philosophical vocabulary and interesting reading. 
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Definition of Terms 
The following list of terms and definitions form a 
"Chinese Glossary" for the thesis. Host sources are the 
glossary sections of large books, although attention has 
been given to explanations appearing in journal articles, 
whether through specific or contextual delineations (Chan, 
1967a, 1967b; Chang, 1955; Cheng, 1972b, 1979a; Ching, 1973, 
1976; Cua, 1971a, 1971b; deBary, 1981; Hall 8 Ames, 1984; 
Jung, 1966; Tu, 1972, 1978). The concepts are listed in the 
order of their presentation in the thesis. The superscripts 
are used for concepts with identical transliterations, but 
different meanings and characters in Chinese. The more im- 
portant concepts are labelled "a" regardless of their order 
in the thesis. 
yi 
t' ien-li 
ch'eng 
sheng 
hain a 
ch'ien-hsing 
yi -nien . b 
i (yi) 
liang-chih 
thoughts, intentionality as a reaction to objects, will 
principle of Heaven 
sincerity 
creativity, life force 
mind, consciousness, mind-and-heart 
self-actualization, fulfilling the 
human design 
intention-thoughts 
appropriateness, fitness, rightness, justice, righteousness; one of the Five Virtues principle 
conscience, knowing-the-good, consci- 
entious consciousness 
l. b decorum, manners, etiquette, propriety; 
one of the Five Virtues; politeness, 
customs, ritual 
chih hsing ho-i 
li -chih 
] a 
hsing -li -hsueh b . a 
chih 
tuan 
j en 
chih 
tzu-te 
chih 
li -i-f en-shu ~ a 
hsin b 
chung 
shu 
te 
pen-t ' i 
yi -tuan ~ c 
unity of knowledge and action 
fixing the determination, making a 
resolution 
principle, reason 
The School of Human Nature g Principle; Neo-Confucianism 
extension, development, pursuing 
beginning, seed 
benevolence, love, good will, "the first 
virtue, " humanity, human-heartedness 
wisdom, discernment, knowledge 
getting it oneself, (learning/philo- 
sophy), self-realizing (ethics) 
perception, learning, discernment, 
'common sense" 
principle is one but its manifestations 
are many 
faithfulness, "the fifth virtue" 
loyalty 
reciprocity 
virtue, power, strength 
original substance (of the mind), origi- 
nal condition, foundation, human essence, (see ~hsin b) 
heresy, what differs from the learning 
of ordinary people 
hsueh learning (in Chinese) 
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ssu- tuan 
chih liang-chih b ~ a 
. d . a ti-yi yi 
. a ti-erh yi 
ko-wu 
ching 
satori 
ch eng-yi I . b 
tao 
b b e 
wei-chi-chih-hsueh 
shingaku 
chung -ho a 
t' ai-chi 
ch'i 
feb 
hsing 
hsin -chi-li a . c . a 
shih hsueh 
hsiang-yuan 
giri 
ninjo 
Four Beginnings (includes jen, i, li, 
chih) of virtues 
extending conscience 
Fh Fi t Pt 'ipl: 
~lim - h'h 
The Second Principle: experience 
rectifying affairs, investigating 
things (or events) 
reverence, self-control, concentration 
enlightenment - a Zen term 
making sincere the will, almost identi- t 1 to phih ~li - hih 
The Way 
Beaming for the sake of one's self 
Confucian/Shinto schools in Tokugawa, Japan 
equilibrium before arousal and harmony 
after arousal 
The Great Ultimate (combination of li . a 
and chi) 
vital force, matter-energy, vital 
nature, material substance 
law, punishment, discipline, model 
action, completion of knowledge 
mind is principle 
practical learning 
passive conformist, good villager, thief of virtue, Pharisaic, hyperhonest 
duty, righteousness, moral obligations, ethical principles 
feelings, see ~ch'in 
16 
gi 
jitsugaku 
giri no gaku 
shen-tu 
k'uang 
chun-tzu 
justice, morality, loyalty& relation- 
ship (see i) 
principle, reason, logic (see li ) . a 
practical learning 
human ethical concerns 
watchi, ng over the self when alone, 
self-vigilance 
wild, eccentric, wild ardour 
gentleman, inspirational model 
hao-jan-chih -ch'i self-determining principle 
kung-fua 
chung -shu 
siao-jenb 
sheng-yi 
nirvana 
sheng-li a 
lebenswelt 
effort, completion of knowledge 
empathy 
inferior man, small man 
creative will 
nothingness, Buddhist goal 
e t e p i epic ) e t'ie -ii) 
room for life (German), phenomenal field 
seken 
tsung-chih 
wei-fa a 
tzu-j an 
c hung a 
hsing b 
ch'ing 
room-for-life reinforced by shame and 
obligation (Japanese) 
central purpose 
before arousal (mind), a description f ~ce, te c dit' of p -t'i 
spontaneity 
equilibrium, tranquility, central 
thing, affair, event 
c' ) t e, ) e p -e'i) 
emotions, function of the mind 
17 
su 
yi -fa 
reciprocity 
after arousal (mind), a description 
of hsin 
t' ien-ming Heavenly mandate (~min is defined as the determined, necessity, fate) 
ho 
chih -chih b a 
k'e-chi 
k'e-chr-fu -li h b b 
harmony 
extending knowledge 
overcoming the fixed perspective of the ego 
subdue one's self and return to pro- priety 
Note: The following terms are Japanese, not Chinese: 
satori, shingaku, giri, ninjo, gi, ri, jitsugaku, 
giri no gaku, and seken. Nirvana is the only 
Sanskrit term. Lebenswelt is the only German 
term. The glossary offers the complete range 
of superscripts. The thesis body gives a con- 
densed version of the superscripts to avoid 
tedium. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EXISTENTIAL THERAPY AND NEO-CONFUCIANISM 
Introduction 
This is a chapter focusing on the self as actual and 
potential, as well as an entity in interaction with others. 
The bulk of it is divided into three major parts. ~ian- 
chih (conscience) is the fundamental starting point. 
Philosophers should use their major proposition as the 
h 1 f* f th d 1*p t. ~L'tt - h'h 11 h ' d 
as a self-theory in psychology. The study was inspired by 
the research of Seymour Epstein (1973). The next section 
shows that Neo-Confucianism is a growth system. Its con- 
cepts are designed to change in accordance with societal 
realities. A sincere will is necessary for maintaining 
ritual or etiquette. 
The middle part will look at authenticity and 
sociality. A distinguishing feature in Neo-Confucianism 
is the insistence upon self-actualization only through 
authenticity displayed in a social context. Kindred 
spirits encourage each other in the pursuit of 
common goals (Ching, 1973). Sociality is justified 
on the grounds of human improvement (Tu, 1972). Fur- 
thermore, spontaneity is the result of following objec- 
tive principles that bear a multitude of manifestations 
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(li-i-fen-shu) (Liu, 1972b) . Such freedom is cherished 
as a joy for the optimistic Confucians who take a dif- 
ferent stance to the questions raised by European 
existentialists (Nivi son, 1973) . 
The final part will discuss various aspects of Neo- 
Confucian structure. Neo-Confucianism and existential 
therapy share the self-actualization goal. The Neo- 
Confucian structure section starts with insight since it 
is the beginning of the actualizing process. It includes 
the theory of opposition between the conscious and un- 
conscious by Carl Jung. Neo-Confucian metaphysics of 
will is discussed with attention to concrete manifesta- 
tions and colorful analogies. Finally, the chapter 
ends with a Neo-Confucian motivation theory based on ima- 
gination filling in form to provide meaning, 
Attempts to relate Neo-Confucianism to process phi- 
losophy and phenomenology are made at various points in 
the chapter. An effort has been made to arrange the 
subtopics within each section in an order compatible with 
the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsin ho-i) 
Humanistic and Existential Ps cholo 
A survey of the basic postulates of humanistic psy- 
chology and existential therapy provides a good point of 
entry for readers of a psychological or Western orienta- 
tion, Humanistic psychology will be considered first, 
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since existential therapy is one of its branches. Human- 
istic psychology asserts that man is a whole that exceeds 
the sum of his parts (Bugental, 1965) . Humans can not be 
reduced to drives, unconscious determinants or need 
satisfactions (Shaffer, 1978) . Man as an intentional 
being chooses variety and disequilibrium too (Bugental, 
1965) . Freedom and the here-and-how are stressed heavily, 
albeit with biological and environmental limitations 
(Shaffer, 1978) . Man is a participant and not a bystand- 
er in life. Being is in a human context, for we are al- 
ways in relationships with others (Bugental, 1965) . 
Thus, humans are not fixed products, but are continually 
in the process of self-definition (Shaffer, 1978). 
Bugental (1965) asserts that awareness and its continuity 
at many levels is a defining trait of man. He admits 
that humanistic psychology is more certain about what it 
opposes, than what it supports. Counseling faces a 
"double criticism" since it is between obj ective science 
and subjective values. It is a rare discipline that at- 
tempts to possess expezimental rigor and a human concern 
(Weisman, 1965) . 
Existential therapy agzees with the basic postulates 
of humanistic psychology, while choosing to emphasize 
certain tenets more than others. Freedom to choose at- 
titudes and actions are stressed in both. Existential 
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therapy adds that our confrontation with an uncertain 
world, and potentially meaningless situations are factors 
stimulating to our abilities for choice (Corey, 1983) . 
Our own finiteness adds to the uncertainty, but gives 
meaning to life. Corey (1983) believes most therapeutic 
approaches share the goal of helping individuals, "to act 
and accept the awesome freedom and responsibility for 
action" (p . 64) . Existential therapy aims at expanding 
awareness in order to increase our potential for free 
choice. 
Brief Descri tion of Jen 
Jen (benevolence) is a potential starting point for 
a study of Chinese philosophy. Yet is is one of the most 
difficult concepts to express adequately, because of its 
glh lot e. Tller rth 'll re~le-h(he th 
focal point of his studies partly for that reason. 'ung 
(1966) notes that love is "the most persistent tradition" 
in the analysis of jen. "Reasonable kindness in action" 
is one way to describe jen. Jen can be viewed as the 
perfect virtue because it synthesizes the other four 
. b "constant virtues": i (appropriateness), li (propriety), 
chih (wisdom) and hsin (faithfulness) . Confucius was b 
the first Eastern philosopher to make jen (benevolence) 
an important concept (' Jung, 1966) . He was also one of 
the most prolific and scholarly researchers of all time 
(Chen, 1976) . 
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Jen not only synthesizes the other virtues but is 
actually their beginning (tuan) . Mencius was the first 
ge t di e the h g'h ' ge t l t e ( o-t * ). 
Sympathy is the beginning of jen and the prerequisite for 
the other four virtues. Mencius offered the example of 
a natural feeling of sympathy for a child falling into a 
well (Chan, 1969a) . Perhaps "survival wish for others" 
is a succinct description of ]en's beginning. Faithful- 
ness (hsin ) is the only virtue that "does not have a b 
beginning, " but is achieved through the consistent per- 
formance of the other four virtues (j en, i, li and chih ) . b aa 
(Chan, 1967a) . 
Tseng Tsu described jen as the unity of conscien- 
tiousness (~chun ) and altruism (shu) (Jung, 1966) . Jen 
gives substance to virtue by extending one's concern 
(Cheng, 1972b) . Tu (1972) sees reciprocity as the princi- 
ple underlying human relations; a need to help others. 
Chu Hsi stated that return is knowing when to stop, or 
a balancing of reciprocity (Chan, 1967a). An ability to 
relate to others meaningfully, reflects one's own level 
of self cultivation. In these cases, the researcher be- 
( )o(h lee)ppo he~(-hh( 
science), due to the emphasis upon extending the self . 
While jen is the ultimate virtue, sincerity (~chen ) 
is the principle and motive for existence. The Doctrine 
of the Mean states: "Sincerity is the way of Heaven. 
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The attainment of sincerity is the way of men" (Chen, 
1976, p. 19) . Whitehead (1926/1954) considered sincerity 
to be the primary religious virtue. Change is seen as a 
constant process, thus necessitating personal adjustment 
to the Mean or equilibrium. All things are relative and 
interdependent. If a component of the two relativities 
becomes too strong, it usually leads to its opposite re- 
action (Chen, 1976) . The dynamic nature of the self will 
be discussed in the following major section; together 
with the other three virtues (te) with beginnings (tuan) 
i (fitness), li (decorum) and chih (wisdom). . b aa 
Part One: Conscience and Change 
Lian -chih as a Self-Theory in Ps cholo 
A frequently quoted article in the study of per- 
sonality is "The self-concept revisited: or a theory of 
a theory, " by Seymour Epstein (1973) . The study focuses 
upon the self-concept as a theory about the self, hence 
it can be empirically verified since it is a theory. The 
self-concept has two basic functions. It organizes data 
of experience, especially social interaction, in order 
to make sequences of action predictable. The self-concept 
tries to fulfill one's needs, maintain self-esteem and 
avoid social disapproval or emotional disturbance 
(Epstein, 1973). 
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Ch g-y ng Chang (1974k) d fin 
~1( -ch h ( 
science) as being "three things in one: the ability to 
know what are first moral principles, the ability to 
identify rale~ant individual facts for moral evaluation, 
and the ability to correctly relate moral principles to 
particular facts for correct moral judgments" (p . 82) . 
Lik ' e, l~c- h(h ( on n ) i 1 imm d'*t 
application to a situation through experience and reflec- 
ti k 9 1 dge (Ch g, 197sb). L~n- hih pro 'd s 'n- 
ner base of self esteem through a belief in the goodness 
of the 'g' *1 c dit' n (9 -t'i) of ths 'od (h 'o). 
Al*ck f elf- temi at llyh t' 1 (y'-t ) 
because it differs from what is present in ordinary people 
(Ch' g, 1976). gi ce ~)' -ch'h is bell ed t exp 
a commonality of thought, social acceptance is a natural 
result for its practice (Nivison, 1973) . Understanding 
llil-ch h m s th abilicy t dl t g ' h b t 
pulses and an ethical decision. The goal of the research- 
er is to relate the self-theory of Epstein (1973) to 
theory and practice in Confucianism, as described by 
Chung-ying Cheng (1974b). Confucian virtues will also be 
discussed to clarify the three-partite system of know- 
ledge and ethics (normative/descriptive-situational and 
social) . 
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Both Epstein (1973) and the Neo-Confucians see a 
g o th pt' 'pl ' th s lf t-h *ty nd ~la - hlh. fh 
dynamic organization manifests this ability through the 
increasing assimilation of data, and the accommodation of 
existing concepts. Cheng (1974b) states that personality 
growth is the result of interaction between dispositional 
attainment and social achievement. Together with its 
dynamic organization, the self-theory maintains a system 
of priorities among its concepts concerning information 
regarding the world, self and their interaction (Epstein, 
1973) . 
Neo-Confucian views on the intrinsic or immanent har- 
mony between man and nature add to the internal consist- 
n y of 1~st'ch s elf theo-ty (ch g, 19711. Neo- 
Confucians believed in the organismic development of jen 
(benevolence), as well as the need for descriptive/ 
normative knowledge (chih ) through learning (hsueh). 
Epstein (1973) states that "the most fundamental 
purpose of the self-theory is to optimize the pleasure/ 
pain balance over the course of a lifetime" (p. 407) . 
Neo-Confucian doctrines of mankind's essential goodness 
includes the capability to unite knowledge with action 
(chih basin ho-i) . Furthermore, Neo-Confucians were 
basically happy individuals. Wang Yang-ming compared 
existential anxiety or anxiety about anxiety to "looking 
for a donkey while riding it" (Nivison, 1973). Wang's 
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well-known personal life was full of tragedy yet he did 
not choose depression (Ching, 1976) . 
The Self-Cones t as Viewed b Others 
Seymour Epstein (1973) discusses the theories of 
several psychologists who have studied the self-concept 
in the past. This study will focus on the psychologists 
cited by Epstein, whose theories are most compatible 
with Neo-Confucianism. Phenomenological psychologists 
consider the self-concept to be the most essential con- 
cept in psychology, since it offers the only means for 
understanding the individual's behavior. 
Epstein cites George Mead (1934) whose model is like 
Neo-Confucian views on propriety in one's life-style 
(li ) . Mead believed the self-concept arises through . b 
social interaction from a concern for the reactions of 
others to the individual. Mead notes that learning to 
perceive the world as other people already do is the way 
to anticipate the reactions of others. People learn to 
incorporate an estimation of the "generalized other, " 
as a source of internal regulation that guides behavior 
through a variety of social roles. 
The development of concern for proper social func- 
tioning was discussed by Mencius in the Four Beginnings 
(ssu-tuan) of virtue (Chan, 1967a) . 
and compliance are the beginning of 
Feelings of deference 
propriety (li ) . An . b 
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attitude of def erence is implied in Mead ' s theory. More- 
over, the feeling of shame is the beginning of rightness 
as appropriate action (i) . Confucius said that a man 
with a sense of shame is very close to being brave . 
Appropriateness is the foundation of courage (Chang, 
1955). 
Epstein cites Lecky's self-concept theory as a nucleus 
of personality; a dynamic system involving continuous 
assimilation of new information and modification of old 
theories . Lecky (1945) seems to capture the spirit of 
thih ~lido - hih (erte 11 g e ), p tit 1 rly 
since he believes the prime motivation is a striving for 
ty. We g Ye g-e' g et t th t l~h'h 1 the 
First Principle (~ti- i ~i) and experience is the Second 
Principle (ti-erh Zi) (Ching, 1973) . The section on 
empirical validity for a theory will develop this view- 
point further. 
Epstein cites Rogers' (1951) self-concept view as hav- 
ing only the characteristics of which the individual is 
aware and has control over . Rogers ' theories may repre- 
sent the ultimate development of the subjective pheno- 
menological standpoint. Wang Yang-ming's interpretation 
of ko-wu as "rectifying affairs" is helpful to Rogers' 
view of the self. Ko-wu seeks to examine thoughts (~i) 
which give rise to faulty perceptions (chih); factors in 
a faulty belief system that are unknown to the client. 
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Structure of the Self-Theor: Attributes in Common With 
All Theories 
Epstein (1973) lists six methods for evaluating any 
theory, not necessarily psychology or even the social 
sciences: (1) extensivity, (2) parsimony, (3) empirical 
validity, (4) internal consistency, (5) testability and 
(6) usefulness (p . 408) . The first three theoretical 
evaluations of Epstein can be related directly to the 
three facets of theory and practice in Confucianism, 
presented by Cheng (1974b). These components are practi- 
cal flexibility in application, normative/descriptive 
knowledge and understanding the background of action, or 
the social context. (See Figure One. ) Internal consistency 
is defended through a brief Neo-Confucian critique of 
Zen . Testability is analyzed through the use of Ch'eng- 
Chu and Lu-Wang interpretations of ko-wu (investigating 
things, rectifying affairs) which serve to augment 
ilia 1- h'h. U af 1 a a d oa t at d th gh th ty 
of the intellectual, pragmatic, emotional and volitional 
in Neo-Confucian theories on reason. 
E~ta t 
The extensivity of a coping self-concept is related 
to~1-h'h(th gh ph ' p p t' 1 
fl h'lity. 1 f t, th d lp t*f ~1' -h'h a 
is called "extension" (chih ) . The application of 
NORMATIVE/ 
DESCRIPTIVE 
PRACTICAL 
FLEXIBILITY 
BACKGROUND 
OF ACTION 
j en (benevolence) 
chiPQwisdom) 
i (appropriateness) li (decorum) . b 
I 
I 
I 
I 
parsimony extensivity empirical 
validity 
Figure I 
Interaction of Confucian Virtues 
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normative knowledge to concrete events can be found in 
discussions of the virtue, fitness (i) (Cheng, I972b) . 
It can be viewed as a mediating variable between ideals 
and realities. Appropriateness (i) is not to be confused 
with passivity, since ideals aze made more congruent 
and realities reflect our impact through its use. Thus, 
extensivity as f i tnes s (i) can be illustrated through 
the unity of knowledge and action (chih hain ho-i) 
Knowledge begins with thought and is incomplete without 
practical action. Flexibility is derived through apply- 
ing a principle to various particular cases (li-i-fen-shu) 
Rightness (i) stresses the relativity of actions, due 
to the uniqueness of situations. Creativity is needed 
on the part of the individual to utilize insights of the 
good (Cheng, 1974b). 
P~ed 
Parsimony in the self-concept is correlated to 
l~d — h'h, thr ugh h red fcc ru t d d 
scriptive knowledge (chih ) together with benevolence 
(jen) . Parsimony is reflected in a hierarchial structure 
of postulates from higher importance to lesser importance 
(Epstein, 1973). Jen in particular is the ultimate uni- 
fying virtue, as well as the first to develop in child- 
hood (Tu, 1968) . Reflective knowledge must be supported 
by a continuous learning from experience. Knowing the 
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good requires a conscious awareness to allow for goals, 
and the motivation to reach for goals (Cheng, 1974b). 
The differentiation in extensivity and the integra- 
tion in parsimony are complementary qualities, reflect- 
ing a dialectics of harmonization in Confucianism. Par- 
simony is essential to prevent a self-theory from becom- 
ing situationally determined. Extensivity is needed to 
keep a self-theory growing and free of arbitrary restric- 
tions (Epstein, 1973) . 
Em irical validit 
Empirical validity is reminescent of the Confucian 
concern for the background of action. Social situations 
are the arena for self-actualizing (Tu, 1972) . Epstein 
(1973) states that the most a theory can be is self- 
correcting. Wang insists, "The man who falls once ac- 
quires one more experience. There is no reason why the 
failure of today cannot very well become the success of 
the day after" (Ching, 1973, p . 48) . Virtues cannot be 
known without consciously participating in their develop- 
nt ith g, lglahl. 4 r q 'ren t tl~'th'h '4 
shift to induction when deductive reasoning is not applic- 
hlet th it ti . L~h'had t t ni 
directly connected to sociality and propriety (li ). . b 
Importantly, learning in Neo-Confucianism is a 
gradual process, not an all-or-nothing proposition. 
Epstein (1973) has observed that effective defense 
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systems allow awareness of reality to progress at the rate 
at which it can be assimilated. Both the Ch'eng-Chu 
and Lu-Wang schools emphasize personal understanding 
of the Classics through study and practice. Philosophy 
can be internalized only in this manner as it is the 
quest for self-improvement (Tu, 1978) . 
Internal consistenc 
T ti m of ~l' n — hih ith th th d ptaac "bad by 
Epstein (1973) will change to a topical approach for the 
last three categories. Internal consistency preserves 
the validity of a theory. Epstein (1973) mentions the 
awareness of inconsistencies is more harmful than the 
inconsistency itself. A defense of internal consistency 
n 1~a-ch'h o N o Cdu -an m'uid b mo t p * t' i 
through comparison to another philosophy. The researcher 
will give a brief description of a Neo-Confucian critique 
of Zen Buddhism. The critique itself is a citation from 
Ch'eng Hao in a letter from Wang Yang-ming, thus illus- 
trating the unity of Neo-Confucianism, 
The Neo-Confucians studied Buddhism with the desire 
to assimilate some of their theories on the mind, which 
had been neglected by early Confucianism. The Buddhist 
monastic ideal was considered to be a threat to the 
family and a functioning society as well. Ch'eng Hao 
complimented the serious reverent (~chin ) attitude of 
Zen Buddhists (Ching, 1973). However, he noted their 
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neglect of appropriate (i) conduct, through an overempha- 
sis on the enlightenment experience (satori) . Zn the 
end, they "do not even succeed in straightening their in- 
terior disposition by reverence" (Ching, 1973, p . 9) . 
Ch'eng Hao observed the reciprocal effect of attitudes 
and behavior, nearly nine centuries before Albert Ellis 
(1971) popularized its occurrence through rational-emotive 
therapy (RET) . 
T~est*b'lit 
The te tab'lity of ~lt o - h'h is h lped by it 
tension and the use of auxiliary methods, chiefly ko-wu 
(rectifying affairs, investigating things) . Principle (li ) is inherent in all things, an Eastern phrasing of 
cause-and-effect. Thus an increase in experience improves 
the lid ty f )~is -oh'h, both i 't ie t bil'ty nd 
empirical value. Recall that experience is absorbed into 
ilia 1- h'h. Th ta k f k -a« s t f nd P 'i Pl (1' ) 
«nk ent 
~)i -hh. Thed' etg bee th 
Ch 'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools is where principle is 
found. 
The Ch'eng-Chu school believed in the exhaustive 
investigation of events and things (ko-wu), in order to 
e k the 'll ' s (o~h'en - 1). Ch g (1979 ) 't* 
that Wang's version of ko-wu is to "realize the princi- 
ples (li ) in one's intention ()yi) activity and conse- 
quently realize li in things we focus on in the Zi 
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activities" (p. 290) . Wang Yang-ming ' s interpretation 
of ko-wu was "rectifying affairs". Wang stressed the 
immediacy of intentionality (Zi), as a reaction to ob- 
jects in consciousness (Jung, 1965). Importantly, T'ang 
(1973b) stressed that the Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools 
could not supplant the other because they represent dif- 
ferent philosophical approaches. The researcher agrees 
with T'ang and feels that an intermediate position is 
probably the best. 
The difference between the Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang 
schools is very similar to the debate between behaviorism 
and cognitive therapy today. The Ch'eng-Chu school fo- 
cused upon the acquisition of objective principles (li ) ~ a 
in order to promote behavioral change. The stimulus- 
response model is principle (li ) leading to a sincerity ~ a 
of 'll (~h' - ). W «g Y* g- g's th ry f k- 
is essentially identical to the cognitive theory of 
learning, as cited by D. B. Wolman (1973) in the Dic- 
tionary of Behavioral Science, 
Cognitive theory of learning = "postulates 
existence of intervening central processes 
in learning which are cognitive in nature 
and which states that learning involves new 
ways of perceiving rather than of incorporat- 
ing new responses into the behavior repertoire" 
(p. 67) . 
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Usefulness. 
L~e -oh'h f 1 h pt hl — 1 'tg the 
essence of reason and a goal in Neo-Confucianism. In 
the next ma]or section, the investigator will examine 
three cases of Neo-Confucianism changing with the needs 
of s ety. Atpts t, 1st 1 k th ~1' -ohh 
incorporates the intellectual, pragmatic, emotional and 
volitional (Cheng, 1974b). 
Knowledge is the foundation for developing poten- 
tial and self-actualization. The intellect recognizes 
and provides the goals. Such knowledge inclines one to 
practicality, since it is directive, restrictive and 
evaluative (Cheng, 1974b). An increase in knowledge 
creates a readiness and lessens the possibility for 
arbitrariness or hesitation. Emotional drive is based 
upon the urgency, that is due to the perceived relevance 
of action toward a goal (Cheng, 1974b). A counselor could 
motivate a depressive by helping the client find relevant 
goals. The counselor may explain that goals not only 
provide direction but stimulate pleasant feelings. 
Maslow (1968) reports that self-actualizing people 
are able to derive pleasure from their work to the point 
that work becomes pleasure. Beck (1976) observes that 
severely depressed individuals feel like "losers" that 
lack a trait needed for competence and happiness. The 
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medical model of depression points to chemical imbalance 
as the cause for mental illness, a view which damages 
self-esteem even further, while exonerating the indi- 
vidual from making conscious efforts to improve through 
learning. 
Mencius wrote that learning is nothing more than 
utilizing potential, a recovery of what could be (Ching, 
1973) . The investigator would like to add a commentary 
to Mencius. People lose their minds because they do not 
think they are worth keeping. The volitional component 
is a determination to unify the intellectual, pragmatic 
d ott o t oo cadet t' o of l~ia — h'h th o gh tio 
Perhaps the most inspiring support for the Neo-Confucian 
way of life was written by Ch'eng I, "I hope you will 
seek the Way through the Classics. Zf you make more and 
more effort, some day you will see something lofty before 
you. Unconsciously you will start dancing with your hands 
and feet. Then even without further effort you will not 
be able to keep yourself from going on" (de Bary, 1983, 
p. 60) . 
The Nature of the Postulates 
Epstein (1973) states that if self-theories contain 
behavior directing postulates, then it is necessary to 
reconstruct another's postulates in order to understand 
their behavior. Some domains have postulates which are 
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common to all people, while other domains are more spe- 
cialized. Epstein (1973) believes overall self-esteem 
is the highest postulate and includes "general competence, 
moral self-approval, power and love worthiness 
lowest order postulates under competence include assess- 
ments of specific abilities" (p. 411) . 
It is safe to surmise that accomplishment in learn- 
ing was closely related to self-esteem in Confucian China. 
Yet this fact is no more alien than viewing Western 
psychology as an educational process. Most importantly, 
Confucian learning is not restricted to scholarly activi- 
ties for the sake of esoteric knowledge. Confucian learn- 
ing is primarily 
. directed toward moral improvement mani- 
fested by authentic behavior and sociality (Tu, 1972) . 
Confucian/Neo-Confucian tradition showed a deep respect 
for the average person. Wang Yang-ming wrote "what the 
commoners do daily without realizing it, is tao (the Way" 
(Ching, 1976, p. 102). Moreover, both Neo-Confucianism 
and Zen stressed manual labor as a necessary component 
of education (Ching, 1973) . 
It seems particularly relevant to examine the rules 
of learning developed by Chu Hsi and commented upon by 
Wang Yang-ming. Chu Hsi developed a five-step learning 
theory known as the Rules for Instruction of White Deer 
Academy. The five steps are study, inquiry, thinking, 
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sifting and practice. A direct passage from Chu Hsi ex- 
plains the procedure completely snd succinctly: 
"After one has studied extensively, he can have the principles of all things before him. He can therefore examine them and compare them to get the right questions to ask. Then, as he inquires carefully, his teachers and friends will whole- heartedly engage in give-and-take with him, and he will begin to think, As he thinks carefully his thoughts will be refined and free from im- purities. Thus there is something he can get foz himself (~u so tzu-te). He can now sift what he has acquired. XsSe sifts clearly, he can there- for be free from doubts and put his thoughts into action. As he practices earnestly, all that he has achieved will become concrete demonstrations 
and will no longer remain empty words"(de Bary, 1983, p. 60). 
Note that Chu Hsi discussed putting thoughts into 
action. History has tended to give full credit to Wang 
Yang-ming for developing the theory of the unity of knowledge 
and action (chih ~hsin ho-i). Additionally, Chu Hsi stressed 
"learning for the sake of one's self" (wei-chi chih hsueh) 
(de Bary, 1983). The rigid examination system was a selec- 
tive borrowing from Chu Hsi's commentaries on the classics, 
revealing the legalist tone of Confucian application in 
government. 
Wang Yang-ming believed Chu Hsi's procedure was 
sound but risked becoming fragmentary, through an empha- 
sis upon principle (li ) as apart from mind (hain) (Ching, 
1976). Wang believed in cultivating the mind through a 
concentration on the virtues. The four beginnings (ssu- 
tuan) start developing in childhood. The beginning of 
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jen (benevolence) --the first virtue--is a feeling of sym- 
pathy for a child who has fallen into a well (Chan, 1967) . 
Wang's interpretation of ko-wu (rectifying affairs) ex- 
pl itly emph s'* s hi g the ill i r (~ch' — ) 
before the investigation of events, which is ko-wu ac- 
cording to Chu Hsi. The first step in Chu's "Rules" in- 
cludes the investigation of events as a part of study . 
Wang chose to develop the attainment of principles (li ) 
by starting from the mind (hain), an extension from the 
root to the branches (Ching, 1976) . Wang may have de- 
veloped a system of teaching which could reach a wider 
range of students than Chu Hsi. All three scholars em- 
phasized tzu-te (getting it oneself) . 
Neo-Confucianism Chan in with the Needs of Societ 
A proof that Neo-Confucianism is a system that can 
change with the needs of the time, could be the most 
substantial and important aspect of this thesis. Neo- 
Confucian concepts themselves must show an ability to 
change and develop . The previous major section of this 
chapter demonstrated that the Neo-Confucian view of the 
oes em (~1' — h'h) ' g c th sy tern, h'ch h 
validated as a theory. 
Extensivity in a coping self-concept was correlated 
with the Confucian/Neo-Confucian virtue of appropriate- 
ness (i) . Extensivity can be seen as the ability to 
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assimilate new information into a philosophy as well as 
a self-concept. On the other hand, an explanation of 
the capacity for Neo-Confucianism to change must be 
limited by its own tenets. A researcher can not stretch 
a philosophy to the extent that its original meaning is 
distorted. The task is to revise the letter of the law 
but not its spirit. 
Developing this section has been a challenge for 
the investigator. There are various ways to prove the 
ability of Neo-Confucianism as a philosophy to change. 
However, it could be difficult to relate these components 
to each other. Fortunately, a philosopher has recourse 
to a central methodological theory which serves as a 
foundation for drawing comparisons . 
This concept is li-i-fen-shu, principle is one but 
its manifestations are many. Since individuals and situ- 
ations are different, the application of jen (humanity) 
must vary in order to preserve the principle (Liu, 1972b). 
Humanity or benevolence (jen) has a creative drive 
(~shen ) together with sincerity (~ch'en ) that enables 
practice of the virtues. Otherwise ethics would be tedi- 
ous and depressing without the. spirit underlying the vir- 
tues (Liu, 1972b) . A utilization of this theory will be 
discussed in the Case Studies chapter. Furthermore, pro- 
p 
' ty ll' ) q ' * ' * 'ot t'* (~h - ') . b 
order to be "true" propriety. 
The areas which will be covered in this section in- 
clude the efficacy of written language and educational 
theory. In addition, the researcher will provide Neo- 
Confucian answers to two questions raised by Abraham 
Naslow (1968); namely, sorrow inspite of religious in- 
doctrination and joylessness despite economic freedom. 
A Neo-Confucian outlook of ethics and science also will 
be examined. 
Neo-Confucianism as a Part of Eastern Culture 
Abraham Maslow (1968) and the Neo-Confucians inde- 
pendently arrived at the decision that an inner source 
of values is the only viable alternative for mankind. 
Part of the strength of Neo-Confucianism as a philosophy 
is that it was not considered as a separate discipline 
but the "wisdom penetrating all aspects of life" (Chan, 
1959, p. 114) . Maslow (1968) felt that the failure of an 
externally derived set of beliefs led to the anguish of 
European existentialists, a condition he described as 
"high I. Q. whimpering on a cosmic scale" (p. 16). Tu 
(1972) strongly criticizes the Kierkegaard leap of faith 
from an ethical social life to a religious reclusive 
life, as degrading the human potential for building a 
good society. 
The Confucian/Neo-Confucian penetration of Far 
Eastern life is manifested in education and politics. 
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Neo-Confucian philosophy was expressed commonly as a me- 
thod of learning (de Bary, 1983) . The previous section, 
"L~de — h'h s s Lg t-he ty d psy h*lcgy. " d sc ed 
Chu Hsi's "Rules for Instruction" and Rang Yang-ming's 
comments concerning them. All levels of schooling in- 
cluded Confucian/Neo-Confucian philosophy as part of the 
curriculum in pre-Communist China (Wu, 1971) . The divi- 
sions between education, philosophy, psychology and reli- 
gion were not distinct. This cultural phenomena makes 
Neo-Confucianism an ideal subject for interdisciplinary 
research, in the opinion of the researcher. 
It could be argued that the Confucian system was a 
subtle form of indoctrination, but all societies need to 
impart shared cultural values to its members. The pre- 
dominant themes included "learning for the sake of one' s 
self" (wei-chi chih hsueh), sincerity and social harmony 
(de Bary, 1983). Such assertions are clearly the anti- 
thesis of Marxist degradation of the individual and vir- 
tues, together with its deification of class conflict 
(Cheng, 1977) . 
Sung (960-1279) Neo-Confucianism flourishe'd in the 
capital and in regions that "led in agricultural produc- 
tion, trade and population growth" (de Bary, 1983, p. 58) 
The Neo-Confucian lecture/discussion methods spread to 
less educated citizens in villages and towns by the 
middle to late Ming (Sixteenth century-first half 
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Seventeenth century), and to Eighteenth-century Tokugawa 
Jap n tl gh th ~h' ku ch 1s (de B ry, 1983). 
Neo-Confucians held government offices throughout 
the Far East. Scholar-sages were granted the opportunity 
to pursue cultural interests, while performing political 
and bureaucratic functions. Ch'eng I (1033-1107) was a 
lecturer from the classics mat; the personal mentor to 
the Emperor. Chu Hsi (1130-1200) passed the civil ser- 
vice examinations and became subprefectural registrar- 
at the age of 18 (de Bary, 1983) . 
Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) was the Grand Co-ordinator 
of the southeast China border regions of Kiangsi, 
Kwangtung and Fukien. Wang not only reorganized the 
government but pacified bandits and surpressed rebellions 
as a general (Ching, 1976) . Yoshida Shoin was regarded 
as the moving spirit behind the Meij i Restoration (1868- 
1912) in Japan (Chang, 1955) . However, all of the afore- 
mentioned sages frequently were ignored or faced persecu- 
tion by self-seeking rulers. Even Confucius himself, who 
at one time held a cabinet post, lived with complacency 
and danger during the disintegration of the Chou dynasty 
(Chen, 1976) . 
Efficac of Written Lan a e 
The efficacy of written language is stressed in Neo- 
Confucianism to provide concrete msxims for specific 
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actions. Such a goal does not assume that it is possible 
to give a complete definition for the ultimate good (jen) 
(Liu, 1972b) ~ Neo-Confucianism absorbed the Zen warning 
of not letting words become the masters of our minds 
(Ching, 1973) . The ultimate good is understandable in 
principle, but not completely definable. All the virtues 
may be seen as aspects of jen in the unitary system of 
Confucianism (Liu, 1972b). Once again, the concept li-i 
fen-shu (principle is one but its manifestations are many) 
describes Neo-Confucian world views. 
W «g Ya g- iog o 'd r d c~h-h ( q il'b ion/ 
br«op) ndt' i. -hi (geo«lan«t) t be qi lnt 
concepts, but he preferred to use the former term 
(Cheng, 1972a) . The investigator f eels that Wang Yang- 
~ 'g'p f n forth-ho a apl fag*- 
Confucian's drive for clarity in expression. Noreover, 
it' was a trend begun by Chu Hsi, showing the continuity 
of development in Neo-Confucianism (Tu, 1979) . The great 
ultimate (t' ai-chi) is a Taoist-influenced metaphysical 
term, used by early Neo-Confucians, that combines li a 
(p i pie) *nd h'' ( ii 1 f e). 
~th -ho ( q li'- 
brium/harmony) is a more relevant term that describes 
states of mind and behaviors, before and after arousal 
(fa) by a stimulus (Cheng, 1972a) . 
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Taoism was noted for its rejection of written lan- 
guage and conceptual knowledge. Direct experience was 
seen as the only source for true knowledge. Chuang Tzu, 
a leading Taoist, did not think it was possible to trans- 
mit the knack of knowledge through writings. However, 
he admitted that words can lead to a higher level of un- 
derstanding and meaning, but then the wozds can be for- 
gotten once their purpose as "skillful means" has been 
fulfilled (Vervoorn, 1981) . Such beliefs cast doubts 
on the objective validity of Taoism. Furthermore, Taoism 
is usually interpreted as advocating total relativism, 
according to Herbert (1950), Welch (1965) and Cheng 
(1977) . 
Ideas begin as flashes of insight but they need 
to be expressed and defended in propositional form so we 
may understand them. Writing is the fundamental ingredi- 
ent in transforming insight into substantial ideas. 
Otherwise, thought is vague without the channeling through 
written expression (Pletcher, 1983) . Chang Tsai (1020- 
1077) urged sifting through ouz thought until it can be 
expressed in words (de Bary, 1983) . Pletcher (1983) 
believes there was little reflective argumentation in 
philosophy before the development of written language, 
citing Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching as an example of recording 
oral teaching. 
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Some Taoist writings urge people to reflect wisdom 
without making plans, grasping knowledge or being ab- 
sorbed by activities. Taoism is inclined to forgetting 
preferences and distinctions, partly because of the fu- 
tility in perfection (Feng & English, 1974). Clearly, 
such concepts are contrary to Neo-Confucian li-chih 
(forming a resolution), chih hain ho-i (unity of know- 
1 dg nd tion), ch'h ~1" n -c) ih (est ding o 'en ) 
and ko-wu (investigating things) . Words are viewed as 
the cause of distinction. Chuang Tzu even quotes madmen 
who see the settling of a good example as subverting vir- 
tue and inviting disaster (Feng & English, 1974). 
Taoism promotes complete flexibility in thought 
and action. Chuang Tzu believed one "who has been trans- 
formed has no more constancy . . . " (because) "the un- 
derstanding of the sage matches the fluidity of reality" 
(Vervoorn, 1971, p. 313). 
Taoism seems to 'exhibit "extensivity" (chih ) without b 
"parsimony. " These are terms borrowed from Epstein (1973) 
hdch er d's d 'n th n us t' . "1~hit 
as a self-theory in psychology. " Such a creed is danger- 
ous as it leads to a situational determination of be- 
havior, or an external locus of control. The disdain 
for reason and written language in Taoism leads to detri- 
mental effects in its philosophy. Moreover, the 
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relationship between the development of reason and writing 
skills appears to be interactionary. 
In showing the adaptability of Neo-Confucianism, a 
clear trend toward parsimony should be manifested in its 
comparison with Taoism. At the same time, a growth- 
system ought to be revealed through an examination of 
Neo-Confucian structure and applications. A respect for 
reason (li ) and efforts at written expression are com- ~ a 
ponents of Neo-Confucianism, which are shared by the ma- j ority of civilized humanity today. The close ties be- 
tween composition and rational/ethical philosophy may 
be a significant contribution of the Confucian education- 
al system. 
Education Theor 
Education theory displays a historical similarity 
between the unquestioned acceptance of Bloom's Cognitive 
Taxonomy of Educational Objectives and the elevation of 
Chu Hsi's interpretations of Neo-Confucianism to a state 
orthodoxy. When theory becomes dogma, creativity and 
scholarship are stifled. Moreover, Neo-Confucianism will 
not be exempt from constructive criticism, particularly 
if the dissent comes from within the philosophy and re- 
lated fields, such as psychology . The scholarship of 
Wang Yang-ming was partly a reaction toward deficiencies 
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in established Neo-Confucianism. Cheng (1984) encourages 
innovation and constructive criticism in order to create 
a modern Neo-Confucianism for both East and West. 
A lication recedin com rehension. 
Bloom's Cognitive Taxonomy of Objectives and its 
critique by David S . Moore (1982) seems at least partly 
analogous to the Neo-Confucian schism. Moore (1982) 
questions Benjamin Bloom's rating of application (Stage 
3) as a higher-order skill than comprehension (Stage 2) . 
Comprehension is defined as the giving of descriptions, 
stating main ideas and comparison. Application is de- 
fined as utilizing techniques and rules to solve problems 
that have a single correct answer (Gall, Dunning 
Weathersby, 1971, p. 261) . A Neo-Confucian may question 
the inclusion of "single correct answer" in a definition 
of application, preferring "one or more correct answers 
bounded by propriety or rules (li ) . " . b 
Moore (1982) states that a child's mind seems to 
naturally generalize on the grounds of inductive in- 
fer'ence. He cites examples of trial-and-error learning 
in arithmetic and English grammar to prove his assertion. 
Furthermore, Aaron T. Beck (1976) views the beginning 
of language development in children as application through 
direct observation. 
The research of Beck (1976) and Moore (1982) sug- 
gests the possibility of application with the grasp of 
basic knowledge (Stage 1) . Moreover, certain aspects of 
comprehension: comparison and stating main ideas seem 
to rely on skills in application. Wang Yang-ming seems 
to be vindicated by this research, because he stressed 
the fundamental inseparability of knowledge and action 
(chih hain ho-i) 
Wang stated that knowledge is incomplete and without 
substantiality or concreteness in the absence of action. 
He viewed intentionality (yi) as the beginning of action 
(hain ), hence knowledge (chih) itself is practical before 
it becomes theoretical (Jung, 1966). In other words, 
one should finish what one starts, and the effects of 
this choice is exhibited through behavior. 
Wang repeatedly offered the examples of archery and 
filial piety, as cases where action is clearly required 
for knowledge. Additionally, athletic ability and kind 
feelings are principles (li ) that exist in the mind 
(hsin); an example of hain chi li (mind is principle) 
(Ching, 1976) . The extension of inner capacity or in- 
nate knowledge through learning and self-cultivation is 
ch'h 
~lia -ch'h (Ch 2, 1972 ) The h 1 h ' f of th 
descriptive-phenomenological view (hsin chi li) and the 
at' 
-pt t'c 1 1 ( hih ~1o — h1h) ' th ity 
of knowledge and action (chih hain ho-i) (Cheng, 1972 a) . 
In the Case Studies chapter, we will look at how Beck' s 
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(1976) Graded Task Assignment utilizes action leading to 
knowledge in order to treat depression. 
Inse arabili of action from knowled e. 
Returning to education theory, Moore (1982) views 
Bloom 's method of separating question-types as artificial. 
Moore shows that the narrative structure of history com- 
bines knowledge (Stage 1) and synthesis (Stage 5) . The 
structure does not lend itself to bifurcation, since they 
are learned simultaneously . This example represents the 
ultimate instance of the unity of knowledge and action 
(chih hain ho-i), because the two components are actual- 
ly aspects of the same reality. Liking a good aroma or 
color is another example of simultaneous unification, 
although these are facets of the cognitively primitive 
-t n (f*ur begs «g ) . 
Wang was wary of Chu 's Five-Step Rules for Instruc- 
tion, mainly because of its separation of action from 
the other steps and placement at the end, The student 
should be made aware that action is transpiring through- 
out the learning process. Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-1695) 
saw the "separation of knowing faculty and thing known" 
leading to a lack of self-assurance, and the root of 
"two great flaws in Chinese culture: perpetual suspen- 
sion of decisive (moral) action, and reliance on authori- 
tarian formulas" (Struve, 1982, p. 108) . Both 
Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) and David S. Moore (1982) view 
problem-solving as an ongoing process that combines dif- 
ferent levels. 
In concluding, Moore (1982) asserts that evaluation 
(Stage 6) occurs at all levels and a complete evaluation 
is impossible. Bloom believes evaluation is the highest 
level of learning, and as such, it must be preceded by 
the other five levels. Once again, the researcher i: s re- 
minded of the schism between Wang Yang-ming and Chu Hsi. 
Chu Hsi believed in the exhaustive investigation of 
e cote (to-oo) to ct'fy tt ill fc~)t' — '). B tty 
(1980) states "Chu spoke often of progress, seldom of 
fulfillment or enlightenment" (p. 122) . Betty (1980) 
cites Chu, "Just investigate one item after another 
somehow untill the utmost is reached. As more and more 
is done, one will naturally achieve a far and wide pene- 
tration" (p. 122) ~ 
Like Moore (1982), Wang believed continuous evalua- 
tion occurs at all levels. Since thought (Zi) is a reac- 
tion to an object in consciousness (hsin), our very' aware- 
ness of external reality predisposes us to evaluation. 
Thought (Zi) begins the unity of knowledge and action 
(chih hain ho-i) (Jung, 1966). If mind and things com- 
pose one body, one can be sure that things are investi- 
gated by rectifying one's own mind (Betty, 1980) . 
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Treating things as outward causes conflict, since the 
belief we have of the event is literally one with the 
mind (Betty, 1980) . Here is a clear case of Neo- 
Confucianism sounding like the rational-emotive therapy 
of Albert Ellis. Ellis (1971) insists the belief we have 
about an event determines our reaction, apart from the 
event's objective reality. 
The spirit of reason and scholarship is seen through 
the research of Moore, Bloom, Wang and Chu. Their dif- 
ferences in approach serve to complement rather than 
negate each other. How could one react without the 
existence of another? Much of the problem with the works 
of Bloom and Chu was due to exaggerations and errors by 
their followers, as admitted by Moore (1982) and dis- 
cussed by Liu (1984) . Moreover, Liu (1984) saw some 
conflict as arising from partly faulty interpretations 
. of Chu by Wang, especially when the latter was young 
and despondent. The desire to update theories is an ef- 
fort to restore appropriateness to a new situation. The 
effect is cumulative rather than substitutive, and an 
example of li-i-fen-shu (principle is one but its mani- 
festations are many) 
A lied Neo-Confucianism in Histor 
Three topics will be examined, "(1) Modernizing 
the law for its own sake, (2) Righteous profit: a 
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merchants' class ethic, and (3) Ethics and science. " 
All of these cases illustrate Cheng's (1979b) contention 
that learning has to be practical to protect society 
from being overthrown by anti-intellectual forces. The 
first example shows that decorum (li ) is form with move- . b 
ment, a virtue that must change to remain authentic. 
The second case shows philosophy changing to remain con- 
gruent with existing realities out of empathy and respect 
for its society. The third case illustrates the incor- 
poration of benevolence (/en) into practical learning 
(shih hsueh) 
Heinemann (1953) proclaims the necessity of 
"existential theologians" in their defense of humanity 
with regulative instead of constitutive principles. 
Existential theologicans' "chief interest does not lie 
in dogmatics and in the external observance of rituals, 
but in the souls of men, in their predicament and in the 
willingness to help them" (Heinemann, 1953, p, 253) . 
Wang Yang-ming's motivations seemed to be focused on 
helping humanity through reason. 
Maslow (1968) observed that much of conventional 
behavior is not really morality, but the accepted habits 
of the many. Aaslow's (1968, 1970) studies of success- 
ful people, self-actualization and enlightenment ex- 
periences was an attempt to broaden psychology's horizons 
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to include the "brighter side" of humanity. Maslow's 
(1968) critique of the "psychopathology of the masses" 
is reminescent of the Confucian disdain for the passive 
c t ta 't (h~* - a ). 1 'd f 'ts '*1 t 1 
ments, the greatest danger to a society is when its mem- 
bers do not know why or how something is good. Chang 
(1963) states that arbitrary ways of viewing matters 
blunts the achievement of a harmonious society. 
Neither the unexamined lives of the "good villagers" 
(h~sfa - ), th "psyches tho l sy f th s 
should be seen as a pessimistic indictment against the 
good nature of humanity. Actually, the necessity of 
learning as a process involving both attitude and be- 
havior increases in its importance for fulfilling po- 
tential. Learning can be defined in its broadest sense 
to include anything that requires the mastery of tech- 
nique, not just "bookish" endeavors. 
Modernizin the law for i. ts own sake. 
Wang Yang-ming faced the problem of outdated rituals 
(li ) conflicting with the personal values of the intelli- . b 
gentsia. These rituals concerned honoring of ancestors 
and the positioning of tablets in temples (Ching, 1973) . 
The reader may feel that the researcher is discussing 
an irrelevant issue. However, the issue was extremely 
relevant to Sixteenth-century Chinese, just as local 
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customs are important to Americans. The understanding 
of the rationale leading to the change is the important 
consideration, and an example of li-i-fen-shu (principle 
is one but its manifestations are many) . 
The difficulty in changing the rituals was compounded 
by its passive acceptance by the masses and literal iden- 
tification with decorum (li ) (Ching, 1973). b 
Chinese concept, li, can mean both rituals in a narrow b 
sense, and propriety or etiquette in a wider sense (Cua, 
1971b). However, many ancient rules of propriety (li ) 
were too complicated to be fully understood and conse- 
quently ignored. Wang accepted the wisdom of the an- 
cients, as leading them to create rituals that were rele- 
vant to their times (Ching, 1973) . 
Importantly, acting according to real propriety (li ) . b 
requires an understanding, as opposed to a blind follow- 
ing of routine. Wang wrote when "man lost his genuine 
feelings (he) now' finds it hard to speak about real pro- 
priety" (Ching, 1973, p. 98) . The passive conformist 
(h~sia — ) a bject f e r'vie' ' C 
fucian China, to the point of being called a "thief of 
vir tue" (Tu, 1968) . 
Neo-Confucianism clearly exhibits the conceptual 
structure required' of a growth-system in this case. Tu 
(1972) insists that li is a movement and the most . b 
observable virtue. Li serves as a boundary for what can . b 
be considered appropriate (i) action (Cua, 1971a). Addi- 
tionally, li is described as the repository for past . b 
appropriateness (i); the content of virtue (Hall 
Ames, 1984) . Wang encourages his readers with an amusing 
quote from Mencius, "Even if, without knowing the size 
of the foot, one tries to make sandals, we know he will 
not end up making a basket" (Ching, 1973, pp. 98-99) . 
The reasoning content of Wang Yang-ming in this 
case seems to be Kohlberg 's (1981) Stage 4, the "law- 
and-order" mentality. Wang effectively persuades the 
reader to believe new rules are needed. One can disagree 
with existing laws, and still possess Stage 4 reasoning, 
if the suggested remedy is developing new rules (Haan, 
1975). The typical level of moral reasoning is used 
677. of the time, and one includes the less advanced forms 
in their behavioral zepetoire (Kohlberg, 1981) . Typical- 
ly, Neo-Confucians such as Wang utilized post-conventional 
reasoning (Stages 5 and 6), as evidenced by their em- 
phasis upon the objective, universal nature of principle 
oz reason (li ) . 
Ri hteous profit: a capitalist ethic, 
The other contemporary problem Maslow (1968) men- 
tions is joylessness in spite of economic pzospezity. 
Once again, Neo-Confucianism faced a problem and modified 
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the philosophy, while preserving its basic structure. 
Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868) faced the issue of how to 
combine righteousness as appropriateness (i) to economic 
profit (Cluck, 1984) . Like Renaissance Europe, establish- 
ed traditions frowned upon the merchant and considered 
that class to be the lowest. Nevertheless, merchants 
became quite wealthy and were an important component 
of a functioning society. When reality conflicts with 
philosophy, it is time to revise philosophy. Tokugawa 
Neo-Confucians developed a merchants' class ethic. 
The dual concepts, ~iri (duty) and nein o (feelings) 
formed the basis of the Japanese merchant ethic (Gluck, 
1984) . Duty is a compound word that combines the 
characters, gi (rightness as fitness) and ri (reason) 
(de Bary, 1979). Duty extends the idea of personal 
righteousness of action to the economic good of the na- 
tion and ultimately the world. The development of mer- 
chant class ethic was a resistance of outdated biases 
through the application of universal Confucian principles. 
The Lord of Nitsui stated the merchants' goal should be 
to make "great profit honorably" (Gluck, 1984) . It might 
be a rare example of Stage 6 morality, the highest level 
in the cognitive-moral scale of Kohlberg, who has ob- 
served that duty and references to principles abound in 
post-conventional morality (Kohlberg, 1981). 
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The concepts, kiri and nein o interacted to produce 
harmony in the individual and society. Yamaga Soko (1622- 
1685) did not believe in surpressing natural desires, 
because they are powerful creative forces. The sage's 
duty was to nurture and satisfy desires as a participant 
in Nature's immanence (de Bary, 1979) . Tu (1968) per- 
ceives the relation to jen (benevolence) to li (proprie- b 
ty) as fulfilling desires in an ethical context. 
Ethics and science. 
Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714) was a prolific writer in 
set e aod t tact ay (~its at ). ttt te 1 ay ea- 
phasized human ethical concerns (giri no gaku) . A physi- 
cian must be proficient in humaneness through moral obli- 
gation and empathy, or else one becomes like the Taoist 
immortality seekers, according to Ekken (Takehiko, 1979) . 
The reverent Neo-Confucian proclaimed the study of horti- 
culture should not be purely out of love for beauty or 
profit. One must keep regard for the "proclivity of na- 
ture to give birth to living things, " or risk "trifling 
with things and losing one's sense of purpose" (Takehiko, 
1979, p. 279) . 
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Part Two: Authenticity and Sociality 
A~theet ' t' 
Self-actualization or sagehood is the p~imary con- 
cern in Neo-Confucianism. Wei-ming Tu (1972) defines 
sagehood as becoming fully realized and authentic. The 
central concern of psychotherapy is authenticity, accord- 
ing to Bugental (1965) . The process consists of helping 
the patient to (1) overcome distortions of awareness and 
(2) accepting the responsibilities and opportunities of 
being authentic. Bugental defines neuroses as the denial 
of distortion of authenticity. 
The next chapter discusses the neuroses more fully 
in section II-D, "Appropriate discernment of thought; a 
personality model. " The emphasis upon authenticity is 
probably one of the clearest similarities between existen- 
tial therapy and Neo-Confucianism. Sincerity and genuine- 
ness are frequently used synonyms for authenticity. 
Authenticity is acting in accordance with one's na- 
ture, A lack of authenticity is exposed by conflict with 
the givenness of being (Bugental, 1965). Bugental (1965) 
lists three attributes of authenticity: (1) Being as 
fully aware as possible, (2) choosing the possibility 
with actuality at the moment and (3) taking responsibility 
for choices while recognizing basic imperfection. 
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Confucius described the inauthentic expressions of the 
self as arbitrariness of opinion, dogmatism, obstinancy, 
and egotism (Tu, 1972) . 
The therapeutic situation calls for counselors that 
are authentic with themselves and others. Genuine thera- 
pists do not need to be blunt with their directness. 
A blend of diplomacy and honesty is required for dealing 
wi. th selectively attentive clients (Beck, Rush, Shaw 
Emery, 1979). It is essential for the therapist to have 
the skill to communicate authenticity to the client. 
Cua (1971a) citing Whitehead observes that each 
language systematizes expression and includes a historic 
tradition. A Taoist or Zen disdain for language would 
be absurd in the counseling situation; aside from well- 
timed moments of silence for reflection and the like 
(Hackney & Cormier, 1979) . Promising the patient a 
quick recovery is also a mistake. Demonstrating that 
painful emotions are reversable by correcting faulty be- 
liefs and self-defeating behaviors can be effective 
(Beck, Rush, Shaw 6 Emery, 1979). 
Neo-Confucianism views self-actualization as an is- 
sue of effort, attitude and behavior more than actual 
scholarship; a theory shared with existential therapy. 
Wang Yang-ming particularly emphasized the possibi. lity 
of sagehood in all people. Wang considered learning to 
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include the crafts of the commoners, since he wondered if 
the Sung (960-1279) masters' insistence on booklearning 
revealed the limited applications of a bougeoise world- 
view (Ching, 1976) . No other society, philosopy or reli- 
gion emphasized scholarship as much as Neo-Confucianism 
(de Bary, 1983) . Yet Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085) saw "mopping 
floors and answering basic questions" as a prerequisite 
for higher learning and reason itself (Chan, 1967a) . The 
natural humility of Neo-Confucian philosophers is illus- 
trated by these examples. The counseling situation can be 
seen as an "education in becoming authentic" in both 
East and West. 
Authenticit Described in the Letters of Wan Yan -min 
The researcher will focus on three aspects of authen- 
ticity as discussed in original letters by Wang Yang-ming, 
translated by Julia Ching (1973): (1) sincerity, (2) 
watching over the self when. alone (shen-tu) and (3) 
patience under criticism. 
Sincerit (ch'en ) 
Neo-Confucian literature is rich in its understand- 
ing of sincerity. The practice of making the will sin- 
(~h' ea — l) Pt t ' 1ly dt c'el t 'th ekt 
~ f 'ec (ch h ~1' - h'h). th k y t pt 
of Neo-Confucianism. Wang Yang-ming prescribed self- 
examination for one who loves others but is not loved 
in return. Wang warned of the dangers in being a stickler 
for details, It is a tendency that leads to excessive 
comparisons, ostentation and conscious error without 
learning (Ching, 1973). Since the researcher is learn- 
ing and becoming more conscious, he feels a sense of 
compatibility with Wang's teachings, despite the admitted- 
ly lengthy detail'. 
Rightness (i) is defined as "adapting oneself proper- 
ly to objects, it refers to my mind having done what is 
appropriate. For rightness is not an external object, 
which one can seize and take over" (Ching, 1973, p. 29-30) . 
"The understanding of the good is itself the effozt of 
attaining sincerity . . . The goal of the understanding 
of the good is to become sincere" (Ching, 1973, p. 30) . 
Lu Hsiang-hsan (1139-1193) stated, "there is no greater 
delight than to be conscious of sincerity when reflecting 
upon ourselves" (Ching, 1973, p. 73) . Evil itself is 
viewed as insincerity because our nature is good. 
Wang believed shame is often due to insincerity. 
Shame can be felt when one is unable to win an argument, 
subdue others in temperment or follow their impulses. 
Recall that shame is one of the Fouz Beginnings (ssu-tuan), 
specifically the beginning of appropriateness (i) (Chan, 
1967) . Wang observed straightforward and generous minds 
are capable of holding much information as well as 
building a sense of confidence, T'ang (1973a) offers a 
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unique observation of self-confidence as the ultimate 
concern of Confucianism. 
Carl Rogers (1961) lists two of his most significant 
learnings as directly related to authenticity or sin- 
cerity: "(1) In my relationships with persons I have 
found that it does not help in the long run, to act as 
though I were something that I am not. (2) I find I am 
more effective when I can listen acceptantly to myself 
and be myself" (p. 16-17) . Maslow (1968) has observed 
an unusual ability for self-actualizing people to detect 
the fake in personality. Self-actualizing people are 
better judges of character partly due to a greater sense 
of security, 
Watchin over the self when alone (shen-tu) . 
Authenticity depends upon an orderly private life. 
Wang Yang ming discussed shen-tu (watching over self when 
alone) as the key to self-cultivation. Shen-tu is 
"practicing vigilance wi. thout being seen" and "apprehen- 
sion without being heard" (Ching, 1973, p. 79) . The 
practice of shen-tu serves as an important reminder that 
we must remain calm and happy when we are alone. It is 
relatively simple to be content when our friends arrive. 
Respect and reverence is the function of spontaneity 
and principle. A respectful reverent attitude allows 
one to act without doubt over actions. The investigator 
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believes shen-tu could be considered an aspect of li 
(decorum), despite the fact that the "other" is not 
present. Through shen-tu, the self is objectified by a 
respectful attitude towards one's self. Moreover, re- 
spect and deference is the beginning (tuan) of propriety 
(li ). 
Our only task should be learning from experience 
constantly, and its essence is watching over ourselves 
when we are alone (Ching, 1973) . This procedure is 
reminescent of cognitive change methods in cognitive- 
behavior therapy (Hackney R Cormier, 1979) . 
A gentleman's only fear should be the neglect of 
study in its broadest sense. The requirement for self- 
quest is not to overreact to praise or criticism, because 
one who becomes fearful cannot become a gentleman. 
Through such practice, the gentleman "finds himself in 
no situation when he is not himself, " a citation Wang 
Yang-ming borrowed from Tsu Ssu, the author of the Doc- 
trine of the i~tean (Ching, 1973) . 
It should be noted that the term, "gentleman", is 
not meant to be sexist, but the proper translation of 
chun-tzu. The investigator asks the reader to consider 
"gentleman" to be of neuter gender. The increasingly 
negative connotations of the word, "lady", makes its use 
grossly inappropriate for this study. 
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Maslow (1970) has noted the tendency of self-actual- 
izing people to enjoy privacy and solitude more than 
average, without becoming antisocial. It is not clear 
in Naslow's thought whether solitude precedes self- 
actualization or visa-versa. A self-actualizing indivi- 
dual necessarily enjoys solitude and sociality more than 
an unsatisfied individual. Naslow (1970) adds that self- 
actualizing people have fewer but deeper friendships, yet 
may attract syncophantic admirers. 
Patience under criticism. 
Wang Yang-ming received harsh treatment from enemies 
in government; including public flogging, exile, and at- 
tempted assassination (Tu, 1978) . Wang received criti- 
cism from Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucians who regarded him as 
a ~ku 'an (wild) Zen Buddhist (Ching, 1976) . Wang 's let- 
ters on patience under criticism are particularly in- 
spiring to the researcher because of the profound sense 
of empathy and responsiblity, without a desire to blame 
others. 
Criticism can occur in social or professional cir- 
cles, One should ask if they were lacking in kindness 
(jen) and manners (li ) to a critic . If self-examination . b 
reveals that one was polite and friendly, then the case 
is closed. The gentleman (chun-tzu) has a life-long 
concern but no temporary worries (Fu, 1983) . 
In a professional situation, criticism rarely has 
much to do with personal grudges. One's opponents feel 
they are defenders of the truth, Wang admits that a new 
theory can look like "forced interpretation' and things 
invented by the imagination" (Ching, 1973, p. 67) . Argu- 
ments about learning reflect a desire to learn that goes 
beyond differences of opinion. It is possible that the 
critics decided not to believe nor investigate with hu- 
mility. However, we, the theoreticians could have been 
carried away by a desire to excel and bear the responsi- 
bility for their alarm (Ching, 1973) . 
Fitness as a Niche 
Cheng (1972b) emphasises the development of appropri- 
ateness (i) as transforming the world into a world of 
self. Tu (1972) also describes the extention of propri- 
ety (li ) in the same manner, 
When fitness is discovered and one can become firm 
in it, the self can be strengthened through its extension. 
Cheng (1972a) sees appropriateness (i) as a self- 
determining principle (hao-'an-chih-chi) . A knowledge 
of the structure of propriety (li ) provides the means 
to transcendent (Tu, 1972) . Extension of the self is 
ply hh~l' -hih (et d g cf ). T1le 
searcher feels that Cheng (1972b) and Tu (1972) have 
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expressed the importance of finding one's niche with 
philosophical rigor . 
Decorum (li ) seems to have priority in maturation b 
and historical record, as it is the limiting framework 
for acceptable behavior. Appropriateness (i) appears to 
be the means for working within the framework of decorum 
(li ), reflecting a concern for the content of actions. . b 
Appropriateness (i) is discussed further in the next 
chapter in Section II-E, "Axiom three: conscience and 
appropriateness. " 
Inauthenticit as Incom late Socialization 
A key difference between Confucian and Western 
concepts of self-actualization is the heavier importance 
placed on society in the former culture. Perhaps the 
discussions of authenticity and sociality will flow to- 
gether because of the likeness seen in the East, Jung 
(1966) states the necessity of social existence as a means 
of improvement to achieve authenticity. Tu (1972) goes 
as far as to say the distinction between the authentic 
and inauthentic self is a case of complete versus in- 
complete socialization. Tu believes the conflict between 
an inner sense of personal morality and an outer expres- 
sion of social responsibility is an overrated issue. 
Chang (1954) states that our first moral obligation 
is to transcend our biases, prejudices and other 
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egotistical habits. Rogers (1961) has observed insin- 
cerity and false fronts in almost every failure in 
communication. The dysfunctional behavior is due to 
a fear of being judged and not understood, Hopefully, 
the Confucian approach can develop confidence in one' s 
authenticity, as opposed to reacting fearfully to society. 
~ro 
' 1't 
Nature of Nan 
Neo-Confucianism is noted for its emphasis upon 
social harmony supported by principled post-conventional 
morality. The belief in the goodness of human nature 
(ps-t' ) s d ' ' sf 1 p*' ' rth*orpr'th 
p t' ( 1 h h ' ho-'). tffo t (~h f ) -r ot'- 
vation appears to become stronger when one has cherished 
beliefs and traditions to uphold. The goodness of human 
nature and a "heaven-saturated world, " leads to a per- 
ception of reality that is "friendly to right (~reall 
right) decision, if one learns not to obstruct or resist 
it" (Nivison, 1973, p. 135). Popular Western existen- 
tialists (philosophers and psychologists) believe mankind 
lives in an "outer world (that) is utterly indifferent 
to the rightness of his decisions and an inner world 
which just is those decisions" (Nivison, 1973, p. 135). 
Yet Neo-Confucianism does not solidify into a set 
of dogmas or foggy speculations despite its metaphysical 
leanings. A general in/unction is recognized as being 
difficult to understand in its raw sense. The individual- 
in-action "tells" the conscience about circumstances. 
Goodman and Naultsby (1978) stresses, "The way a ration- 
ally-thinking person acts depends on the circumstances, 
because he thinks first, then acts. Sometimes he responds 
one way, other times different ways to very similar situ- 
ations. That's the rationally creative approach to life" 
(pp. . 112-113) . The rectifying act is not necessarily 
a sinner's rebellion nor a puppet's indecisiveness. It 
simply reflects a need to know-the-good, a discernment 
of stimuli, an attitude of reverance toward society, 
and a goal of increased spontaneity . Li (manners) gives . b 
form to jen (benevolence) and "as jen is preserved, the 
self and the other are then identified, " according to 
Ch'eng Hao (Chan, 1963) . 
Situation Ethics 
Liu (1972b} views moral principles as universally 
applicable absolutes while "moral maxima are relative 
and confined to particular situations" (p. 421) . Prin- 
ciples only point to general directions. Chang Tsai 
wrote "principle is one and its manifestations are many" 
(li-i-fen-shu) . The situation ethics perspective of 
Neo-Confucianism has been noted repeatedly by several 
authors such as Tu (1968}, Cheng (1972b}, Liu (1972b}, 
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Nivison (1973) and Hall and Ames (1984) . Unfortunately, 
the Confucian/Neo-Confucian tradition has been frequently 
misperceived as rigid and legalistic by Western outsiders. 
Cheng (1972b) and Hall and Ames (1984) view much of 
the misunderstanding as resting with incomplete transla- 
tions of i, or "righteousness as appropriateness". More- 
over, righteousness has the connotation of narrow and 
dogmatic in the West, which is radically different from 
the Confucian concept. Unfortunately, typical brief 
translations of i seen by the researcher are simply 
"righteousness. " The researcher believes "appropriate- 
ness" or "fitness" would be far better single-word trans- 
lations of i. These definitions for i were found in the 
Doctrine of Mean (Cheng, 1972b) . 
Cua (1971a) states, "one of the most valuable func- 
tions of li is the establishment of harmony" (p. 133). 
Furthermore, Confucius states "respectfulness without 
li becomes tiresome, carefulness without li becomes . b b 
timidity, daring without li becomes turbulence and b 
straightforwardness without li becomes rudeness" . b 
(Analects I. 12) . Normative force is maintained only 
thr gh a ' er ioi nt' e (~h' - i) to zd th it i. 
Li (propriety) comprise the background of action or b 
social arena for behavior (Chang, 1974b) . The rules are 
needed to prevent behavior from degenerating into acts 
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without moral significance (Cua, 1971a). The subsection 
dealing with past applications of Neo-Confucianism fo- 
cused primarily on the creative tension between i and li. 
Chapter Three also discusses situation ethics in Neo- 
Confucianism. 
Relationalit and Communication 
The very etymology of ~en (benevolence) suggests 
relationality and communication. Jen is a simple four- 
stroke character composed of two ideograms: "man" and 
"two" (Jung, 1966). Tu (1972) sees the etymological 
meaning of ~en as "msn in society, " Streng (1982) cites 
T ang Ch« i s (1973a)contention that an entity is de- 
fined by its position in relation to the other things, 
because of fundamental inseparability . Since ~en in- 
corporates reciprocity (shu), responsibility is stressed 
as much as freedom. 
Cheng (1984) cited the "humanity/relationality" 
tradition of Chinese philosophy, as bearing the potential 
to complement the Western philosophical orientation to- 
ward "ob]ectivity/individuality. " Moreover, the re- 
searcher believes Chinese philosophy is more compatible 
with psychology than Western philosophy in this instance. 
Communication is held as a vehicle of truth, a 
recognition of a shared world. Spoken and written 
language are important because they enable j en to be 
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understood (Jung, 1966) . Such a contention frankly seems 
to belabor the obvious. However, Buddhism viewed language 
as empty symbols, skilled means to a goal and passing 
phantoms (Cheng, 1982) . The Neo-Confucians were forced 
to deal with issues in a philosophical manner that 
Westerners accept as undisputable truths. 
Recall the beginning of the authenticity section, 
in its discussion of genuineness in the counseling situa- 
tion. Beck and his colleagues (1979) emphasize the need 
to communicate one's authenticity, as opposed to merely 
possessing it. Wang Yang-ming lamented that too many 
p opl ale o oe l e (1~st -ch'h) t t etle t 
extension (chih ) (Ching, 1973) . The blend of honesty b 
and diplomacy Beck and his colleagues (1979) see in 
counseling is part of propriety (li ); a virtue that en- . b 
compasses all social contacts. 
S ontaneit and Nothin ness 
David S. Nivison (1973) shows the diametric opposi- 
tion of Neo-Confucian and Western existentialist beliefs 
on freedom and nothingness. Clearly, the Neo-Confucians 
have a far happier philosophy. The researcher believes 
Neo-Confucian views on spontaneity are some of their 
most progressive contributions to philosophy, partly be- 
cause they strove to unite reflection with immediacy. 
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Spontaneity is the result of following principle 
and is shown in a reverent attitude. Freedom is desir- 
able to the Neo-Confucian and the result of adjusting our 
self-understanding by removing anxieties. Western exist- 
entialists believe freedom is an awful burden from which 
we try to hide (Nivison, 1973) . In effect, these Euro- 
peans constructed a philosophy of neurotic avoidance 
(Coleman, Butcher R Carson, 1980) . Authenticity is 
seen by the European existentialists as accepting a world 
without principles and the resulting anguish of ground- 
less responsibility. 
In all fairness to the West, existential therapy 
has moved toward a more positive outlook through the work 
of psychologists like Rollo May and Abraham Maslow. 
Once again, we see a case where Western psychological 
thought is more compatible with Neo-Confucianism than 
Western philosophy. To the researcher, psychology also 
appears to be directed toward "relationality/becomingness" 
like Neo-Confucianism but unlike Western philosophy. 
The final section of this chapter, "A Metaphysics of Will" 
discusses spontaneity further. 
"Nothing" for the Neo-Confucians is an "absence of 
preconception or selfish interest that could bind us to 
things" (Nivison, 1973, p . 125) . The Western existential- 
ists feel consciousness is nothing because it is different 
from the object, yet we are hurled into the world and 
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forced to deal with such things. Neo-Confucianism sees 
the mind as nothing more than the principles it is think- 
ing of at any one point. In other words, the goal is 
realizing principle in consciousness, or hsin chi li 
(Nivison, 1973) . 
Confucius sounds like a behaviorist when he stated 
that people practice goodness (~en) because either they 
are motivated to take the next step or they are not so 
motivated (Nivison, 1973) . The ob]ectivity of rationality 
and a predisposition in humanity for striving toward 
reason as a goal allows Confucian tradition to be prin- 
cipled in Kohlberg's terms. Neo-Confucianism is a ve- 
hicle for leading people from their first spontaneous 
reactions and moral sentiments (ssu-tuan) to post- 
conventional reasoning. 
Alienation 
An effective way to delineate sociality could be 
to include a discussion of its opposite: alienation. 
Psychologist Rollo May attended the 1969 East/West Philo- 
sophers' Conference (Manley, 1970) . He delivered a lec- 
ture on a clinically alienated individual. It was con- 
ceived by the conference members that a society could 
be clinically alienated as well. Exalting law (fa) 
above principle (li ) leads to social mores (li ) without . a b 
kindness (j en) . 
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S. E. Lee introduced the concept of ~chun shu 
(loyalty/intensive empathy) as a way of combatting aliena- 
tion. Thome Fang amplified c~hun shu in stating that it 
is "the attempt to enter into the heart of the matter 
with intensive empathy" (Manley, 1970, p. 393) . A con- 
flict was conceived by Fang as the result of independent- 
ly derived situations and causes in the subj ect and ob- 
ject. Importantly, Western existentialism stresses 
thrownness into independently derived situations as the 
root of a tormented reality (Nivison, 1973) . Cheng 
(1977) states that Chinese philosophy does not view con- 
flict as having a basis in reality, unlike Marxism. 
Fang sees the Western transcendence of the Divine 
as a cause for alienation, a theological concept not 
found in the East. However, it is completely uncer- 
tain if alienation is less common in the Far East than 
the West. The researcher believes agnostics, atheists, 
or those who are indifferent to theological concerns, 
also create a transcendent image of God through His ab- 
sence in the person's conscience and life-view. "In- 
different transcendence" is common in secular societies 
throughout the world. 
The investigator agrees with Fang's call for im- 
manence as a cure for alienation. A complete transcen- 
dence" of the Divine could be heretical to Christianity 
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as it ignores the soul. Immanence retains the soul while 
recognizing the Divine presence in nature, while uplifting 
aesthetic appreciation to the status of prayer. Ful- 
filling our duties to associates also becomes a type of 
prayer. Reverence is easier in a theology of immanence 
because the presence of the Creator in the creation is 
not forgotten. The process theologian/philosopher Alfred 
North Whitehead believed God is the spark of every'crea- 
tive act (Whitehead, 1954). 
es of alienation. 
During the conference, alienation was originally 
divided into three categories: (1) clinical, (2) social 
or political and (3) essential or cut off from God. It 
is possible to be socio-politically or essentially 
alienated but not feel alienated and visa-versa (Manley, 
1970). 
James C. Manley (1970) reports that the discussion 
session chaired by Shu-hsien Liu was probably the most 
successful in grappling with the different senses of 
alienation. Slightly new categories were utilized. 
The clinically alienated and the socially alienated due 
to socioeconomic class were lumped into one category. 
The second form of alienation involved moral alienation 
from society. A curious combination of sociopaths and 
enlightened ethical leaders, such as Bertrand Russell 
and Gautama Buddha, were included in the category. 
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People like Wang Yang-ming or the Buddha embraced the 
cause of alienated people after solving their own aliena- 
tion through an enlightenment experience. 
The third type of alienation was a self-alienation 
stemming from "an inability to identify with the present 
self together with the desire to reach a higher self" 
(Manley, 1970, p. 394) . True alienation was seen as an 
apathy that reveals overall indifference and despair, 
The investigator adds that depression can show similar 
symptoms to alienation. The logotherapy of Frankl (1962) 
recognizes the presence of philosophical dilemmas con- 
tributing to mental illness. 
Dealin with alienation. 
A holistic counselor pays attention to an introspec- 
tive client's philosophical concerns. To dismiss somewhat 
esoteric beliefs as irrelevant story-telling or symptoms 
of chemical imbalance demeans the client and reduces the 
possibility of treatment. A cluster of irrational beliefs 
can be revealed through a neurotic's personal philosophy. 
Such information increases the counselor's power for 
disputation. An effective cognitive approach traces 
stimulus-response patterns back through ideations, an 
extension of behaviorism. Interestingly, the Confucian/ 
Neo-Confucian tradition saw greater potential in the 
k~uan personality (wild, eccentric, "mad ardour") than 
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tll l~lsl — ting (g l. fo t, 
~ 
d 11*g ") 
The juan are energetic aspirants for greatness who only 
need to find their niche in order to "settle down" (Ching, 
1976) . 
The Paradi atic Gentleman: Self-Perfection Throu h 
~goo 1 t 
A good way to end two chapters on authenticity and 
sociality is to describe a "reachable ideal"---the chun- 
tzu, or gentleman. Once again, we see a behaviorist tone 
to Neo-Confucianism through the chun-tzu. The chun-tzu 
is a readily observable criterion of social success 
through principled ethics. Antonio Cua (1971a) recalls 
that Confucian high schools transmitted the appeal of the 
chun-tzu to the students. The gentleman was compared to 
tt tf tot (a~to- ) ' p tio 1 e f 
duct, 
En'o the world. 
One of the most acceptable Neo-Confucian practices 
for the West is a shared joy in socializing with people. 
Tu (1968) insists that the ma]or purpose of cultivating 
(en (benevolence) is to be of great use to others, with- 
out being a utensil. Worldly activities are seen as 
valuable and self-fulfilling. Jan 's inner demand for 
self-actualization gives meaning to li as a principle . b 
of particularization in etiquette (Tu, 1972) 
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Neo-Confucianism is existential in its belief that 
we need other people, an element Bochenski (1954) sees 
in all European existentialisms. Unfortunately, European 
existentialists often dwelled on absurb randomness in- 
stead of accepting life with a search for principle (li ). 
Gabriel Marcel, however, perceived our task as creating 
the self and helping another to create his own freedom 
(Bochenski, 1954) . An often quoted passage from Con- 
fucius is nearly a exact duplicate of Marcel's statement 
(Ching, 1973) . 
One's ability to relate to others in a meaningful 
way reflects one's level of self-cultivation (Tu, 1972) . 
Good performance in a social situation is a creative 
act. Torrance (1979) attained a new meaning of Naslow's 
(1970) statement that a good soup could be as creative 
as a symphony, after observing veteran tempura chefs in 
action. Recall Chang Tsai's classic statement, "Princi- 
pie is one but its functions are many (li-i-fen-shu) " 
(Chan, 1967 a). The Neo-Confucian model of self-realization 
is human relatedness. Accordingly, sociality is a de- 
sirable and definable trait of the ultimate human attain- 
ment (Tu, 1972). The improvement of humanity is a jus- 
tification for sociality. The rules of li (etiquette) . b 
point to a movement toward authentic relationships. 
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Appropriateness (i) is the way for an individual to 
achieve self-realization (tzu-te) through bestowing or 
deriving meaning from a situation (Hall 6 Ames, 1984). 
To a certain extent, appropriateness (i) and decorum 
(li ) are overlapping virtues . The researcher feels . b 
appropriateness (i) is a more advanced skill that occurs 
later in development than propriety (li ) . Socialization . b 
clearly occurs through the "generalized other" explicity 
described in li (decorum) . b 
Appropriateness (i) entails a concrete rationalism 
that differs from the immediacy in good manners (li ) . b 
as it is a higher cognitive level of development. Li . b 
(manners) itself has been described as "the repository 
of past i" (appropriateness) (Hall 6 Ames, 1984). The 
Confucian concern is for good growing out of a concrete 
situation as opposed to generalities independent of ac- 
tion. The three virtues can be related in the following 
way: jen as substance, i as mediation and li as form ~ b 
(Cheng, 1972b) . All of the virtues are growth-oriented 
through providing a structure and the means to go beyond. 
See Figure One. 
An ethics of role. 
Antonio S. Cua (1971b) describes Confucianism as 
an "ethics of role. " Equal emphasis is given to the 
inner life of self-cultivation and the outer life of 
relevant well-mannered expression to the circumstances 
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of society. The interdependence of j en (benevolence) 
and li (propriety) embodies an "ethics of character" b 
and an "ethics of ritual rules" respectively (Cua, 197lb). 
The investigator believes Confucianism shows a greater 
concern for social skills and their development than any 
other Eastern philosophy. 
Cua (1971b) defines li (propriety) as "the tie or . b 
contact of an individual a'gent's actions with the cultural 
form of life which gives them the locus of identification 
and the possibility of moral achievement" (p. 40) . Tu 
(1972) sees li as the externalization of )en and the b 
principle of particularization. Li is a concern f' or . b 
the background of action, thereby exerting a moderating 
force on the individual 's beliefs. In other words, li 
is the ability to relate oneself to another and a cherish- 
ing of harmony (Tu, 1972) . 
Knowin the roots. 
Part of being a gentleman (chun-tzu) is being kind 
to one's parents and spouse. Only the individuals who 
are good to their "roots" can be expected to be good to 
their "branches, " that is, friends and acquaintances 
(Tu, 1968) . In today 's mobile society, close friends 
are part of one's roots as well. Problems in learning 
are frequently related to an inability to distinguish 
the roots from the branches, or maj or from minor points. 
Early Confucians had ideological disputes with the 
Mohists over the nature of love. The Mohists advocacy 
of universal love degenerated into universal apathy (Tu, 
1968) . A philosophical theory is invalid if it cannot 
be put into practice. A knowledge of norms (li ) is in- . b 
volved in appropriate (i) action. 
According to Cua (1971a) Confucius viewed the, status 
of gentleman as a reachable goal, while sagehood was per- 
ceived as an abstract standard of inspiration rather than 
aspiration. The investigator likes to see the chun-tzu 
(g tlaa ) th embodim t of ~he - i ( t' * ll): 
an actuating force in a commitment to ethics. Wang Yang- 
ming preferred to state that sagehood was within every- 
one's reach, although it is likely that "sagehood" for 
Wang was the equivalent of "gentleman" for Confucius 
(Ching, 1976) . Perhaps the most faulty component of 
existentialism is a lofty view of self-actualizing. A 
goal of perfection can become an illness in itself, as 
well as a hersey to most theistic traditions. 
A gentleman (chun-tzu) incorporates the unity of 
knowledge and action (chih hain ho-i), the virtues 
(te) and a spirit of catholicity and neutrality. One 
can see the continuity of Confucian/Neo-Confucian tra- 
dition from the Analects to Wang Yang-ming (Chan, 1967 a) 
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Confucius states in the Analects that the gentleman is 
one in whom words and actions are in harmony (II. 13) . 
Wang Yang-ming wrote that thought (yi) begins action 
(hain ) and action is the completion of knowledge (chih) 
(Ching, 1973) . Confucians view sincere wishes as in- 
sufficient for deeds to be considered meritorious. For 
example, "respectfulness without propriety (li ) becomes 
laborious bustle" (Cua, 1971a, p. 133) . Wang Yang-ming 
quoted Confucius stating, "Learning without thinking is 
labour lost" (Ching, 1973 a p. 106) . 
Catholicity and harmony refer to the situation 
ethics perspective of Neo-Confucianism incorporated in 
th o pt f ~h-ho (t a q ll ty/h ta y) d 
li-i-fen-shu (principle is one but its manifestations 
are many) . The gentleman applies these concepts by 
recognizing the limits of one's knowledge. Paying atten- 
tion to the social surroundings can lead one to the 
cad ly' f pt aclpl . fh ppl cat' of ~lf -ch'h 
is a concrete rationalism which utilizes empirical data. 
Japanese society still reflects the Confucian empiricism 
with tranquility (Kishimoto, . 1959). 
Part Three: Neo-Confucian Structure 
Insi ht and the Theor of 0 osition 
Rollo May (1975) defines self-actualization as 
bringing something new into reality. Carl Rogers (1961) 
sees the good life as a process of movement in a direction 
which the person selects when free to move in any direc- 
tion. Rogers emphasizes that it is a process or direc- 
tion, not a state or destination. Abraham Maslow (1968) 
described self-actualization as the fulfillment, use and 
exploitation of talents, capacities and potentialities. 
The characteristics of the process according to Rogers 
(1961) are (1) increased openness to experience, (2) 
increased existential living, (3) increased trust in self, 
and (4) process of functioning more fully. Alfred North 
Whitehead (1929/1958) based process philosophy on oc- 
casions of actualization. Every occasion is a combination 
of diverse element into a unity. The derivate is a fusion 
of the particular ground and its consequent. 
Novelt and Reason 
Rollo May (1975) sees self-actualization as begin- 
ning with an insight, but requiring determination to 
produce concrete results. The essential factor is the 
degree of absorption, or intensity level (May, 1975) . 
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I. M. Bochenski (1954) believes the existential experience 
as starting point is the commonest characteristic among 
existential philosophies. Whitehead (192 9(1958 ) consider- 
ed reason to be the judgment of novelty. Reason allows 
novelty to be realized in purpose and finally in fact. 
Ideal novelty is an analytic force against the synthe- 
sized ground of reason. Hwa Yol Jung (1966) explains that 
the goal is simply to put knowledge into action (chih 
hain ho-i) . The realization of knowledge depends on the 
benevolence (jen) and actions of the subject. 
Intensity level, as discussed by May, is best trans- 
lated in Chinese by li-chih, which means "fixing the 
determination, " or "forming a resolution" (Ching, 1973) . 
The author would like to introduce a new synonym for 
li-chih: "goal-setting. " 
Breakthrou h of Insi ht 
In discussing insight, Rollo May (1975) cites the 
theory of opposition by Carl Jung. Jung stated that 
the opposition between the conscious and unconscious 
mind is a system of self-regulation (Jung, 1953). May 
(1975) observes that insight has to break through the 
conscious efforts at rational thinking by an individual. 
The more dogmatically an argument is fought for con- 
sci. ously, the more likely unconscious doubts are held. 
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May (1975) defines the unconscious as the potentiali- 
ties for awareness or action which the individual can not 
or will not actualize. This view is strikingly similar 
t th N*-C f 'a atept, ge -t', a g" fgt 1 
condition of the minds" (Chang, 1979a) . He adds that 
the areas in which we are most intensively committed 
are most likely to lead to insight. Recall that "inten- 
stv haft eat" 1 s sss *ed ' Chf s s 1'- hth 
(Ching, 1973) . The processes of forming go on all the 
time, which is why insights frequently occur during re- 
laxation after hard work (Nay, 1975) . 
Insi ht Acce tin the Past 
Ignoring these unconscious doubts leads to symptoms 
that thwart conscious intentions. These forces tied 
up in the neuroses can extend the scope of life when 
released through insight (Jung, 1953) . 
True insight does not condemn the past, or else 
the "former life will suffer repression and produce just 
as unbalanced a state as existed before (Jung, 1953, p. 
74). The Confucian dialectics of harmonization sees 
opposing views as ultimately complimentary because con- 
flict is considered to be a contradiction of reality 
(Cheng, 1977) . Jung (1953) sees everything as a pheno- 
menon of energy, much as Neo-Confucians relate ch'i 
(matter-energy) to )pi (intentionality) (Cheng, 1979a). 
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Without its opposite, a truth or value would have 
very little meaning (Jung, 1953) . The opposite of the 
Buddhist aspired value, nothingness (nirvana) as a state, 
appears quite meaningful to the researcher. A conversion 
needs to conserve some of the previous values of the 
adherent, together with a recognition of their opposites 
(Jung, 1953) . Otherwise, appropriateness (i) of action 
vanishes and the new believer will find difficulty fitting 
into a cultural life-style (li ) (Cua, 1971b), The views 
of Whitehead on actualization or concretion are especially 
helpful. Each occasion is a unification of antecedent 
and consequent; the desirable present was made, possible 
by the less admirable past (Whitehead, 1958) . A key 
disagreement between existentialism and Neo-Confucianism 
is the fozmer's disregard for man as the manifestation 
of a broader life process. Bochenski (1954) views 
autonomous subjectivity in a creative sense to be one of 
existentialism's defining characteristics. 
The sudden insight, or enlightenment of Wang Yang- 
ming was true to the theory of opposition by Carl Jung, 
in that the experience of Wang did not lead him to doubt 
his Confucian heritage. Tnstead he chose to emphasize 
some Confucian concepts that had been neglected by more 
current scholars. Wang developed a minor concept used 
of his philosophy (Tu, 1978) . Wang also tried to resolve 
the differences between his viewpoints and those of Chu 
Hsi; perhaps too much. Wang never felt comfortable in 
disagreeing with Chu, due to his deep admiration for the 
character and scholarship of the Sung master (Liu, 1984). 
A Meta h sics of Will 
Understanding of form or principle (li ) takes a 
metaphysical tuzn in both Neo-Confucianism and existential 
therapy. May (1975) explains the ecstasy of finding form 
as an expezience of "this-is-the-way-things-are-meant-to- 
be. " Liu (1972a) concludes that transcendence of personal 
problems allows one to participate in the immanent creati- 
ity of th uu' et (s~hu -1 ). t h *r utl k ' ~ 
similar to Beck's use of decentezing in the treatment of 
the emotional disorders (Beck, 1976) . Sincerity (c~h'en ) 
is the means for reaching this goal; the primary religious 
virtue according to Whitehead (1926/1954). 
Princi le, Vital Force and Will 
First of all, the ultimate inseparability of princi- 
pie (li ) and vital force (ch'i) must be emphasized 
(Takehiko, 1979) . The following analysis is meant to 
show conceptual interdependence rather than separation. 
The researcher's interpretation probably shows more 
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influence from Chu Hsi than y)t(ang Yang-ming, unlike the rest 
of the thesis. 
The issue of will enters the picture when creativity- 
* -'P Pl (~h -l') ' Plo *d. Nth N *-t f 
t phy ' l th * ' alt the t' 'll (~h - ') t 
the same level as principle (li ) and vital force (ch'i). 
Creative will can be viewed as the moving force for ch'i 
as it travels through the framework of principle (li ), or 
as an aspect of vital force (ch'i) itself (Tong, 1982). 
Vital force has ontological priority since it provides a 
pl f pt' 'pl t* dh, j t th g'ht (y - ' ) 
is a prerequisite for reasoning (Cheng, 1979a). An el'ament 
of inference after the action is explicit. Behavior modi- 
fication programs, the graded task assignment designed by 
Aaron T. Beck (1976) for depressives and the advocacy of 
manual labor by Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085) contend that we 
derive our attitudes from our behavior. All three theories 
point to the need for action to make knowledge real and to 
the ontological and existential priority of vital force 
(ch' r). 
Principle has locigal priority and directive power 
vital force (Takehiko, 1979). Recall the previous com- 
parison of principle (li. ) to hopes, dreams and ideals. 
Logical priority is like cognitive therapy in its 
assertion that attitudes have behavioral consequences 
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(Beck, 1976) . Chang Tsai stated "principle is one but 
its function is differentiated into the many" (li-i-fen- 
shu) (Liu, 1972b) . The diversity of function creates the 
need for rightness as appropriateness (i). There is no 
room in Confucian/Neo-Confucian tradition for righteous- 
ness as dogmatic inflexibility. 
Analo of the Filled Ice Tra 
Metaphysics runs the risk of becoming the definitive 
esoteric abstract topic. The researcher will provide an 
example of metaphysics in everyday life: the filled 
ice-tray. The plastic ice-tray is an example of li a 
(principle, form), while the cooling water represents 
ch'i (matter-energy) . The action of pouring the water 
l te the t y eshfh ts tl ill (~sh — '). fh 
continuous freezing of the water also shows creative will. 
The actual process eliminates all indeterminateness from 
the idea of the ice cube as a possibility. 
Without the water, the ice tray would be useless. 
Wang Yang-ming considered people with little substance 
to be boring (Ching, 1973). Without the ice-tray, the 
water would be an undifferentiated mess. Wang Yang-ming 
wrote that people with little framework to their thought 
were rude (Ching, 1973) . When the ice hardens into cubes, 
we can see a unity of principle (li ) and vital-force ~ a 
( h'i); * I te e' tet of ff l 1'k ~(f - h'h 
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(conscience) . When the ice melts, we watch principle 
dissolving and matter-energy free-flowing. The disin- 
tegzation is analogous to a mental breakdown. 
The li-ch'i paradigm was also used to explain the 
differences between adult and child education respectively 
(Chan, 1967a ) . Rollo May (1975) uses an argument similar 
to the li-ch'i paradigm in discussing the contrast of 
the Appolonian to the Dionysian, and limits to spontanei- 
ty. May appears to show Neo-Confucian influence in these 
writings, as a result of the five-week East/West Philo- 
sophers' Convention he attended in 1969 (Manley, 1970) . 
The Four Qualities and the Five Virtues 
The Neo-Confucian theories of metaphysics are an 
effort to conceptualize cha~ge in actuality. Neo- 
Confucianism also reveals a growth-system through de- 
scziptions of the extension of conscience (chih ~lian 
chih), appropriateness (i), and propriety (li ). The b 
virtues show change in moving from the Four Beginnings 
(ssu-tuan) to faithfulness (hsin ) the fifth and final b 
virtue. The Five Virtues also reveal the Four Qualities 
which describes the process of changes in the universe. 
The Four Qualities are as follows: (1) origination 
is the beginning of things, (2) flourishing is their 
development, (3) advantage is the result of the harmony 
of all things, giving each of them theiz own strong 
92 
points, and (4) firmness, the completion of all things, 
"in which they are firm, strong and correct to the end" 
(Chan, 1967a, p. 9). The Four Qualities reflect the dia- 
lectics of harmonization in Neo-Confucianism (Cheng, 1977) 
The quality, origination, is comparable to the vir- 
tues humanity (j en) when the virtues are discussed 
separately. Collectively speaking, humanity (jen) em- 
braces the other four virtues. All virtues participate 
in the growth process of the qualities. In other words, 
~en is "The Origination" and the other virtues possess 
originations. 
S ontaneit and Princi le: A Criti ue of Western Existen- 
tialism 
Sp ta ity (t~zu-' n) i the e le f nt vni g 
to principle (li ) . Delaying decision-making often means ~ a 
the calculating of selfish gains (Nivison, 1973) . Neo- 
Confucianism provides an education in post-conventional, 
principled reasoning . We can experience gains in confi- 
dence through the extension of conscience (chih ~lian- 
chih), since it is based upon objective principle (li ). 
Importantly, Neo-Confucian teachings on the Four Begin- 
nings (ssu-tuan) are designed for the preconventional 
child. Developing the virtues (te) guides the adolescent 
into conventional, Stage 3, "nice guy" morality. 
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Cheng (1971) astutely points out that the overem- 
phasis on personal subjectivity in Western existentialism 
is humiliating, Bochenski (1954) perceives existentialism 
as a "therapeutic device" lacking the objective scienti- 
fic attitude of the Greeks. Existentialism is more com- 
parable to Indian philosophy in its obsession with death, 
suffering and failure (Bochenski, 1954), Moreover, 
existentialism disregards immanence. The quest for 
universal principles shared by Neo-Confucianism and 
Lawrence Kohlberg's (1981) revival of Greek Platonism 
enables individuals to develop greater ethical decision- 
making skills. The stress on subjectivity and the im- 
permanence or non-existence of principle severely limits 
ethical potential in all relativistic philosophies; such 
as existentialism, Buddhism, Taoism and anthropology. 
Platonism and Neo-Confucianism 
Kohlberg (1981) believes justice is the highest 
Platonic virtue. Platonic virtue includes personal 
authenticity, preserving harmony and proper actions that 
are due to each thing and class (Chang, 1963). Whereas 
wisdom (chih ) wisdom is the fundamental Chinese virtue, aa 
its application through appropriateness (i) seems to 
add credence to Kohlberg's theory on the universality 
of justice. Wisdom is both intellectual and practical 
or moral. The researcher disagrees with Chang's (1963) 
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belief in the dissimilarity between Platonic justice and 
Confucian righteousness (i) . 
Chang (1963) feels that "justice . . . is a much 
wider concept than righteousness (i)" (p. 300). The in- 
vestigator believes the idea of equilibrium/harmony 
(~ho -h ) p r e res cc&u '*u '. ch g' (3963) d c p- 
tion of "righteousness as the right thing to do in a par- 
ticular case, " and justice as "what is due to each 'thing 
and class" appear to be quite similar to the researcher, 
aside from the more empirical approach taken by the 
Chinese (p. 300). The a ~riori stance in Platonic jus- 
tice seems to make the concept more narrow than Confucian 
righteousness. 
The researcher agrees with Chang's (1963) assertion 
that wisdom is the most fundamental Chinese virtue. 
However, wisdom (chih ) is somewhat raw and unrefined 
without its application through appropriateness as 
rightness (i) . The next chapter, "Applying Neo-Confucian- 
ism to the cognitive/rational-emotive therapy of the 
emotional disorders, " develops fitness (i) within the 
context of therapy. Cheng (1972b) states that appropriate- 
ness (i) is the only Chinese virtue that cannot go to an 
excess, an assertion firmly grounded in the philosophy 
of Mencius. 
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Motivation Theor: A Passion for Form 
Developing a Neo-Confucian motivation theory is an 
ambitious project, because the researcher is molding the 
more implicit aspects of philosophical concepts into a 
psychological theory. The proposed motivation theory 
is somewhat like a theory of problem-solving or creati- 
vity. It is apparent that a researcher must formulate 
similar models for motivation theory and personality 
theory for the sake of inner consistency. A Neo-Confucian 
personality theory is provided in Figure Three. 
The investigator was inspired by Rollo May's (1975) 
discussion on "the passion for form, " a method involving 
imagination filling in gaps to provide meaning. Several 
Neo-Confucian concepts are inadvertently implicated in 
May's (1975) theory. Recall the investigator 's assertion 
in the introduction that part of the pzoof for Neo- 
Confucianism's applicability rests in the present exist- 
ence of similar theories and methods in psychology. The 
concepts related to May's (1975) "passion for form" are 
as follows: (13 yi with somewhat faulty chih (imagina- 
tion), (2) i (meaning through fitness), (3) li (form, 
p i pie), d c bf t 0 f (4) ch h l~hll 
(extending conscience) and (5) ko-wu (rectifying affairs) 
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The first two concepts compose the basic belief 
system as discussed in Figure Three. The third concept, 
li, is the goal of the individual. The last two eon- ' a 
cepts are the methods by which the belief system reaches 
its goal. 
Constructive Memor 
Rollo May's (1975) concept of the imagination pro- 
viding meaning is related to constructive memory as dis- 
. cussed by Frederick C. Bartlett (1932). Several factors 
can be attributed to a lack of literal accuracy in re- 
call: (1) visual imagery, (2) familiarity with a par- 
ticular element, (3) personal interests and (4) ra- 
tionalization. Rationalization was defined as "an at- 
tempt to make the material more understandable, com- 
fortable and satisfying" (Zechmeister & Nyberg, 19S2, 
p . 301) . Memory is built out of our attitude toward an 
active mass of organized past reactions. May 's (1975) 
"imagination providing meaning" appears closest to 
"rationalization" in Bartlett's (1932) memory research. 
An interaction between one's knowledge and the tezt is 
constructive when inferences and elaboration of the 
material-to-be-remembered is present. 
The Confucian virtue i (fitness as meaning) appears 
to be the most relevant Chinese concept to rationaliza- 
tion in Bartlett's memory research, In this case, 
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l~s-ch'h l o e) d (pp p ' t s) ~ et 
show some dissimilarity. The flexibility of i might go 
hyodthpetttidcectnsof~l'n-hdhs th 
two serve to balance each other. Chapter Three examines 
the 'o h l~n-hh diss ss tilly d 
tical; a far more frequent condition. 
Immediac and Phenomenolo 
The concept of intentionality (Zi) in phenomenology 
can become rather complicated. In this instance, the 
researcher is looking at immediacy as a quality that re- 
moves humans from a vacuum, but forces us to live through 
a world of phantoms and facts. Psychology and philosophy 
enable humanity to deal with inevitable fallibility. 
Intentionality becomes synonymous with existence itself, 
because thought requires an object (Jung, 1965) . Even 
the Buddhist seeking enlightenment has to think about 
nothingness, even though it is neither a place nor a 
thing (Cheng, 1982) . 
The phenomenal world, or Lebenswelt, is composed of 
things which occupy the forefront of our attention (Jung, 
1965) . We may see things that are not really there, but 
ought to be there for the sake of coherence and meaning 
(Zechmeister p Nyberg, 1982) . Seken is a syncretic 
Japanese concept describing a social reality; a Lebenswelt 
laden with a fear of social disapproval and a sense of 
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obligation. The interaction between perception and at- 
tention explains why Japanese are motivated to apologize 
(Tohru, 1983) . 
Moreover, the immediacy of imagination and the pro- 
cess of constructive memory, point to the fallibility of 
the belief system. Paradoxically, these operations are 
necessary for normal functioning. Perhaps psychopathology 
is partly the result of an inherently deviation-amplifying 
sys tern. 
The Function of Princi le 
Neo-Confucian li has a two-tiered function: antece- a 
dent cause of events and overall regulation; a combina- 
tion of the existential and metaphysical. The concepts 
i (fitness) and Zi (intentionality) are purely existen- 
tial, although ~i is seen as the manifestation of ch'i 
(vital force), a metaphysical concept (Cheng, 1999a) ~ 
The investigator proposes an extension to the mean- 
ing of li (principle). The investigation of events 
(ko-wu) necessarily reveals a principle (li ) behind all ~ a 
things; an Eastern way of phrasing cause-and-effect. 
However, not all principles of events are good, even 
though the understanding of good-and-bad events is good. 
To dismiss bad habits and faulty thinking as simply 
extraneous ~i (thought) or ch'i (vital force) is to 
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disregard classification schemes in psychopathology. 
"False li " (principle) channels erroneous attitudes 
and behaviors according to a structure; albeit, a fragile 
one, but a structure nonetheless. Cua (1971a) believes 
Confucius and Aristotle would agree that moral virtues 
are habits for cultivating appropriate attitudes for 
conduct in life. 
The search for principles has to distinguish between 
that which facilitates harmonious relations, and vehicles 
promoting strife and disintegrated functioning. Wang 
Yang-ming held seriousness (c~hin ) as his central purpose (t~hih) for exte di g o ee ( h'h 1~th h) 
to find "true principle" (li ) (Jung, 1965), Furthermore, 
the researcher believes his contention is justifiable on 
the Neo-Confucian observation that mental activity 
(f'- ( ) i so t d with th r se of 'h th g od d 
evil. Perpetual mental inactivity (wei-fa), like (Zi) 
with neither proper nor faulty perception (chih) are as 
impossible as completely unique, non-classif iable mental 
illness. 
Search for Meanin 
May's (1975) "passion for form" is similar to Viktor 
Frankl's "search for meaning" (Frankl, 1962). The usage 
of meaning for Frankl is more reflective than May's 
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(1975) description of meaning. Frankl (1962) believes 
the search for meaning is a primary force in life. Ther- 
apy is directed toward the future, instead of reinforcing 
the neurotic's dwelling on the past. NcDowell and 
Stewart's (1982) analysis of Kierkegaard views commitment 
to an absolute, and the subsequent ordering of life around 
that goal as the beginning of the ethical stage The 
absolute is li (principle) and the belief system seeks 
its incorporation and realization. Selfhood is achieved 
through commitment, or fixing the determination (li-chih) 
in Neo-Confucian terminology . NcDowell and Stewart (1982) 
cite Frankl as a description of the ethical man envisioned 
by Kierkegaard. 
The investigator believes serious goal-setting is 
the hallmark of reason as well as ethics. Choices can 
be made with assertion for emotions are granted a frame- 
work. Satisfaction depends upon the ability to general- 
ize an intuition to events; according to Whitehead (1929/ 
1958) . A correlary to imagination filling in form could 
be form critiquing imagination. Simple reflection or 
the gathering of new information can provide the test. 
Exte iiog e e i h h ~1* — hih) *ad t'fyi g 
affairs (ko-wu) is the Neo-Confucian way for utilizing 
stored knowledge or gathering new understanding. Atten- 
tion is always given to the specific context. 
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Creativit in Existentialism 
Freudian psychoanalysis. degrades creativity as being 
projective of desires rather than principles and a mani- 
festation of past conflicts (Nay, 1975). The creative 
process is seen as "regression in service of the ego;" 
a mere symptom that can be reduced to a neurotic cause. 
External evaluation poses a threat and a need for defen- 
siveness (Rogers, 1961), The Freudian attitude toward 
creativity may represent a self-fulfilling, particularly 
if an individual is somewhat familiar with the basic 
suppositions of Freud. 
Hopes, dreams and expectations play the role of 
principles (li ) before actual manifestation (ch'i) in 
Neo-Confucianism and existential therapy. T'ang (1973b) 
calls ch'i, the existential process. May (1975) com- 
pares the creating of one's self to concrescence in the 
process philosophy of Whitehead. A Neo-Confucian stance 
can unify the importance of the future and past, which 
is the focus of existential therapy and Freudian psycho- 
analysis respectively. While personal experience makes 
~ln - hih (co ci n l eon h*t diff e t n h 
dividual, Carl Rogers has found that his most personal 
experiences were the most generally felt by others 
(Rogers, 1961) . Nivison (1973) reports that Wang Yang- 
g 'd d l~h'h t be b ' f t n*1'tf 
IQZ 
than individuality. A new experience that leads to a 
creative venture, or more complete understanding can be 
viewed in two ways through ko-wu (rectifying affairs, 
investigating events). 
The "missing piece of the puzzle" may be found in the 
new experience. It can lead to a better understanding of 
faulty beliefs (~i without chih )' and inapplicable know- 
ledge (chih without i). A greater flexibility or 
refinement may be all that is necessary. The completion 
of a search for form successfully resolves the will 
(~h' - ) d p d o' g. Ih 1 g' o'og f 
irrational thought sequence can be traced. 
Existential There and Co nitive Thera 
Some Shared Goals 
The insight theories of May (1975) appear to be re- 
lated to the cognitive therapy of Beck (1976). Both are 
concerned with finding activating cognitions in the un- 
conscious or preconscious mind. The conscious mind can 
lose awareness due to its dogmatism, which is often ir- 
rational. It could be said that a break in the unity of 
knowledge and action (chih ~hsin ho-i) occurs, when con- 
scioius effort degenerates into static rationalization. 
The only observable action is emotional eruption due 
to the inapplicability of poorly discerned beliefs. The 
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most important aspect of Wang's thesis on the unity of 
knowledge and action is the inseparability of thought and 
practice (Cheng, 1979a ). Thus, a negative belief must 
command emotional consequences in the same manner as their 
positive counterparts. Insight can provide a goal that 
pulls a client toward rational thinking. Please refer to 
the next chapter "Applying Neo-Confucianism to the 
Cognitive/Rational-Emotive Therapy of the Emotional 
Disorders. " 
Summar /Conclusion 
"Existential therapy and Neo-Confucianism" is an 
effort to introduce traditional Eastern views on the con- 
1 &~1- h'h), th ' 1 1f, d 1f- t 1 
t' l~?'' -h ' ) t W t* p y h 1 gy. 
"~L' - h'h 1f-th y ' p y h 1 gy, t"t 1 
ates Wang Yang-ming's theory of conscience according to 
the six methods for verifying any theory; (1) exten- 
sivity, (2) parsimony, (3) empirical validity, (4) 
internal consistency, (5) testability, and (6) usefulness. 
"Neo-Confucianism changing with the needs of society" 
h'ow its growth-system orientation solved problems that 
still affect mankind today. Sincerity of will is a nec- 
cessary attitude toward a ritual. Revision is demanded 
to remain in accordance with propriety. This framework 
can be used to change personal habits, too. 
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Part Two examines authenticity and sociality; the 
self in relation to others, Authenticity is described 
in three different ways in Wang Yang-ming's letters: 
sincerity, vigilance in solitude and patience under 
criticism. Fitness (Qi as finding a niche is discussed 
before inauthenticity as incomplete socialization leads 
into the sociality section. The sociality section is 
composed of six major parts: (1) nature of man, (2) 
situation ethics, (3) relationality/communication, (4) 
spontaneity and nothingness, (5) alienation, and (6) the 
paradigmatic gentleman: self-improvement through so- 
ciality. 
Part Three is probably the most technical portions 
of the chapter. "Insight and the theory of opposition" 
looks at the relation of enlightenment to Carl Jung's 
theory of opposition. "A metaphysics of will" is a 
study of principle (li ), vital force (ch'i) and creative 
11 (~sh — '). Zt's r. ' ~ de r te er a 
esoteric label through analogies between the three meta- 
physical categories and a filled ice-tray, together with 
comparisons to psychology. The existential chapter 
culminates with a Neo-Confucian based motivation theory. 
The motivation theory is closely related to the re- 
searcher's personality theory, which is discussed in 
Chapter Three. See Figure Three. The function of 
constructive memory includes imagination, a factor which 
leads the investigator to see an inherent warp in the 
belief system. Imagination with a lack of supporting 
facts is a type of false principle (li ) . Psychopathology 
may be the result of a deviation-amplifying system. The 
following chapter is an attempt to combat emotional dis- 
orders through cognitive/rational-emotive therapy and 
Neo-Confucianism. Rather than dismissing human goodness, 
these observations stress the need for education. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
APPLYING NEO-CONFUCIANISM 
TO COGNITIVE/RATIONAL-EMOTIVE THERAPY 
Introduction 
The goal of this study is to show the relationship 
between Neo-Confucianism and the cognitive and rational- 
emotive therapies of the emotional disorders, particularly 
depression. The researcher will attempt to prove that 
Neo-Confucianism can actually amplify current techniques 
in therapy. This study endeavors to go beyond simply 
making esoteric comparisons. 
The researcher shares the same basic purpose as Ellis 
and Harper (1975), namely, to transmit "the best wisdom 
about human nature from the past and present--and particu- 
larly from the somewhat neglected philosophic writings 
and to make it widely available, with suitable revisions 
and additions, to present day troubled people" (p, ix). 
The chapter will have three major parts: the introducticn, 
the Four-Axiom Teaching, and the summary. The introduction 
will answer some basic questions. The Four-Axiom Teaching 
begins with a theoretical expression of the nature of man in 
Sentence One. The Second Axiom shows the phenomenological 
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orientation of Neo-Confucianism. The link between Axioms 
Two and Three expresses a personality theory and model of 
problem behavior. The counseling process is discussed 
primarily in Axioms Three and Four. To a certain extent, 
the unitary structure of Neo-Confucianism allows for a 
discussion of all the aspects of counseling theory and 
practice throughout the article. 
Two figures that relate psychology to the Four-Axiom 
Teaching are provided in the paper. Figure Two is en- 
titled, "The beginning and end of emotional disturbance. " 
It focuses on the research of Aaron T. Beck (1976), 
concerning automatic thoughts and primitive thinking. 
Figure Three is called, "Applying Ellis' ABC Personality 
Theory to the Unity of Knowledge and Action, " and it uses 
the research of Albert Ellis, while differentiating the 
belief system and adding a resolving intervention. The 
summary is an expression of Neo-Confucian concepts in 
language that is more familiar to psychologists. 
Wan Yan -min and His Potential for Toda 
Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) was one of the greatest 
Neo-Confucian philosophers. Later scholars considered 
him to be a co-founder of the Lu-Wang School of the Mind 
within Neo-Confucianism. Actually Wang received far more 
influence from Chu Hsi (1130-1200) than Lu Hsiang-hsan 
(1139-1193) . The scholarship of Chu was superior to that 
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of Lu (Liu, 1984) . Nevertheless, Wang 's philosophical 
thought grew to resemble the works of Lu, thus developing 
the earlier scholar 's groundwork. 
Wang was also a government official and an outstand- 
ing general. In fact, he wrote the Four-Sentence Teach- 
ing right before he was called back to active service 
(Chan, 1972) . The Four-Sentence Teaching is important 
because it serves as an excellent outline, summary . and 
guide to Neo-Confucian thought. Most concepts in Neo- 
Confucianism can be related to the Four-Axiom Teaching. 
This article will attempt to show the relevance of 
Neo-Confucianism to cognitive/rational-emotive therapy. 
(1) The emphasis upon the client's conscious ability 
to think rationally, despite some tendencies toward 
"crooked thinking" is found in Wang's doctrine of ~lian- 
chih (conscience, innate knowledge of the good), (Refer 
to the Chinese Glossary if additional assistance with 
the Chinese terminology is necessary) . 
(2) Both Beck's (1976) cognitive therapy and the 
cognitive theory of learning see correcting perception 
as the key, rather than incorporating new responses; a 
view shared by Wang's version of ko-wu (rectifying af- 
fairs) . 
(3) Ellis' (1971) ABC personality model of activat- 
ing event + belief = emotional consequence is found in 
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Wang's doctrine of chih hain ho-i (unity of knowledge 
and action) . The Second through Fourth Sentences show 
the same sequence. The unity of knowledge and action 
also reveals the cognitive/rational-emotive therapy warn- 
ing against overgeneralization, since it implies absolutes. 
(4) Beck (1976) and Ellis (1971) use a reeducational, 
disputational approach in counseling. Wang's philoso- 
phical letters reveal the same attitude. Julia Ching 
(1973) states that the Chinese do not separate the opera- 
tions of intellect and will. The word "~i", encompasses 
both aspects in its definition. 
(5) Both cognitive therapy and Neo-Confucianism be- 
lieve thought precedes emotion. Thus a reaction "can be 
dissected rationally into its thought components" 
(Goodman & Naultsby, 1978, p. 65). Neo-Confucianism 
urges expressing our understanding in words so as to 
clarify thinking (de Bary, 1983). 
(6) Both cognitive/rational-emotive therapy and Neo- 
Confucianism are fairly easy systems for a client to 
understand, Beck (1976) endeavors to relate cognitive 
therapy to everyday experience; entitling some of the 
chapters in his books with references to common sense. 
Wang Yang-ming proclaims experience to be the Second 
P a 'pie d~1' - hih (c* i ) t b th F st 
Principle (Ching, 1973) . Neo-Confucian writings usually 
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take the format of personal letters, as opposed to the 
lengthy abstract texts found in Western philosophy (Wu, 
1971) . 
The current use of many psychological concepts and 
methods compatible with Neo-Confucianism seems to justify 
its revival today. This research is not empirical but it 
is hoped that the theoretical system can inspire empirical 
research. Predictive validity is essential for a theory, 
if it is to offer a unique contribution to science. The 
th beli th t the a in, "Bp ta 'ty (t~au- ) 
is the result of conforming to principle (li ), " may be 
tested empirically by means of a questionnaire. 
Nevertheless, humanistic psychology is opposed to 
the Long-standing belief that empiricism is the only valid 
method for gathering behavioral information (Corey, 1983) . 
Among other things, Neo-Confucianism endeavors to give a 
metaphysical foundation to cognitive processes. The re- 
searcher believes such labeling could facilitate the 
counseling process. A depressed, cynical client may be 
a discouraged idealist who would like to philosophize 
successfully'. 
A 1 in Neo-Confucianism to semor Research 
Alfred North Whitehead (1926/1954) listed the tests 
of accuracy for a metaphysical description: (1) logical 
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coherency, (2) adequacy, (3) exemplification in other fields 
than the one it receives its origin. The very body of the 
thesis is an effort to prove the logical coherency and 
adequacy of Neo-Confucianism. Exemplification of Neo- 
Confucian metaphysics in other fields is evident in memory 
research. 
Henry Ellis' (1983) resource allocation model points to 
the effects of mood upon the availability of cognitive pro- 
cesses. Additional research has shown that depression 
harms both the encoding and retrieval processes. The cog- 
nitive effort effect is established, as subjects were more 
were more likely to remember information, if they were in 
a neutral (non-depressed) state (Thomas, MacFarland, Lane 6 Ellis, 
1984). These results seem to confirm Wang's theory of the 
unity of knowledge and action (chih ~hsin ho-i), especially 
the view of action as the completion, effort and substan- 
tial aspect of knowledge. 
The Four-Axiom Teachin 
Here is a translation of the Four-Axiom Teaching by 
Chung-ying Cheng (1979a), 
"(1) Devoid of good and evil is the substance 
(p -t'1 fh ' ). (2) I 1 d 'th god d 11 
ment of intention (~i). (3) Knowing good and evil (func- 
t'o f) go d-ko 1 g (~1' - h'h). (4) '1* d g d 
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and remove evil is the act of rectifying affairs (ko- 
wu). " (p. 278). 
The doctrine of innate rationality is Sentence Three. 
The style in which the Four-Axiom Teaching is presented re- 
flects that Neo-Confucianism is a moral philosophy, which 
sometimes are exhortations that are inappropriate for 
psychology. 
Axiom One: Human Nature 
Within Neo-Confucianism, the First Axiom has caused 
the most controversy, due to its esoteric nature and 
problems in translation (Cheng, 1979a). Pen-t'1 (original 
condition) is practically synonymous with ~hsin , which ~ b 
means human "essential nature. " It is a discussion of 
the mind before phenomena. "Devoid of good and evil" 
more precisely means "beyond good and evil, " according 
to (Cheng, 1979 a). The original substance of the mind 
appears to perform some of the same functions as the un- 
conscious in psychology. 
g t' th 'g 1 h t e (f -t'') ' e' ply 
described as being good, without regard as to whether 
principle can be duplicated in the phenomenal world (Fu, 
1983). In either case, the major argumentation is viewing 
th ff t (~k-f ) f mt 1'ty (~1' o - h'h) * th 
f dt (f -t'')*f tll d(hf ). T'gth 
(1973b) views the stage "beyond good and evil" as not 
gloating over one's good works. 
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Cheng (1979a) observes that this notion was used for 
enlightening the average. Rationality as the foundation 
of the mind lends itself to a goal-directed counseling 
approach, because it is a theory of effort. The goal- 
directed counselor practices the unity of knowledge and 
action (chih ~hsin ho-i). 
~S 
th g(t ) * d't' (P o-t' ') f th h' d (hs 
can be summarised in the following. manner: 
(1) Humans have intrinsic worth because we possess 
reason (li ) which is granted by Heaven. Neo- 
Confucianism stresses immanence more than 
transcendence, much like the Anglican bishop, 
George Berkeley (1865-1753) (Harris, 1969). 
Li , is used to describe heavenly reason and 
the cause of events. 
(2) Good and evil are not opposite values, rather 
"nothing" and "something" are opposites. 
(3) Mind is in a state of potential energy which is 
based upon the metaphysical value of li 
(principle, form). Pen-t i and li (decorum) t . b 
are closely related etymologically. 
(4) Things (wu) have an inherent principle (li ), 
just as the human mind (hain) has an original 
h t (h -t' ') (~h' ). 
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Neo-Confucianism stresses the unity of mankind 
and nature. 
Axiom Two: Intentionalit 
The Second Axiom refers to intention (~i), which 
in Chinese is defined as a reaction to an object. Chang 
(1955) considers the key to Wang's system to be the 
viewing of things as objects of consciousness. Thought 
requires something to be thought about. Wang's theory 
is unique philosophically, for seeing a close connection 
between willing and knowing. Such an outlook is common 
in cognitive psychology. 
Wang Yang-ming went beyond this theory in surmizing 
that seeing and thinking are similar processes, which 
could be a key philosophical basis for the use of imagery. 
Wang's theory of intentionality is the most clearly 
phenomenological aspect of his system (Jung, 1965) . 
The researcher prefers the intentionality interpretation 
of ~i because it preserves the cognitive-behavior stance 
on the precedence of cognition to emotion. Furthermore, 
intentionality is very similar to attention. Yi should 
not be confused with c~h'in , or emotions. Simply, con- 
sciousness (hsin) is characterized by thought (Zi) 
(Jung, 1965) . 
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Automatic thou hts . 
The "automatic thought" is described by Beck (1976) 
as discrete, specific, self-defeating thoughts which 
originate spontaneously from the pre-conscious . In Neo- 
Confucian terminology, an automatic thought is Zi 
a (thought) without chih (perception) or with faulty 
chih. See Figure Two. 
Th H -Corfu ' a ne pt, C~1l' ~ - ' (mak' g wfll 
sincere) is particularly meaningful when viewed in light 
of the need to make a proper unity of thought (~i) and 
discernment (chih) . Keep in mind a related principle, 
namely the unity of knowledge to action (chih hain ho-i) 
Automatic thoughts are part of the function of the 
cognitive triad in depression: (1) negative self-con- 
cept, (2) negative world-view, and (3) pessimistic out- 
look on future (Beck, 1976) . The cognitive approach 
attempts to fill the gap between the event and unpleasant 
emotional reaction. Cognitive methods bring the activat- 
ing thought into awareness and employ rational methods 
for coping purposes. 
The Neo-Confucian goal is to unite thought (~i), 
perceptual knowledge (chih) and appropriate application 
(i) . Both Chang (1955) and Jung (1965) believe the 
failure to realize the unity of mind and the principles 
of things (hsin "ought to be" li ) is a ma)or cause of 
problem behavior. 
Level of 
Awareness Unconscious Preconscious Conscious 
A. T. Beck' s 
Cognitive 
Therapy 
Model 
Unclassified 
I 
I 
DepressivQI ~ g 0 0 Emotions 
I g 
I MA 
I 
JJ n 0 0 
n e 
'0 e 
e 8 aa 
Normal 
Emotions 
Wang Yang-ming's 
Idealistic 
Neo-Confucian 
Model 
Pen-t'i 
(original 
substance) 
Negative 
Yi (thought) 
' 4 
I 
1 
J e 
~ 8 o J n 
V 4 
I 
V g N 
q$ g R O 
O 
Positive 
Chih 
(knowing) 
Sentence Number Two Four Three 
Figure II 
The Beginning and End of Emotional Disturbance 
Note: In this table the pairing of chih and i (appropriateness) is assumed for the sake of brevity, in the section on positive emotions. Also, 
"negative ~i" is really yi with faulty or minimal chih (discernment). 
Liang-chih and ko-wu are similar to their Western counterparts. 
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The discussion of ko-wu (rectifying affairs), later 
in this thesis, should clarify any misconceptions about 
~i (intentions). Ro-wu is the correcting of intentions 
that give rise to faulty perceptions: a cognitive theory 
of learning (Wolman, 1973). Intention is both desirable 
and unavoidable, a point that was hotly contested with 
the Buddhists (Chang, 1979a), 
Interaction of thou ht and discernment 
The Russian novelist, Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1864/1980) 
explored psychopathology through fiction. Dostoyevsky 
believed depressives search for an "incontrovertible" 
reason for failure. Beck and Shaw (1977) have concluded that 
depressives see themselves as "losers. " The negative belief 
system creates selective attention, changes accessibility, 
or perception (chih) reciprocally (su) influencing thought 
(~i). Depressives are more inclined to remember sad 
events (Riskind 6 Rholes, 1984). The third phase can 
affect the second stage, a factor to be examined further 
in the next section. Also, the sequential nature of 
thinking exhibits that the perception, correct or in- 
correct, precedes a later thought. 
~Sa 
Intention may be described as the following: 
(1) The beginning of intention (~i) is either in 
* d 'theta — h'h (k ' g tfl g* d, 
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conscientious consciousness, concrete ration- 
alism), or it is an automatic thought. Chang 
Tsai stated, "Whenever in our effort at thinking 
we come to something that cannot be expressed in 
words, we must think it over carefully and sift 
it again and again (Chan, 1967a, p. 97). 
(2) Intention is the motivation and beginning of 
knowledge. Action is the effort and completion 
of knowledge (Ching, 1973). Since knowledge is 
the beginning of action, intention is practical 
before it becomes theoretical. Intention serves 
as the original substance of the unity of know- 
ledge and action (chih ~hain ho-i) (Jung, 1965). 
Recall the need to make the will sincere (ch'eng). 
(3) Mind is in a state of kinetic energy which is 
based upon the metaphysical value of ch'i 
(matter-energy, vital force) (Cheng, 1979a) 
Jung (1965) observes that ontology is only 
possible as intentionality. Mind (hsin) 
and thought (~i) are etymologically related 
as well. 
The Link Between Axioms Two and Three 
The link between the Second and Third Axioms is very 
important, because it emphasizes the need to pair inten- 
tion (~i) with perception (chih ) (Cheng, 1979a) ~ Wang 
called thought a reaction to an object, while conscience 
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I~1'*n - h'h) y th ' 't* c bl p t ( h'h) d 
the ever-moving intention (~i) activity. Metaphysically, 
principle (li ) and vital force (ch'i) are also unified 
(Cheng, 1979a ) . The pairing of intention (~i) and percep- 
tion (chih) is a moral epistemological view, as expounded 
in the Four-Axiom Teaching. 
The Ming dynasty Neo-Confucians assumed that the 
pairing of intention (~i) with perception (chih) led to 
appropriateness (i) and manners (li ). Albert Ellis' . b 
(1971) rational-emotive therapy instructs clients to be 
"discriminatingly emotional. " In other words, if "you 
know what is gonig on, mellow-out about itf" Chih 
(wisdom) is considered part of ethics. Principle (li ) 
encompasses all of the virutes and governs the changes 
from pre-arousal to arousal. 
Benevolence (jen), appropriateness (i), manners 
(li ), and faithfulness (hain ) are the other virtues 
(Chan, 1967a). Benevolence (jen) is an overly global term 
to use in a personality model, since technically jen en- 
compasses all virtues (Tu, 1968). Jen is particularly 
implicit in chih (wisdom, learning) as a normative type 
of knowledge. Faithfulness (hsin ) is the presence of the b 
other four virtues in a developed state. Faithfulness is 
the only virtue not included in the Four Beginnings (ssu- 
tuan) (Chan, 1967a) ~ 
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In the case of ~i (thought) and chih (discernment) 
with i, Neo-Confucian epistemology describes the movement 
of mental activity through the link from Axioms Two to 
Three. Its ethics are elaborated in Axiom Three. The 
Ming Neo-Confucians assumed that the pairing of intention 
a (~i) with discernment (chih ) led to appropriateness (i) 
and manners (li ) . . b 
A ro riate Discernment of Thou ht: A Personalit Model 
A model of neurotic and psychotic behavior can be 
made with Neo-Confucian concepts. Discernment may exist 
without appropriateness but the opposite can not be true. 
The original automatic thought could be viewed as an in- 
tention without discernment. The severity of the ensuing 
disorder is indicated by whether a predominance of in- 
coherent or inappropriate behavior is evident. 
Psychoses may be seen as a chronic inability to pair 
intention with discernment. Neuroses would be considered 
as intention with discernment, but with an absence of 
appropriateness. This model is consistent with the cog- 
nitive and behavioral skepticism toward dividing the 
psychoses into bipolar affective and schizophrenia. Thus, 
a lack of discernment is a thought disorder and a lack 
of appropriateness is a mood disorder. See Figure Three. 
Neuroses may be analyzed further with the application 
of Neo-Confucianism. An abnormal psychology textbook 
Albert Ellis' 
Rational- 
Emotive 
Therapy 
A (activating event)-------- B (belief)-------- C (emotional 
conse- 
quence) 
D (disputing 
intervention) 
Wang Yang-ming's 
Idealistic 
Neo-Confucianism 
wu (event)------- ~i (intention)------- h~sin (action 
+ + chih (perception) 
and li (propriety) i (appropriateness) 
I Sentences 2 ('h 3 I 
I I I 
I I I 
~ll - hh ----ko-wu (rectifying 
(good-knowing) affairs) 
"Resolving 
Intervention" 
Sentence 3 Sentence 4 
Figure III 
Applying Ellis' ABC Personality Theory to 
the Unity of Knowledge and Action (chih hain ho-i. ) 
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defines neuroses as an avoidance of problems and a high 
level of anxiety (Coleman, Butcher & Carson, 1980). 
The virtue of appropriateness (i) can reveal a correlary 
to the definition of neuroses, that is, when appropriate- 
ness is lacking. The inability to apply one's knowledge 
to a concrete situation may be mistaken as an avoidance 
of problems (Cheng, 1972b). 
Appropriateness (i) and manners (li ) have a dia- 
lectical relationship . Appropriateness refers to the 
application of normative knowledge (chi5 ) to a concrete 
situation (Cheng, 1974b) . Manners (li ) pertain to the 
individual's tie to the social background (Cua, 1971b) ~ 
Flexibility that retains an inner locus of control is 
the ideal. Awareness of concrete thought about a special 
case is dependent on the circumstances. There is a need 
to strengthen awareness of the conclusions (Beck, 1976) . 
The investigator believes Confucian i (fitness) is 
akin to the situation ethics of Joseph Fletcher. Goodman 
and Maultsby (1978) cite a passage from Fletcher's (1966) 
Nit tioo Ethi - Nh N w M~olit . Nl toh d s hss 
situation ethics as "contextual appropriateness. . . the 
fitting empiricism antilegalism and 
the personal particular" (p. 205), Fletcher (1966) quotes 
the Apostle Paul stating, "The written code kills, but 
the spirit gives life. " Tu (1968) uses the analogy of 
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the Gospel and the law to describe the relation between 
j en (benevolence) and li (propriety) . . b 
Manners of propriety (li ) refers to the life-style . b 
in which one finds oneself (Cua, 1971b) ~ Accepted con- 
ventions are part of the background of action. Neo- 
Confucianism presents a three-part analysis of ethical 
decision-making: (1) normative knowledge, (2) application 
to a situ'ation, and (3) knowledge of the background of 
action (Cheng, 1974b) . (See Figure One. ) Beck (1976) de- 
scribes decorum (li ) as "rules (that) serve as standards b 
to evaluate, steer, or inhibit behaviors; they are applied 
to judge the propriety, justification, and reasonableness 
of behavior" (p. 44). Inadvertently, Beck (1976) links 
three essential Confucian concepts; "propriety (li ), . b 
justification (i), and reasonableness (li ) . ~ a 
Axiom Three: Conscience and A ro riateness 
Chung-ying Cheng (1972b) writes that the virtue i 
(t't a, tht ) ' de t' *1 t ~1'a - h'h ( on- 
science) at times when becoming aware of i preserves 
one's dignity and individual independence. Awareness 
may occur in certain situations or by nature. Although 
the virtues are equally important in their own right, 
the researcher believes appropriateness (i) is the key to 
motivation. This hypothesis was discussed previously 
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at the end of the existential chapter. Satisfaction and 
acceptability from others are derived from the action that 
fitness (i) produces in a situation. Appropriateness (i) 
is the only virtue that cannot lead to an excess when con-, 
sidered by itself (Cheng, 1972b ). We can be displeased 
withut being horrified (Ellis G Harper, 1975). 
Fitness (i) in its application appears to be the 
virtue which is most reflective of the individual's 
pesonality, due to its mediating function. However, 
appropriateness (i) is a demanding virtue for it requires 
comprehension of norms and social conventions, together 
with creative action (Cheng, 1974b). 
Fitness is the Confucian concept most closely re- 
lated to logotherapy, Viktor Frankl's (1962) psychology 
of meaning. Fu (1983) compares Frankl's "life as an 
assignment" to the Neo-Confucian "heavenly mandate" (t'~n o ). Rh th' 1 llf p 'd g* 1 h' h p 11 
the individual forward. 
Rt ' g t*~)- h'h ( ' ) * f 't 
functions is distinguishing good from bad in our thoughts 
(g') d t' (~h' ). 0 *n ' 1 ~1' n - h'h 
commands us to see correct information and become more 
open-minded, but still quite aware (Cheng, 1979a). All 
P*Pl PdthPt t lt h~)'-h'hd(, 
since they are obtained by personal cultivation and 
experience, rather than formal learning. The centrifugal 
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character of the mind through the extension of conscience 
ich h l~h'h i sh th soph o ct'o nd 1'ra b a 
in the world (Jung, 1965) . 
Thinkin st les in the health and de ressed. 
Maultsby provides four clear guidelines in a healthy 
hsl f systsa, ot ' d ' titian - h'h: 
"(1) Are my thoughts based on objective facts'? 
(2) Are they likely to lead me to Life-preserving 
activitiesf 
(3) Are they Likely to lead me to actions that will 
get. me what T. wanti 
(4) Are they likely to lead to actions that will 
tend to minimize significant psycho-emotional 
and/or environmental conflict7" (Goodman 5; 
Maultsby, 1978, p. 20) . 
Maultsby utilizes this questioning procedure at 
Stage C (emotional consequences) in Ellis' ABC personality 
model and in his own method: rational self-analysis (RSA). 
The value of principle (li ), appropriateness (i), and 
harmony (ho), should be clearly shown by the questioning 
procedure. 
Beck snd Shaw (1977) list the three major types of depres- 
sive thought: (1) arbitrary inference, usually in the 
style of personalization, (2) overgeneralization, based 
on limited experience, and (3) magnification, exaggerating 
the significance of negatively perceived events. 
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Recall that Confucius listed arbitrariness and dogmatism 
as inauthentic expressions of the self (Tu, 1972). 
Relatin lian -chih to other facets of s cholo 
h'h b eltdt *th tpi g 
tive psychology. 
(1) Beck's (1976) procedure, decentering, involves 
the use of objective reason, so the client no 
longer feels like the center of all events 
(Beck, 1976). After all, creative principle 
(~sh -1'), H a n' p ' ipi &t''e -i'&, 
is ultimately transcendent and encompassing, 
not the counselor or the client. The con- 
science "ought" to be our best guide. Trans- 
cendent reason actually has a rather mundane 
definition in Neo-Confucianism. It simply means 
that only through not giving up can one parti- 
cipate in the continuous creativity of the 
universe. We must avoid dwelling on mistakes; 
a transcendence of what has past (Liu, 1972a) ~ 
(2) Carl Rogers and Wang Yang-ming share nearly 
identical views on self-actualization. Both 
see the journey as bridging the gap between 
actual and desired behavior (Rogers, 1961). 
Metaphysical truth is desired behavior in Wang's 
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model (Tu, 1978) . Both consider self-actualiza- 
tion to be a continuous process, instead of a 
fixed state, because the nature of reality it- 
self is change (Tu, 1918) . In fact, the Neo- 
Conf ia term, ~h'i -ha' me " t al'*' g 
the human design" or fulfilling form. 
(33 N o-C «f c' n l~h'h ah ld t h oaf ed 
with the uncompromising Freudian superego. In 
1~la -ch'h. we a et'll ad 't t lihi g thi g 
we know are really bad (Cheng, 1979a&. L~ian 
chih is a less scattered doctrine because ego- 
stzength and authenticity are allowed. The 
supezego is "scattered" because its lack 
of applicability (1) fails the Confucian test 
for reason. The superego was never even intended 
to be united with action. 
(4) The central task of Neo-Confucian education is to 
combat problems, not avoid them (Tu, 1978) . 
Its ethical structuze is designed for applica- 
ti aad 3 ilding c cie (i~la -ch'hl 
through experience. A counselor may prod a 
client toward encouraging his associates, rather 
than avoiding them or displaying neurotic be- 
havior in public. 
128 
Axiom Four: Rectif in Affairs 
Moving to the Fourth Axiom, ko-wu (rectifying af- 
fairs) is an increase in observable action (hain ) for 
a sequentially, ordered epistemology, as depicted in 
the Four-Sentence Teaching (Cheng, 1979a). Wang redefined 
ko-wu to mean the realization of principles (li ) in 
one's intention (~i) -activity . . This definition is iden- 
tical to the Dictionary of Behavioral Science definition 
for the cognitive theory of learning (Wolman, 1973). 
Both see the key to learning as correcting the intentions 
that give rise to faulty perceptions, instead of adding 
new responses to the behavioral repertoire (Wolman, 1973) . 
Cognitive treatment centers around making patients 
aware of what they are thinking and how their thought 
is going astray (Beck, 1976) . The client needs to sub- 
stitute accurate judgements and receive feedback for 
information on the correctness of the change, A neurotic 
may need help in applying rules or in developing coping 
techniques since they may be too fragile (Beck, 1976), 
Internalizin rinci le. 
Proper evaluation is based on the advantage or dis- 
advantage to one's goals, as discussed in the previous 
section (Ellis & Harper, 1975). Wang Yang-ming be- 
lieved developing a valid belief system requires the 
existence of principles within the mind, before we can 
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extend them out of ourselves. Wang's maxim Hain-chi-li 
(Mind is principle) expresses the procedure (Chang, 1972a). 
Wang provided the example of filial piety and loyalty. 
He rhetorically asked if the principle exists in the 
people to whom the virtue is directed. If the answer 
is "yes", then what happens when our parents and employers 
move away or die? Do the feelings of filial piety and 
loyalty vanish too? Wang did not think so (de Bary, 
1983) . The researcher utilizes the concept Hain-chi-li 
in an analysis of Maultsby's treatment of a depressive 
in the second case study . 
The emphasis on internalizing principle discourages 
passive conformity in rational-emotive therapy and Neo- 
Confucianism. Rational self-management is the goal of 
rational-emotive therapy (Goodman R Maultsby, 1978). 
Wang Yang-ming wrote, "rightness (i) is not an external 
ob]ect which one can seize and take over" (Ching, 1973, 
p. 30), Tu (1968) observes that the passive conformist 
(t~s' - a ) ttwd s a tt e"f of ' to, " f* 
a lack of conscious decision-making, 
Distancin and uttin knowled e into action. 
Beck's (1976) theory of distancing is similar to 
both Wang's interpretation of rectifying affairs (ko-wu) 
and the cognitive theory of learning. Distancing means 
the regarding of immediate reactions as hypotheses not 
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facts (Beck, 197 6) . The key is to, corr ec t the inner 
belief system, as opposed to adding new responses to a 
faulty core. Cognitive-behavioral homework assignments 
are used to reinforce new ways of perception, a unity 
of knowledge and action (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). 
Ellis and Harper (1975) maintain that improvement 
occurs only when we begin to live our philosophies. Ir- 
rational thoughts need to be disputed as soon as they 
arise to the surface. A negative thought can become 
part of the scheme and the original cause is easily lost 
in antiquity, according to Beck (1976) and Goodman and 
Maultsby (1978) . Neo-Confucian, shen-tu (watching over 
the self when alone) calls for prudence apart from the 
watchful eyes and ears of friends (Ching, 1973) . Through 
rectifying affairs (ko-wu), we can preserve the equili- 
brium (chung) of the unactivated (wei-fa) mind. Activa- 
tion by thought (yi-fa) in accordance with principle 
(li ) is directed towards harmony (ho). Attaining harmony 
is the definition of "good" in Neo-Confucianism (Cheng, 
The schism in Neo-Confucianism: Ch'en -Chu and Lu- 
W~sch 1s . 
Wang's new interpretation of ko-wu (rectifying af- 
fairs) was a major part of his enlightenment experience 
(Tu, 1978) . Neo-Confucianism equated the extension of 
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~1- h h 'th k' g ' e the 'll (~h' — ) 
(Cheng, 1$79a) . Previously, Chu Hsi saw ko-wu as ex- 
haustively studying the principles of events in order to 
k th w111 s' er (o~h' — '). Ph's ie o 1 k 
the potential of intentionality (~i) leading to f aulty 
perception (chih) . Now Wang realized that the Ch'eng-Chu 
Neo-Confucians had been "pulling the cart before the 
horse" for centuries. Today, a typical Neo-Confucian 
may lean toward Wang's view of ko-wu, while realizing 
the interaction between investigating events and sin- 
ity of ill. Plea e afar ha k to "L~dan - h'h s 
self-theory in psychology" in the existential chapter. 
Chu's epistemological sequence is a reverse of Wang's 
Four-Sentence Teaching. Chu believed ko-wu, the investi- 
gation of events in his system, had to precede chih -chih 5 . a 
the extension of knowledge (Gardner, 1983). Meanwhile, 
the individual suspends conscious evaluations until more 
facts are gathered, not realizing the ongoing subconscious 
collecting of faulty beliefs. The researcher proposed in 
Figure Two that such an order of thinking is found in 
a depressive episode. However, through keeping a spirit 
of ~h-h ( q 1'h on/heron y). th pr d r f i- 
vestigating events is simply gaining new experience. The 
key point to remember is that both Wang Yang-ming and 
thog'1'td* ~le-h'h(ns') ith t 
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(chih ). Otherwise, Neo-Confucianism would have degene- b 
rated into a "disguised Buddhism" through a dwelling 
on the mind's nature (T'ang, 1973b). 
Nevertheless, the investigator's purpose is not to 
discredit Chu Hsi any more than it was Wang Yang-ming's 
desire either (Chan, 1972). In fact, some authorities 
(Liu, 1984) believed Wang misinterpreted Chu Hsi's views 
on ko-wu (investigating events) altogether. It is neces- 
sary to study the strong points of the Ch'eng-Chu ortho- 
doxy. The observation that events contain principles 
(li ) or an effect requires a cause is not debatable. 
Moreover, "the prerequisites for any existing reality 
have been fulfilled in order for that reality to exist, " 
according to Goodman and Maultsby (1978, p. 36). Every- 
thing is exactly the way it should be. 
The researcher believes the Chinese outlook of man 
and nature in harmony could prove most beneficial to 
Western man. Irrationally assuming external causes for 
behavior might be traced to the Western dichotomizing of 
man and nature. The West believes man is supposed to 
try to dominate an unfriendly world (Cheng, 1971). 
Lian -chih as a "Resolvin Intervention" 
Ph h p p th dd't f ~1' -ch h 
to Ellis' (1971) ABC personality theory as a "resolving 
intervention. " The new stage would follow the "disputing 
intervention. " Greater empathy for the client would be 
133 
shown through the new method. It is based upon the dia- 
lectics of harmonization, which considers opposing view- 
points as mutually complementary for strength and pro- 
ductivi. ty (Cheng, 1977). 
The self-aces tin entleman (chun-'tzu). 
The researcher will begin his proposal for the resol- 
ving intervention with a comparison of strikingly similar 
passages from Ellis and Qrieger (1971) and the Confucian, 
Nencius (Fourth Century B. C. ). 
The key variable is that Ellis' methods suggest the 
addition of a concept in order to better categorize his 
approach. 
Albert Ellis not only disputes faulty logic, but 
urges his clients not to dispute themselves as individuals. 
One can be right and believe that one is wrong. Ellis 
(1971) shows the reason why people view events as "awful, 
horrible and catastrophic" is because they "think, decide, 
and feel" they cannot stand it. 
Rejection by another person does not make an indi- 
vidual worthless or of no value (Ellis, 1971). Once a- 
gain, we see the tendency toward overgeneralization and 
magnification in emotional disturbance (Beck & Shaw, 1977). 
A Confucian can believe in obligation but accept the fact 
that many people are indifferent. Ellis instructs clients 
to substitute "It's terrible" with "Too bad, Tough shit, 
and Tough luck. " Ellis lists three methods for 
134 
counteracting absolutism. 
(1) Too bad that I fail to do some important 
tasks weTT or that significant others do not 
always approve of me( But that's the way I 
am and will in all probability always will 
be: fallible and partially unlovable. (2) 
~Tou h shit when you fail to treat me fairly 
or to give me the kind of favors I strongly desire from youl But that's the way you 
are: often unfair and ungiving. (3) ~Tou h 
luck when the world is rough and things 
around me are quite difficult( But even 
though I may never like it, that's the way it is, and I can definitely stand it if I 
can't change it for the better (Ellis, 1971, 
p. 10). 
Ellis sincerely believes internalizing such a philo- 
sophy of life would minimize at least 90 percent of 
serious emotional disturbances (Ellis R Grieger, 1977). 
Ellis' technique is an application of situation ethics 
philosophy (Goodman l Maultsby, 1978). It is a view 
shared by Neo-Confucianism. Both are opposed to 
imposing simplistic dogmas to complex situations. 
Obtaining knowledge of the circumstances can be seen 
as both good psychology and a religious instruction. A 
situation is approached as a whole or Gestalt with an 
underlying principle (li ). The following section 
"hhh- h h th' l e te d d tt' " ty e th 
issue further. 
Arguments for not worrying about the opinion of 
others can be easy to understand but difficult to apply. 
t h'ed th t tilt -*h'h (* * ) d 
and the chun-tzu (gentlemen) emphasize self-reliance in 
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self-evaluation. The gripping fear in paranoia illus- 
trates the need for focusing on the ultimate concern in- 
stead of worldly worries. Fu (1983) cites a passage from 
Mencius stating: 
What distinguishes the chun-tzu from other men ll ' hl. pe t ~t I t'g al d 
Suppose there is a man who treats him 
in a perverse and outrageous manner. The 
chun-tzu in this situation will engage in the 
~o owing self-reflectionl I must have been 
lacking in jen (bepevolence); I must have 
been lacking rn lio (propriety). Otherwise, 
how should this Rave happened to me7 If the perversity and outrageousness of the 
other man is repeated after the chun-tzu f' de th t he ha d th' g o gl, g 
will conclude: This man is utterly lost in- 
deed. Such a man is no different from a brute. Why should I be bothered by such a life-long [ultimate) concern, he has no 
temporary [worldly] worries. " (Fu, 1983, 
p. 400). 
Thus, Mencius persuades his client to see an ethical 
rationale for not worrying and developing self-confidence. 
Recall T'ang's (19 73a) assertion that self-confidence is 
the ultimate religious concern in Confucianism. The Con- 
fucian model is a simple goal-direction of achieving in 
life. 
Neo-Confucianism and cognitive/rational-emotive 
therapy are not primarily geared to disputing a client's 
logic. The main goal is breaking through the "loser" 
self-image, so one can be more rational and satisfied 
(Beck (g Shaw, 1977). This breakthrough involves 
g th e ' * I~11 - hihI th f 1* h''t 
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One can choose to view the world as ultimately 
friendly to "right decision" and internalize principle 
(Nivison, 1973). Accepting another's criticism as 
the "final word" leads to a fragile self-theory that 
lacks parsimony, The Neo-Confucian theory that "mind 
forms a unity with all things" is particularly supported 
through these observations. 
Co nitive restructurin 1 the situational nature 
of the' self's aetio'ns 
thea f~ttaa-h'ha 1g't t' 
would be similar to cognitive restructuring. Self- 
defeating thoughts are not only found and stopped, but 
are substituted with positive coping thoughts (Hackney & 
Cormier, 1979). First, clients are trained in becoming 
aware of their automatic thoughts. Then, the counselor 
can help the client identify positive coping thoughts 
suitable for combatting their dysfunctional ideation 
(Hackney 6 Cormier, 1979). Cognitive restructuring can 
be conceived as an element of shen-tu (self-vigilance), 
as the client learns to focus on the mind's function 
(h 1 ) d t 't atlt (g -t' ) 
"Partial credit" would be given to the client 
th** gh ~1- hih 1 g tete t' . )h 
counselor could show the clients that they are utili- 
zing rational beliefs, in certain conditions. Perhaps 
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some of these situations are similar to the ones in 
which they are having difficulty. The approach is based 
on the flexible nature of appropriateness (i) in 
applying ethics to concrete situations. Restricted 
awareness or coping limitations appear to be related to 
an underdeveloped virtue of fitness (i). Causes and 
conditions of harmony and conflict cannot be specified 
without attention to the context of the relationships 
in which harmony and conflict arise (Cheng, 1974b). 
Lazarus (1977) focuses treatment on showing the 
situational nature of the self's actions. In this 
manner, Lazarus decenters the client from putting 
one's ego on the line. The case study by Lazarus 
(1977) reveals that anxiety as well as depression are 
related to overgeneralization and absolutism. 
Conflict does not have ontological ultimacy in 
itself, but serves to complete a state of harmony and 
bring forth a multitude of life. Mankind can overcome 
conflict through developing his understanding and 
accomodating his action. Conflict disappears through 
adjustment (Chang, 1977). 
Rational-emotive imagery (REI) as developed by 
Maxie Maultsby would be an excellent component of the 
resolving intervention. REI is designed to help clients 
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accelerate learning new habits of thinking (Maultsby, 
1977). Beck (1976) and Ellis and Grieger (1977) have 
also used imagery with success. Neo-Confucianism 
utilizes the "mind as mirror" image in showing that 
po t 'ty t~t-' 1 lt f foll ' g p ' 'pl 
(li ) (Ching, 1973). 
Counselin the ifted and ayers e. 
The Neo-Confucian explanation of how to enlighten 
the gifted and average can amplify current cognitive/ 
rational-emotive therapy. The researcher believes 
these explanations are "resolving interventions" of 
111 th'h 1 e th oc 1 h g' th p d 
with information already used by the client. Curiously 
the modern cognitive approach is more similar to 
enlightening the gifted (Beck, 1976). Recall the dis- 
cussion of automatic thoughts and their relation to the 
activation of 3yi (intention), with minimal or faulty 
chih (discernment), Either method can direct a client 
back to the point where the negative emotions started. 
Such techniques increase the ability of the client 
for discernment (chih) and its appropriate application 
(i) (Cheng, 1979a). 
Wang wrote that the gifted can realize the equilibri- 
um of the mind before activation. A thought which is in 
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co d c 'th ~ln - h'h ' si 'lar t th 1 
of the tranquil mind, even thought the mind is active 
(Cheng, 1979@) . . Beck (1976) was able to see two sets of 
irrational beliefs in client's talk (pp. 30-33) . The 
less verbalized or unreported ideation caused the most 
trouble, because it was the controlling theme and was 
made with little awareness. Eventually, Beck (1976) 
pinpointed the irrationality of that belief, by asking 
the client to remember the thought before the negative 
feeling. The researcher's contention is that Beck's ap- 
proach was excellent, but could work best with intro- 
spective clients of above average intelligence. 
Enlightenment for the average was mentioned in 
Axiom One. This method concentrated on the effort for 
1~lan - hih s th fo d tio f th 1 d fk na f-f 
~1'a -chh s p n-t'' f h ' l. S h ffort for r- 
t' lfty incl de h th ~1'a -ch'h nd k -rc t op 1th 
changing reality. The investigator would like to add a 
new counseling technique. Tell the client, "Trying to 
be reasonable is the mind's foundation. " This can avoid 
conflict and tension in a helping situation, In other 
. words, it may be easier initially to comprehend a defini- 
tion of reason than the mind's state prior to activation. 
Wang's instruction for the avezage and gifted are 
consistent with the unity of knowledge and action. En- 
lightenment may be viewed as the first step to 
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self-actualizing. The steps taken after one's insight 
are not overlooked, since Neo-Confucianism is a process 
of growth. 
Lian -chih as Ethical Concrete Deduction 
Western psychology and philosophy traditionally 
divides reasoning style into deduction and induction, 
Deductive reasoning starts with a general set of hypo- 
theses and moves to particular circumstances. Inductive 
reasoning moves in the opposite direction and is general- 
ly considered to be more primitive (Ginsburg g Opper, 
1979), 
It would be a gross oversimplification to classify 
1 nil-ch'h ( gene ) r ko- ( ectify gff '1 s) as 
deductive or inductive reasoning (Chang, personaL communi- 
cation, April 30, 1984) . Comparative research can be 
a complicated task, and one of the most common errors is 
oversimplification in search of one-to-one correspondence. 
Risk of arbitrariness in deduction . 
The g 1 s to sho th t ~1* -chih ' 'ly 
deductive and introduce "ethical concrete deduction" as 
a new synonym. However, deduction itself has an undesir- 
able connotation in Chinese, particularly when truths of 
reason (a ~riori) are found separately from truths of 
experience (a posteriori) (Cheng, 1971). The unity of 
knowledge and action (chih hain ho-i) and the situation 
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ethics of fitness (i) clearly prohibit arbitrary deduc- 
tion, yet Western philosophy was noted for abstract de- 
duction until the Eighteenth century. 
Cognitive therapy has also demonstrated the pitfalls 
of premature deduction. Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery 
(1979) have shown that depressives overgeneralize on 
the basis of limited experience, and magnify the signi- 
ficance of negatively perceived events. The primitive 
thinking of emotionally disturbed individuals exhibit 
striking similarities to adolescent thought (Beck et al. , 
1979) . Aaron T. Beck has utilized the cognitive develop- 
ment theories of Jean Piaget in making these discoveries. 
Concreteness in lian -chih. 
L~n -oh'h loon ' ne 1 ds f ggy d d t on h 
cause it is "always located in instances of actual ap- 
plication" (Cheng, 1974a, p. 8). Cheng continues by 
stating one will not discover all moral principles un- 
less one has been exposed to all possible life situations. 
L~n- h'h has 1'nit d p tential fo gt th: *s a h— 
lief system, it can motivate investigation of principles 
(ko-wu) to extend one's knowledge. Ideally, the exten- 
sio f ~lia -h'hi ffioi t t etedkn ldg 
(chih -chih ) without the auxiliary investigating of 
the principles of events (ko-wu) 
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L~l* -ch'1 rarr. Lth che F 9 g' 1 g ( -t ) 
of virtue (te) . The researcher discussed the beginning 
of jen (benevolence) in the introduction. Basically, 
the earliest moral feeling is sympathy for a person who 
is in danger. When such spontaneous insights are develop- 
ed and internalized, virtues have the ability to guide 
peopl to rd good * t' (Ch g, 19)ca) . :LLL- )hdihh 
bec es d d tive n th baal of e pe (ence. L~a -chth 
is an ability to distinguish in concrete situations not 
a faculty for proclaiming dogmas. 
"The Philosophical Letters of Wang Yang-ming" con- 
t ins e descr pt 'on 'of 1~hit a the 9' t 9 
ciple and experience as the Second Principle (Ching, 
1973) . Wang proclaims "There is no reason why the fail- 
ure of today cannot very well become the success of the 
day after" (p . 48) . The emphasis upon the application 
of ethical knowledge to concrete situations and the un- 
der t diog f gr 4 tio ke l~h'h id t 1 to 
fitness (i) at times. 
Lian -chih in florescence. 
The researcher is using florescence to describe 
111-ch'h 'n th sect , be s , fl esc 
"blooming, as in a culture, " captures the essence of 
ilia 1- h h' d'ff nc f ab tr ct d d ct' 
Ph st ' d t' o t f ~1' - hl ' ch 
assurance of correct judgement. The frontier of one' s 
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understanding is where deductive reasoning takes over. 
The researcher's interpretation of Neo-Confucianism views 
111-hih c dig* of't t k "wc' h d 
tions. Cheng (1974a) instructs his readers to discipline, 
watch, and cultivate the self in all matters of living. 
I th' wy~1' -hih lib* d 1 tat tof 
tion, because the mind is alert, sensitive, and self- 
reflective. The existentialist, Karl Jaspers was fas- 
cinated by the boundary of the self's knowledge and 
action. He believed authenticity is encountered through 
our decisions in new situations (Wilde R Kimmel, 1962). 
However, the investigator believes a call for prudence 
is a deductive principle in itself. A mind in ~lian- 
chih is never at the mercy of circumstances without the 
g 'del' f ~ch -ho 1 q '1'b 'ow/h tao y& fot lia 
~L'-h'h'bjet'b ti b do 
principles. Chang (1971) sees the inherent degradation 
involved in the existentialist insistence upon total 
subjectivity in man. Spontaneous decision-making is the 
result of following principle and the elimination of 
selfish desires. The adaptability in Neo-Confucianism 
is chiefly due to a focus on principle (li ) or reason a 
within the context of the situation. Narrow a ~riori 
judgments are alien to Confucian tradition. 
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Importantly, the Eighteenth-century European philo- 
sophers believed conscience was the final basis for decision- 
making. Western cultivation of conscience developed 
later than China and was stimulated by the printing press 
circulating the Bible. Before the printing press, 
Europeans were 'at the mercy of the Church's interpreta- 
tions and elaborations (Harris, 1969). 
The summary will review the main Neo-Confucian con- 
cepts by expressing them in the language of cognitive/ 
rational-emotive therapy. 
(1) ~L' - hih i th 1n t *pac'ty f* t' lity 
which has to compete with out tendencies toward 
"crooked thinking. " 
(2) Ko-wu, the cognitive theory of learning, is a 
disputing intervention. It examines the prin- 
ciples (li ) in one's mental activity (~i), that 
give rise to perceptions or knowledge (chih). 
(3) Yi without chih is an automatic though which 
gives rise to negative emotional sequence. 
The severity of the disorder is indicated by 
the client's style or self-disputing attempts. 
A notable lack of discernment capacity (chih) 
is worse than the inability to apply (i) one' s 
knowledge. The rudiments of deduction are more 
noticeable in the latter case. (See Figure Two. ) 
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(4) Chih basin ho-i (unity of knowledge and action 
describes the thought sequence. Intention (~i), 
as the phenomenological reaction to objects of 
consciousness leads to discernment (chih) and 
appropriateness (i), within the belief system. 
Emotional consequences, or action (basin ) is due 
to the structure of the belief system, not the 
activating event (wu). See Figure Three, 
(5) L~d -ch'h a t lvi 6 intetv t'on, k n 
association between the new lesson from ko-wu 
and previous learning. Ko-wu differentiates 
the principles (li ) from the intentions (~i) 
in the individual and finds the cause of events 
'n th ' o ta. L~la -ch'h '6 p mat'ly 
deductive, while ko-wu is mainly inductive. 
L~hha* th t 1 el' 6 y tempo e 
the command to shift to induction, as found in 
ko-wu. yha link 6 twe ko- «d ~1' n — h'h 
serves to extend awareness to a restricted 
existence. 
(6) L~l-ch'h a "ath' 1 c et dedu t' n" 1 
rationalism based on experience; a unity of 
knowledge and action. Prudence and the goal of 
ha oy (h) p* 'd th id ' ~1' -ch'h 
with guidelines in unfamiliar situations. 
146 
CHAPTER POUR 
CASE STUDIES 
The following case studies were selected from 
Alh t Ell's' (19717 Gto th ~TB h R o, d 9 'd B. 
Goodman and Maxie C. Maultsby's (1978) Emotional Well- 
~B'n 
~tht h R tt 1-B h ' ~tt ln . Th c 
study selected from Ellis' text is Chapter 81 "A twenty- 
three year-old girl guilty about not following her 
parents' rules, " (pp. 227-287). The case study chosen in 
Goodman and Maultsby's book is Chapter 121 "The Case 
of Ralph Hanover, " (pp. 105-12). Maultsby is the counselor 
in the case study, For this reason, the citations in this 
chapter will refer to Maultsby (1978) alone, since he is 
being quoted and not his colleague. 
The first case study takes the form of a general com- 
mentary, while the second case study follows the inter- 
view with greater specificity. 
Albert Ellis' Treatment of Guilt 
Conscience and A ro riateness 
Albert Ellis' Rational-Emotive therapy utilizes 
many applications of Neo-Confucian concepts, even though 
his techniques are characterized by argumentation. The 
k*7 * pt 'd 1' t' N -C fn ' 's ' ~7' - hh, 
which means "discerning the good" or "conscientious 
consciousness. " Many of Ellis' major assertions can be 
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ltdt ~1'-ch'h. yhh'h lib fp'1 
interest, is that of a young woman who feels guilty about 
not following her parents' rules (Ellis, 1971). 
LLL- hfh y b * b t th 
Freudian ego and superego, even though its translation 
is more reminescent of the superego. A lack of perfec- 
tion and certainty can be tolerated when one follows 
~1' - hh. fh tl k t cl' t' th th 
legalistic. Ellis (1971) taught the young woman to stop 
telling herself that she must be perfect or her prospects 
ought to be totally certain. Thinking in terms of "must" 
and "ought" leads to emotional disturbance, according to 
Ellis. 
A Confucian could offer the observation that many 
people misuse rightness (i) of action to demand a certain 
conduct of others (Hall 6 Ames, 19S4). Apparently, the 
young woman has such individuals for parents. Unfor- 
tunately, the young woman has incorporated her overly 
critical parents, and lacks moderation in the practice 
of self-cultivation. The trouble with a utopian dream is 
its lack of applicability to concrete situations. 
In this sense, chih (wisdom) is similar to the 
virtue i, which means "appropriateness" or "fitness. " 
aa Chih is reason as related to wisdom, discernment and 
knowledge. The beginning (tuan) of chih is like 
~L' -h'h ' 3th t ' t hl't' t nit' g ' h 
that require extension. Ellis (1971) states that one 
should learn to accept mistakes instead of feeling unnec- 
cessary shame. Even if you never made mistakes, Ellis 
asserts that some people would never approve of you. The 
idealistic Neo-Confucian, Wang Yang-ming wrote that learn- 
ing from mistakes is the Second Principle, while following 
ltit- h h th Fl t *9 t 'pl's (thing, 19737. Ii n 
considered the feeling of shame to be the beginning of 
appropriateness (i) (Chan, 1967a). Appropriateness does 
not remain a feeling of shame but develops into courage. 
Mencius showed how we can change our attitude by looking 
at an unpleasant situation in a new light. 
Discriminatin 1 Emotional Pairin Knowled e with Action 
Ellis (1971) states that RET teaches clients to be 
"discriminatingly emotional" (p. 9). Neo-Confucianism 
shares this approach to the human condition. The key 
th t ', 9 t' f LLL- hh''hh. g g' F 
Axiom Teaching included a discussion of the value of 
pairing intention (~i) with perceptual discernment 
(chih (Chang, 1979a). Like Ellis, Wang had no desire 
to banish emotions from the mind. Intention (~i) is 
mental activity itself, an unavoidable reaction to an 
hj t t. ~L'* -hhis* t'* t 
initial reaction (Ching, 1973). The power of reason 
&~1' — hih7 *11 t pnth ' * f -g ' g 
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o e log'cal (g t-. ' ) 'th s hoea h ' g, lth th 
gy of ' t tlo a a th ghts (ya- a ) (ch tg, 1979a). 
Ch'h ( cop t f~1't-hih) e s eh stet( 
ability to distinguish between good and bad, or make 
fine discriminations between "shades of grey. " Chih 
also means knowledge in the sense of book-learning (Cheng, 
1974) . 
Like Ellis, Wang insisted on putting theory into 
practice or pairing knowledge with action (chih hain 
ho-i) . The Neo-Confucian did not contemplate cognitions 
at the expense of solid behavioral action. Wang's philo- 
sophical letters reveal frequent comments on his students' 
progress, as well as suggestions for improvement (Ching, 
1973) . The use of homework assignments in RET can be 
seen as knowledge in its "genuine, concrete and practical 
aspects" (Ching, 1973, p . 106) . 
The course of psychotherapy is a process in itself. 
The rational emotive therapist uses a confrontative 
approach, in order to find the causes of a patients' symp- 
toms. Ellis points to the need to distinguish between 
the actual and the possible, as well as the possible 
from the probable (Ellis, 1971). Ellis' view is remines- 
cent of Neo-Confucian views on the logical priority of 
principle (li ) and the ontological priority of vital- 
force (ch'i) (Tong, 1982) . If the RET therapist makes 
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an erroneous assumption about the cause of a problem, 
the symptoms will remain and another hypothesis will have 
to be formed. 
Sincerit and Self-Realization 
Both Ellis and Wang urged their clients to be true 
to themselves . This is what is meant by self-acceptance 
e d n king en 'll s'nc e (~n'en - l); * ne syn nye 
for extending the conscience (chih lian -chih) . Follow- 
ing one's conscience is contrary to the self-defeating 
belief of seeking an external source as the ground for 
the self. Ellis (1971) disputes emotional dependency 
when he finds there are disturbances in a client's be- 
lief system. Such a condition was partly responsible 
for the young woman's depression in Ellis' (1971) case 
study; a misuse of jen (benevolence) through self- 
indulgence (Hall & Ames, 1984). She relied on her 
parents and boyfriends too heavily. Such individuals 
may submit themselves to fate and choose a self- 
definition of worthlessness; a truly external locus of 
control. Self-assertion bestows meaning to one's own 
person (Hall R Ames, 1984). Ellis (1971) states that 
the only organization can come from within. Neo- 
Confucianism is understood through a personal experienc- 
ing of the Classics, not by role memorization. Getting 
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it oneself (tzu-te) is a prerequisite for putting know- 
ledge or theory into action or practice (de Bary, 1983) . 
Getting it oneself is also defined as self-realizing 
behavior through the practice of appropriateness (i) 
(Hall 6 Ames, 1984). 
Importantly, Ellis (1971) reinforces his clients 
for independent thinking. RET is careful to avoid passive 
acceptance of the therapist's ideas by the client. , The 
client would simply become more susceptible, instead of 
becoming a gentleman (chun-tzu) . Chang (1974a) is s'kepti- 
cal about the privileged position enjoyed by a counselor, 
unless moral autonomy is developed in the client. 
Tu Hei-ming (1972) discusses the Heo-Confucian disregard 
for those who follow convention by merely assuming the 
pp e ce f ' c (need - ). e f d ' on 
i. s necessary. Confucius showed self-realization occurs 
through the purification of its inauthentic expressions-- 
like arbitrariness of opinion, dogmatism, obstinancy, 
and egotism (Tu, 1972) . 
Both Ellis (1971) and the Neo-Confucians frown at 
the behaviorist/legalist method of rewarding outward 
conformity, without seeing the relevance of inner cog- 
nitions. Fortunately, the current trend in psychotherapy 
seems to be toward an integration of cognitive and 
behavioral perspectives. RET tries to keep a balance 
between society and the individual. Many schools of 
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psychotherapy are establishment-centered, as they help 
clients adjust to society while giving up as an individual 
(Ellis, 1971). 
The goal of objectification through becoming a pezson- 
in-context is seen as a rational act rather than submission 
byth N -Cof ' . Pa ' of r. (~h'm- ) 
do not know appropriateness (i) because they are not 
trying to contribute to society. Appropriateness is a 
cncern for proper conduct in the performance of social 
roles (Hall & Ames, 1984). It is an opportunity to be 
unique without fear of disgrace. 
Moderation 
Perhaps Ellis' most graphic contribution to psycho- 
therapy is showing that emotional disorders come from 
believing, "It's awful!" instead of "Tough shit" (Ellis, 
1971). Neo-Confucianism would view overreaction as wis- 
dom (chih ) without appropriateness (i) in the 
ethical sense. A lack of appropriateness is the major 
problem when one magnifies or minimizes the importance 
of an event. Moreover, emotions and actions have a 
reciprocal effect as discussed by Ch'eng Hao (1032- 
1085). Confucians and Neo-Confucians advised moderation, 
since proper reactions change with the varied circum- 
stances we find in everyday life (Nivison, 1973). 
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The interrelatedness of Neo-Confucian concepts allows 
us to view the same situation from the prospective of 
Wang's Four Sentence Teaching. "It's awfull" can be seen 
as thought (3yi) without learning (~ch ). These 
concepts are part of the Second and Third Sentences in 'Wang's 
epistemology, Intention is our reaction to an object 
hil ~(la - h'h ' t tio t th t tho aht. 
~hi -chih ' c tp at e the f ew h *f h'h, th 
flexibility of i and the fluidity of 3yi. Intention is 
metaphysically linked with matter-energy, or life force 
(chi'i) (Cheng, 1979a). Learning for the sake of one' s 
~ lf th th t'c w y t* t ih t to iety ( ei h' 
chih hsueh). Both BET and Neo-Confucianism endeavored 
to track down any emotional problem. Confused ideology 
and attitudes create warped feelings. 
Fear of Re'ection 
A fear of rejection by a significant other due to 
making minor mistakes is a common example of an irrational 
ideology. The depressed young woman feared rejection 
from her parents and boyfriends. RET and Neo-Confucianism 
see crooked thinking and rational thinking as innate 
tendencies which compete with each other. Neo-Confucian- 
ism offers a metaphysical grounding for each of these 
te d ' (1' f* f -t'' d ch' f* f'- ' l. 
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Pragmatic reason involves perceiving the end of a 
situation, and provides the necessary emotional urgency. 
Ellis (1971) states that one should "look at the conse- 
quences of your act from the point of view of what effect 
it is going to have on you" (p . 33). Developing one' s 
own goals and self-confidence keeps you from being vul- 
neable. Reason allows the freedom to let yourself go, 
and think in a clear pattern of thought, since cognitions 
are directed toward a set of goals (Ellis, 1971). Alfred 
North Whitehead (1924/1958) once commented that "the 
ability to analyze seems to vanish under close scrutiny. " 
After a few RET sessions, the depressed woman experienced 
increased abili. ties for novel writing. She was able to 
describe incisively, and not just use metaphors and 
symbols (Ellis, 1971). 
Neo-Confucianism views reason as appropriateness 
(i) to be the virtue which gives meaning to life, and 
the function of the mind (Cheng, 1972b). The depressed 
woman feared the loss of her boyfriend, if she became 
devoted to him (Ellis, 1971). Ellis instructed the 
woman to get rid of this irrational fear so she could 
love someone. This irrational fear inhibited her func- 
tioning in an intimate relationship. Lave and reason are 
general virtues, while rational maxims are the applica- 
tion of the general to the particular (li-i-fen-shu) 
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particular. Ellis (1971) insists "you know on theoretical 
grounds that you have an invalid thought, because you 
don't get negative feelings without first having some 
silly thought" (p. 271) . Once again, we return to the 
oo eye f t ' g true t o o fe e fl~u- tlt) 
the key to mental health. 
He ative Self-Statements (Automatic Thou hts) 
Whitehead (1929/1958) viewed fatigue as the anti- 
thesis of reason. Fear and depression may be seen as 
types of fatigue. Fear moves from the general and ab- 
stract to the specific and concrete. Fear never remains 
free-floating. It seeks a situation for application. 
lis and Grieger (1977) believe people get these fears from 
society and parents or can be genetically predisposed to 
borderline behavior. We speak to ourselves in language, 
not in vague feelings. Ellis asks his patients to look 
for these simple exclamatory sentences which create their 
fears. Aaron T. Beck (1976) classifies these negative 
self-directed statements as "automatic thoughts, " They 
are specific, concrete, discrete, and repetitious, as 
well as reactionary. Automatic thoughts are the anti- 
tll e of ~leo-t't. e tty r t e f*l e fr cork 
which serves to perpetuate the eruption of the mind. 
Cognition precedes emotion, with the possible exception 
of enlightenment experiences through the unity of the two. 
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Ellis (1971) states that the therapist can bring 
such facts to attention, so the client can act on what 
she knows. This cognitive-behavioral sequence is sum- 
marized eloquently by Wang's Four Sentence Teaching, and 
his doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action 
(chih hain ho-i). A fact must be brought to one's at- 
tention in order to become part of knowledge (chih). 
Attention is similar to Neo-Confucian ~i (intention), 
which means a reaction to a thing or event. Yi is mental 
activity itself, the second of Wang's Four Sentences 
(Cheng, 1979a). Knowledge or discernment is the Third 
Sentence. The unity of knowledge and action explains 
how knowledge serves as the beginning and motivation 
for concrete action. Action is the ending and completion 
of knowledge. Knowledge is action in its discerning 
qualities, and action is knowledge in its real and sub- 
stantial aspects (Ching, 1973), 
Relation of Thou ht to Time 
We have discussed the general nature of automatic 
thoughts, and the way an RET or Neo-Confucian therapist 
can help the client overcome their stifling influence. 
Let us look at the actual tense of the automatic 
thoughts from a grammatical point of view. Considering 
the nature of change as an ontological reality, and the 
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need to separate possible from actual, suggests a model 
of rationality and emotional disturbance that is directly 
related to time. The classic automatic thought, "It' s 
awful. '" is a statement in the present tense. Also, the 
depressed client could be seen as living in the "future 
perfect" tense, a term the researcher is borrowing from 
the Latin language. The future perfect tense uses the 
adverbs, "will" and a form of the word "to be, " such as 
"have" before the main verb, which is in the past tense. 
Examples of the future perfect tense include, "will have 
achieved, " and "will have been lost. " 
Ellis (1971) does not see the core of the problem 
as worrying about how things will turn out, but a pre- 
occupation with personal worthlessness if things do not 
turn out favorably. Ellis explained this common tendency 
to his depressed client. The outlook blurs possible 
with actual, and also catastrophizes. Note how two 
separate events in time are considered. The fear of the 
future is not the only topic of discussion, but a nega- 
tive state of being will be caused by the disturbing 
event. The patient can make a rather complicated self- 
statement, "I will be destroyed by the sad event. " No 
wonder Nencius instructed his students to be firm in 
what is small, in order to keep what is great---the 
mind (Chan, 1967a). 
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In closing, let us recall Shu-Hsien Liu's (1972) 
observations concerning the paradox of life, "Only he 
who can transcend his immediate concerns can fully de- 
velop creative potentialities within himself and hence 
develop his nature" (Liu. , 1972a, p. 49). 
Maxie Maultsb 's (1978 Treatment of a De ressive 
The First Two Sessions 
In the first session, Maultsby (1978) alludes to the 
lo t'o sp ct of ~1' -ch'h by stat na "fhl. pro 
that it is his reaction to his own behavior -- and not 
the behavior in itself -- that constitutes the hard core 
of neurosis" (p. 107) . A negative belief system bears 
the capacity of evaluation as does * healthy belief sys- 
tsn. L~L -ch h, on ts f s abl ts ct' t* 
thought (Ching, 1973) . One of the more explicit applica- 
tions for Confucian i (appropriateness) is found in the 
similar evolution of client perspectives to rational- 
behavior therapy. In both Maultsby's (1978) case study 
of the depressive and a description of Confucian i (Hall 
& Ames, 1984), a trend is seen from shame as an indi- 
vidual toward shame before society. Becoming a person- 
in-context is a process of objectification. 
In the second session, Maultsby observes the patient 
becoming depressed about depression (p. 108). Hang 
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Yang-ming once said anxiety about anxiety is like looking 
for a donkey while riding it (Nivison, 1973). The patient 
believes feelings are deep-down while thoughts are super- 
ficial. Maultsby like a Neo-Confucian soundly disputes 
the irrational belief. Chang Tsai (1020-1077) wrote, 
"Whenever in our effort at thinking we come to something 
that cannot be expressed in words, we must think it over 
carefully and sift it again and again" (Chan, 1967a, p. 
97) . Wang Yang-ming 's Four Axiom Teaching shows that 
thought (~i is a reaction to an object (Cheng, 1979a). 
The reaction leads to the next stage which is discernment, 
a capability that is either rational or faulty but alter- 
nately never absent. 
Dr. Maultsby's method of disputing the client shows 
the situational nature of appropriately (i) applying 
ethics to a situation. Maultsby (1978) states, "Even if 
you may have failed at 25, 50, or even 75 percent of 
the things you have tried, all that proves is that you 
were not skilled enough to succeed at specific tasks" 
(p, 110) . Depression seems to be the classic inability 
to delay closure, an essential trait for creativity 
(Torrance, 1979) . The depressive can not understand 
that "principle is one but its manifestations are many" 
(li-i-fen-shu) (Chan, 1967a). A universe governed by 
principle has the capacity for revealing its functions 
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through a multitude of manifestations. No one is a fail- 
ure at everything and no one has tried everything. The 
feeling of shame is a prerequisite for courage. Recall 
the at he 's segg st' 1 1~la - h'h as "t 1 1 g 
intervention" which focuses on successes in an emotionally 
disturbed person. 
The Third and Fourth Sessions 
In session Thzee, Maultsby (1978) pleaded that a 
depressive can "learn how to think straight" (p. 111). 
Mencius wrote, "There is naught else in learning but 
the recovery of one's lost mind" (Ching, 1973) . Mencius 
was referring to everyone's potential for self-actualiza- 
tion. The depressive's stealing fantasies and behavior 
was seen by the counselor as a continuation of past 
actions, and nothing to be upset about. 
Maultsby seems to be trying to help the client be- 
come courageous, in alluding to a progression from a 
"negative" unity of knowledge and action to the rudiments 
of a "positive" unity of knowledge and action. T'ang 
(1973b) notes that remembering correct knowledge for later 
use is not an immediate unity of knowledge and action, 
but serves as a means to that goal. Such information 
affects the client's attitude by increasing his ability 
to control his environment and be effective in everyday 
~ 
't t' a ~ (B k. 19767. B~h(h 's ' ed 
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possessing the ability to stop negative thought from 
becoming negative action in a robot-like fashion. Even- 
t lly d 1p' g~l' -h'h tp gt'v 'd* 
In the fourth session, the depressive reveals shame 
due to actions and non-compliance with society. Such 
ideation could be regarded as evidence of increased ob- 
jectivity. A Neo-Confucian might have complimented the 
client for showing the (tuan) beginnings of fitness (i) 
and manners (li ), before instructing him to strengthen 
his rationality. One needs to overcome the fixed per- 
spective of the ego (k'e-chi) and become a person-in- 
context (Tu, 1968). Order and value have to be context- 
dependent for relevance in an organic system such as so- 
ciety. Through the process of objectification, we expe- 
rience the joy of realizing integrity. Catastrophizing 
is an example of an object in one's phenomenal field to 
which catches the attention of a faulty belief system. A 
sick fear assumes the structure of principle (li ) and ac- . a 
tually increases the manifestation (ch'i) of undesirable 
but not catastrophic events. 
Later Sessions 
As therapy progressed, Maultsby emphasized the con- 
science's role as the final arbiter in decision-making. 
The self is dynamic and it changes with the field or 
focus of existence. Mencius may have seen this process 
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as building the "nobler part of one's nature" instead 
of falling prey to immediate reactions (Liu, 1972b) ~ 
The therapist can not decide for the client in the long- 
run, Part of the depressive's problem was inability to 
distinguish between minor and major things, a lack of 
appropriateness. 
Maultsby (1978) demonstrates that the client is 
ignoring important aspects of life. Depressives need 
to develop the flexibility for interacting in new situa- 
tions and integrating new information into their cognitive 
schemata. Importantly, the depressive learned a "resolv- 
i g at toeat'oa" of ~lie - hih; a epplio t' a f * t e 
imagery to his kleptomania. Wang Yang-ming showed the 
similarity of seeing to thinking in his conceptualization 
of f', e i teat' a l'ty. fh th y f ~lfe -oh'h 
"resolving intervention" was discussed in Chanter Three. 
The counselor emphasizes the importance of will 
with the analogy of a rider on a horse (p. 119) . 
Maultsby (1978) exemplifies "mind is principle" (hsin- 
chi-li ) when he states, "You still insist upon thinking 
of what you are doing as an independent process from 
yourself? You are refusing to realize that you are it'. " 
(p . 119) . Nivison (1973) states that the mind is the 
principle of what it is thinking about. Maultsby (1978) 
concludes the case study by discouraging self-punishment 
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and challenging the client to change undesirable be- 
heaviors. Perhaps, the goal of becoming a gentleman 
behavior (chun-tzu) would inspire a client. 
Graded Task Assi nment of A. T. Beck 
A brief discussion of Beck's (1976) Graded Task 
Assignment could aid an analysis of Maultsby's (1978) 
treatment of depression. Beck and his colleagues (1979) 
report that the more severe instances of depression 
require predominantly behavioral interventions, Cognitive 
techniques are used for less disturbed clients. 
The goal of Graded Task Assignment is to mobilize 
a depressed patient into activity. Simple tasks are 
given at first to the client in order to build their 
self-confidence. As a result, a client is able to do 
more things than previously thought possible (Beck, 1976). 
Wang Yang-ming's belief that action precedes concrete 
knowledge is upheld by studies in cognitive-behavioral 
therapy. Ch'eng Hao stressed menial labor for adoles- 
cents as a prerequisite skill in reasoning (Ching, 1973). 
A. T. Beck (1976) suggests depressed housewives boil 
eggs as a start toward preparing a dinner. Ch'eng Hao 
saw mopping floors as a prerequisite to understanding 
the Classics. The treatment of depression could be 
viewed as the priority of ontology (being) to logic. 
The researcher sees depression as a lack of being. 
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The challenge is not only to make clients active, 
In other words, depression can be cured through achieve- 
ment and acquiring good memories. Depression is fre- 
quently due to bad events, that prime memories of similar 
occurrences (Riskind 6 Rholes, 1984). 
The approach of Ch'eng Hao appears even more rele- 
vent, when one recalls the metaphysical grounding of 
thought (~i) in the vital force of being (ch'i) (Jung, 
1966) . By keeping depressives successful and busy, a 
state of concentration is induced and faulty ideations 
can be alleviated. When clients feel able to do more 
things, their self-concept becomes more extensive. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS 
Method to 
The thesis has been an effort to bring Neo-Confucian 
wisdom to bear on modern problems through a psychology 
student's viewpoint. The existential therapy chapter 
reflected an organization characteristic of psychology. 
The cognitive/rational-emotive therapy chapter utilized 
the Four Axiom Teaching of Wang Yang-ming as an outline. 
The case studies were reviews of Ellis' treatment of 
guilt and Naultsby's treatment of depression from a Neo- 
Confucian viewpoint. 
The addition of Neo-Confucian concepts increases the 
precision of cognitive-behavioral theory. The first 
figure is particularly relevant to existential therapy, 
while the last two figures are more applicable to 
cognitive/rational-emotive therapy. 
Two more figures are found in the conclusion chapter 
as part of the summarization. These figures tie together 
psychological and Confucian theory and practice. 
Benefits to Ps cholo : A Review 
of the Fi ures 
Fi ure One - The Interaction of Confucian Virtues 
Figure One is an analysis of Confucian/Neo-Confucian 
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virtues. The virtues are a three-partite system of 
normative, situational and social ethics (Cheng, 1974b). 
Normative ethics include jen (benevolence) and chih . 
(wisdom). Situational ethics through i (appropriateness) 
is the individual's tie between cognitions and fitting 
action (Cua, 1971a). Appropriateness (i) is the practical 
flexibility of applying ethics to a concrete situation. 
Social ethics can be called understanding the background 
of action (Cheng, 1974b). Propriety (li ) is the indi- b 
vidual's tie between cognitions and the social setting, 
or life-style (Cua, 1971b) . A knowledge of propriety 
precedes appropriateness in cognitive-moral development, as 
well as the historic record. A higher portion of etiquette 
is provided to the individual by society. 
Fi ure Two — The Be innin and End of Emotional Disturbance 
Figure Two attempts to show the relevance of Wang 
Yang-ming's (1527), Four Axiom Teaching to Aaron T. Beck' s 
(1976) analysis of automatic thoughts contribution to 
emotional disturbance. An automatic thought is simply a 
th ght (g') h' h ' t ' d * th ~)' — h'h 
(conscience). The thought is assessed with faulty be- 
liefs. Thinking begins in Axiom Two and is judged by 
beliefs in Axiom Three regardless if they are rational or 
disturbed. Rectifying affairs (ko-wu) . Axiom Four is an 
tt tt t* d t d th i t t' -th* ght (g'- ) 
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which gave rise to faulty perceptions. Seeing and think- 
ing are closely related in Wang's system. Axiom Three 
represents a successful resolution that is incorporated 
N~lf -hlh*1 
Fi ure Three - A 1 in Ellis' ABC Personalit Theor to 
the Unit of Knowled e and Action 
This figure also utilizes Wang Yang-ming's Four Axiom 
Teaching. Confucian virtues are found in the belief 
system (B). One may view Figure One as an examination of 
the belief system. The major contribution of Neo- 
Confucianism is dividing the belief system into thought 
()fi), perception (chih), appropriateness (i), and pro- 
priety (li ) . A model of problem behavior is facilitated . b 
by the four-partite division of the belief system, Per- 
sistent erroneous discernment patterns or chronic un- 
awareness is evidence of psychosis. The inability to 
apply knowledge, or derive and bestow meaning to social 
situations, or a misunderstanding of social situations 
is characteristic of neuroses. 
The disputing intervention is related to ko-wu 
(rectifying affairs) and decentering. The investigator's 
N Cfh -*d 1 'dd l~h'(h " 1 ' g 
intervention" for cognitive-restructing. The unity of 
knowledge and action (chih hsin ho-i) is displayed by 
beliefs leading to emotional consequences, in both 
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rational and irrational thinking. 
Neo-Confucianism provides a needed balance to 
rational-emotive therapy. Ellis (1971) focuses on telling 
clients that distressing events are not really important, 
a passive means of improvement. Neo-Confucianism high- 
lights what the subject can do to actively improve their 
situation, through appropriate (i) ethical action and 
observing etiquette (li ) . . b 
Fi ure Four - Princi le is One but its Manifestations 
~RM 
"Principle is one but its manifestations are many" 
(li -i-fen-shu) is the key methodological concept and the ~ a 
ethical structure in Neo-Confucianism. Li (principle, ~ a 
reason) wss the major concept added by the Neo-Confucians 
to old Confucian doctrine (Chan, 1967a). 
Figure Four displays the relationship of ethics to 
maxims moving from general to particular. The investi- 
gator decided to add this figure after realizing the neces- 
sity to explain the difference between specific virtues 
and maxima. Jen (humanity) is the general virtue that 
precedes all the others. The creative (~shen ) drive for 
jen is sincerity (~ch'en ). Sincerity was considered to be 
the fundamental religious virtue by Alfred North Whitehead 
(1926/1954). The other ethics (li , i, chih , hsin ) are . b . . aa b 
GENERAL PARTICULAR 
VIRTUES ~en (humanity) chih (wisdom) 
li (propriety) 
i (etiquette) 
MAX IMS a manifestation of 
a virtue 
behavioral objective 
as opposed to a cogni- 
tive schemata 
specific suggestion 
instead of a general 
guideline 
Figure IV 
Principle is One but its Manifestations are Many 
(li -i-fen-shu) 
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specific, yet technically aspects of jen. 
The necessity of ethical conceptual structure was 
never questioned by the Confucian tradition. Many philos- 
ophies, notably Buddhism, seem to question the need and 
even the reality of such concepts. The Confucian system 
allows for organization of knowledge in a manner akin to 
cognitive schemata. 
Shu-hsien Liu (1972b) describes principles as giving 
general directions while maxims give specific suggestions. 
Maxims change with time and vary from culture to culture. 
The maxims compose much of the virtues' content and allow 
for their modification. Furthermore, a maxim is 
equivalent to a behavioral objective in psychology. 
Wang Yang-ming emphasized the importance of a sincere 
t' (~hn — ) t d th 't 1 (1' ) t ma' I . b 
in accordance with true propriety. If sincere intention 
is not possible for most of the community, then a social 
rule ought to be revised. Maladaptive habits can be 
changed in the same way for an individual. 
Fi ure Five - Co itive-Moral Develo ment in Neo- 
Confucianism 
The similarity between ethical development and 
moral epistemology is illustrated through their 
relation to the Four Qualities. The Four Qualities 
I 
Four Qualities Origination Flourishing Advantage Firmness 
Ethical 
Development 
ssu-tuans 
Four Beginnings 
te 
Virtue 
hsin 
faithfulness 
the 5th vir- 
tue 
Moral 
Epistemology 
((htang Yang-ming's 
4 Axiom Teaching) 
pen-t"i 
original 
condition 
~lian -chih* 
conscience 
can be identical 
to i, includes 
knpwledge of lio 
ko-wu 
rectifying 
affairs, g4 
investigating 
things 
necessary to 
develop i 
more inductive 
th o 111- hh''hh 
Figure U 
Cognitive-Moral Development in Neo-Confucianism 
Notes: ssu-tuan 
jen 
sympathy (1st) 
chih like/dislike 
li compliance 
1 shame 
intentionality g2 
~1- h'h 
defined as . . . ~i 
+ 
chih perception g3 a 
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(origination, flourishing, advantage, firmness) is a 
description of reality in 'Reflections on ~thin s at hand; 
a twelfth-century Neo-Confucian anthology compiled chiefly 
by Chu Hsi (Chan, 1967a). Reality itself is seen as a 
process of change moving toward completion or firmness 
through a dialectics of harmonization. The Four Qualities 
were discussed previously in the "Metaphysics of Will" 
section of the existential chapter. 
It may seem redundant for the researcher to classify 
concepts as "ethical development" and "moral epistemology. " 
Nevertheless, "moral epistemology" reflects the Confucian 
observation that knowledge has moral ramifications due 
to its application to concrete situations. 
Originations is clearly defined in both Confucian 
ethics and Neo-Confucian epistemology. The Four Beginnings 
(ssu-tuan) are the first signs of virtue. They are mani- 
fested through sympathy for someone in immediate danger, 
compliance with associates, the ability to distinguish and 
shame (Chan, 1967a). Moral epistemology is expressed 
through Wang Yang-ming's Four Axiom Teaching. The origi- 
1 d ~ lpe '-t't& f t1l 'nd (hs' ) ' t 
house of potential and logical priority (Cheng, 1979a). 
The Four Beginnings evolve into virtues (te ) and a 
show various stages of development between "flourishing" 
and "advantage. " Appropriateness (i) is probably the most 
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difficult virtue to embody, as it involves application of 
wisdom (chih ). wQKIn a framework of propriety (li ). L~f-hh('1, 'sdyldyd*lyi d ly t 
of the Third Axiom. It consists of yi (intentionality), 
the Second Axiom and chih (knowing). The ongoing decision 
t xtndcnc( (h'h l~f-hih) ' *c y f* b 
't flit ti*n. L~ch'hi lds h ldg cf 
etiquette (li ) and may be identical to appropriateness . b 
(i) (Cheng, 1972b). 
The skilled ability to rectify affairs or investigate 
things (ko-wu), the Fourth Axiom, exhibits one's wisdom 
at "Advantage". The "hit-and-miss" use of ko-wu in youth 
is similar to the cure of a depressive episode through its 
primarily inductive character. This phenomena was dis- 
cussed in Figure Two and Chapter Three. Adjusted people 
use ko-wu through schooling and in new situations, thus 
building an extensive self-concept. Firmness (hsin ) is b 
the final virtue to be manifested, as it is defined as 
consistently abiding by the other four virtues. 
Etymologically, firmness is composed of "man" and "word". 
Lian -chihl A Contribution to Ps cholo 
Perhaps the ultimate hope of interdisciplinary 
research is showing the applicability of the key concept, 
in the relatively unknown field to the familiar discipline. 
In many respects, this study has attempted to show the 
tl'ty f)~(-hh ( 'ac). fh a le 
la f' ~ln -shih *s " th' al o et d d ce' 
L~hth y b 'dg the g p b t b tt t d d 
and trial-by-error learning, 
Through the importance placed in authenticity and 
ial'ty. ~1' - h h de 1*p ' c t t 1th oth t 
fh otig *f ~la -hh f d ' th s -t (f 
b gi ing ) . L~f- h'h 1 e s th lf' f 1'ty 
de s — k ag. G p' g 1~oh'h *s ' 1 ght 
ce t'ly d the ' dl. 'dn 1 t at d ~1' n — h'h, 
a combining of theory and practice. The paradigmatic 
g tl (ch -t* ) e bod ~1'* — hih hil *1 'og 
a reachable ideal, a coping model seen by society. The 
ctt f'g d *bdth e f~1'an-hit* * 
of "avoiding, ending, and curing" emotional disturbance. 
Extendin Neo-Confucian Cones ts Throu h 
S thesis with Ps cholo 
At times, the researcher has felt a need to expend 
the meaning of Neo-Confucian conceptual terminology. A 
synthesis changes some of the concepts' original meaning. 
The constructs are not imaginary because they reflect 
empirical and intuitional observations and an absence 
of nihilism, An increase in the power of the concepts' 
explanatory capabilities was the goal of the procedure. 
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Principle (li ) needs to account for more than the true, ~ a 
good, and beautiful. A solid epistemology can not afford 
idealism. It is more parsimonious to accept the purpose 
of ko-wu (rectifying affairs) as revealing "true" and 
"false" li , as well as )yi (intention) with proper or ~ a 
faulty chih (perception) . The understanding of "true" 
and "false" (li ) is in itself true li , so the original 
meaning is preserved through its expansion. A single 
f'- e (tho ght) t e t e et d'fl tl'y th h- 
sence of some form of perception, either proper or faulty. 
The investigator has chosen to separate ko-wu (recti- 
fying affairs) from chih lian -chih (extending conscience) b 
more than the Sung-Ming Neo-Confucians did in their 
writings. Yet, ko-wu (investigating principle) remains 
d th d f l~h(h ( 'e ) ' the 
system of the researcher. Ko-wu is necessary when the 
self is at the boundaries of the known and unknown. 
Creative tension is seen in the use of reflection with 
immediacy to insure a principled spontaneity. Tech- 
nically speaking, ko-wu does serve to extend conscience 
(chih lian -chih) in the long run. However, the "spirit" 
f tel~hit e t* fl t "h '* *l, " 
through a self-confidence regarding situational ethics. 
Finding principles (li ) at the moment of action is a ~ a 
spontaneous unity of knowing, feeling, and willing. 
176 
Neo-Confucians Just Want to Have Fun 
The bottom line on a theory in psychology or 
philosophy should be "Does it help me have fun7" "Is it a 
fun way to look at life?" Neo-Confucians repeatedly 
wrote about the joy experienced through understanding and 
applying their philosophy. Who could forget Ch'eng I 
(1033-1107) stating that "unconsciously you will start 
dancing with your hands and feet" through an understand- 
ing of the Classics, Lu Hsiang-shan (1139-1193) stated 
"There is no greater delight than when reflecting upon 
ourselves to be conscious of sincerity, " (Ching, 1973, 
p. 30). 
Nivision (1973) quotes a statement Wang Yang-ming 
made to a young disciple who feared that a gentleman is 
full of sorrow because he is so serious. Wang replied 
"your anxiety about anxiety is like looking for a donkey 
while riding it. " Neo-Confucians did not advocate 
existential anxiety. Tu (1968) sees the fulfillment of 
desires within an ethical context as the meaning of 
k e-chi fu-li (subduing oneself and returning to pro- I b 
priety), Moreover, Neo-Confucian sages believed that 
somewhat wild eccentric individuals (k~uan ) were more 
likely to become good students than passive conformists (h~). P hp t ' t '* 1 I t h 
than will power. Wang himself was considered to be quite 
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wild (k~k'uan ) as a young man. He experimented with 
Taoism and Zen extensively (Ching, 1976). 
Part of Wang Yang-ming's ethical fulfillment of 
desires included preparing large banquets for his stu- 
dents. Wang invited over a hundred people to Pi-hsia 
Pond to celebrate the night of the Mid-Autumn Festival. 
Ching (1976) reports, "wine was served after which the 
guests enjoyed themselves by singing, beating drums, or 
boating" (p. 09) . Self-actualizing requires an authentic 
active social life, according to Neo-Confucian doctrine. 
The researcher hopes the reader had fun learning about 
Neo-Confucianism. 
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